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ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains three essays on topics in agricultural economics. The research is 
focused on the economic effects of different trade policies applied within the US, Canada 
and the European Union.  
 
Essay one evaluates the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the single EU 
common market. The degree of integration of these three countries in agricultural trade in 
the EU has not previously been evaluated. Trade theory suggests that one of the outcomes 
resulting from a regional trade agreement is increased market integration among markets 
in member states. The cointegration of the commodity prices across countries is tested 
using time-series techniques. This method is important as it can be applied to questions 
relating to globalization.  
 
Essay two examines the biofuel industry in Canada and US from a trade perspective. The 
development of a large market for biofuels is judged to have two main benefits for North 
America: environmental benefits in Canada and energy security in the US. A theoretical 
model is developed using the option value theory to determine whether the two distinct 
motivating factors can lead to different levels of optimal subsidies in each country. While 
the development of a biofuel industry is viewed as extremely important in a number of 
countries, the trade laws on subsidies with respect these products lacks clarity. This 
research represents an important step in understanding the economics of biofuels and the 
situations where trade disputes can be expected to appear in the future. 
 iii  
Dumping is the subject of the third essay where the strategies of firms in the face of an 
anti-dumping action are examined using game theory. The possibility of free riding in 
case of an anti-dumping petition is investigated in two situations: the benefits of the anti-
dumping case are considered either a public good or a joint product. The second situation 
can be applied only for US, because of so-called Byrd Amendment. The theoretical 
model developed represents an important contribution to trade policy and it can be easily 
applied when examining the effects of other trade or domestic policies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The first essay evaluates the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the single EU 
common market (they joined EU in the same year, 1995). The nature of market 
integration prior to and after accession is empirically investigated for a number of key 
agricultural products. Trade theory suggests that one of the outcomes resulting from a 
regional trade agreement is increased market integration among member states. Market 
integration then becomes a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to initiate the 
movement of resources from inefficient into efficient industries among those countries 
engaged in trade liberalization – the central process that brings economic gains from 
trade. If market integration does not arise, trade-liberalizing initiatives would not function 
as predicted. This essay addresses the following issues: 1) Are agricultural markets in 
these three new acceding countries integrated with those in the EU and among 
themselves? and 2) Is there evidence of market integration in the pre-EU and/or post-EU 
period? Price movements are studied for rye, soft wheat, barley, oats and potatoes. The 
products chosen for analysis differ with respect to their relative importance. For example, 
the first four products listed above are heavily supported by Common Agriculture Policy 
(CAP), while the fifth product (potatoes) is not. The EU offers an intervention price for 
rye, wheat and barley, while the exports of oats from Finland and Sweden are highly 
subsidized. The movement of commodity prices across countries is tested using time-
series techniques. Cointegration analysis consists of two steps; first, the cointegrating 
relationship is investigated to see if prices are related by a long-run relationship; second, 
to determine if two countries belong to the same market, an adjustment process to short-
run shocks must be investigated. The long-run relationship between the prices under 
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consideration is tested using the Johansen procedure, while the short-run dynamics of the 
prices is modeled using an error-correction model. We found that cointegration analysis 
can be applied to four of these products (rye, soft wheat, barley and oats). The prices of 
these commodities were highly cointegrated after the three countries joined the EU. Of 
the four markets tested, the rye and barley markets proved to be most tightly integrated 
with the German (EU) market, while the oats market was the least integrated. In the pre-
EU period, cointegration among prices was found for rye, soft wheat and barley between 
Austria and Germany. This method is important as it can be applied to questions relating 
to the globalization of markets as well as the efficacy of trade liberalization initiatives..  
 
The second essay examines the biofuel industry in Canada and US from a trade 
perspective. The development of a large market for biofuel is judged to have two main 
benefits for North America. The first is a reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) 
for Canada, while the U.S. is developing a biofuels industry to reduce dependence on 
imported oil from economically and politically volatile areas. The main disadvantage of 
using biofuels at the moment is its high cost relative to petroleum. Even at current 
petroleum prices, a biofuel market will not grow without being highly subsidized by 
governments. A theoretical model is developed using option value theory to determine 
whether the same governmental policy (subsidization) can lead to different levels of 
optimal subsidies in each country, where the subsidy policy is driven by two distinct 
motivating factors: energy security and environmental commitments. Note that if the 
level of subsidies for the development of biofuels industry in the two countries differs 
considerably, the likelihood of a trade dispute arising increases. The optimal biofuel 
subsidy in Canada is a function of price and quantity of biofuel consumed, and the 
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quantity of oil that is replaced by biofuel. In contrast, the US optimal biofuel subsidy is a 
function of the same parameters plus the price of oil. Based on our theoretical model, we 
conclude that the levels of the optimal subsidies would be different in general, save for 
two situations: first, when there is no demand for biofuels, in which case we concluded 
that the optimal subsidies would also be zero, and second, when the price of oil 
internalizes the externality which is produced by the consumption of oil. While the 
development of biofuel industry is viewed as extremely important in a number of 
countries, trade laws on subsidies with respect these products lacks of clarity. The 
primary problem regarding the biofuels is their definition and classification under WTO. 
Definition of the products is a central question. The rules for industrial products specified 
under the WTO Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (SCM) agreement set greater 
constraints on subsidy levels, while the rules for agricultural products specified under the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) place fewer constraints on subsidies. However, if 
biofuels were to be categorized as industrial products by the WTO and the current levels 
of subsidies continue in the industry and are administered in the same way, there exists 
considerable potential for trade disputes in the future. However, if biofuels were to be 
categorized as agricultural goods, trade disputes will be a function of whether the 
subsidies are included in the so-called “green box” or not. If they are included in the 
green box being used for environmental reasons, they will not be actionable or limited, so 
there will be no trade problems. In this case, there needs to be scientific evidence that 
environmental benefits are provided and, second, the industry is subsidized because the 
biofuels are not priced competitively. Further complications would arise if biofuels are 
considered environmental goods, energy goods or goods subsidized for national security 
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reasons. The importance of developing the biofuels market suggests a need to analyze the 
changes that should take place at the domestic and international level in this industry. 
This research represents a vital step in better understanding the economics of biofuels and 
the situations where trade disputes can be expected to appear in the future. 
 
Dumping is the subject of the third essay where the strategies of firms in the face of an 
anti-dumping action are examined using game theory. The possibility of free riding in 
case of an anti-dumping (AD) petition is investigated for two situations. First, the 
benefits of an anti-dumping case are considered to be a public good, meaning that all 
firms in the industry benefit from restricted trade while only the petitioners pay the costs. 
The AD benefits are non-rivalous when one firm’s consumption of a unit of benefits does 
not subtract from the consumption opportunities available to the other firms in the 
industry from the same unit. In fact, AD benefits are non-excludable as they are 
accessible to all firms in the industry and they cannot be provided just to the petitioners. 
In this case, it is expected that the free riding will be high. Secondly, the anti-dumping 
benefits are considered a joint product, a situation that can be applied only for US 
because of so-called Byrd Amendment. According to the Amendment, any duties 
assessed from an anti-dumping case will be shared among the firms that supported the 
original petitions. Therefore, the firm-specific benefits represent an incentive for firms to 
participate in the lobbying process, and, thus, the free rider problem would diminish. The 
theoretical model is a two-stage lobbying game of protection with heterogeneous firms, 
which is solved using backward induction. Thus, in the second stage, given the AD duty, 
the domestic and foreign firms set their output levels by playing a Cournot-Nash game. In 
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the first stage, the domestic firms play the non-cooperative lobbying game that 
determines the AD duty rate. Hence, in each stage, a Nash equilibrium is obtained for the 
specific sub-game. One of the main conclusions of this research is that before the Byrd 
Amendment was implemented, a petition was supported financially only by the minimum 
number of firms necessary to initiate a petition, while all the others would free ride. 
These firms are assumed to be the most efficient producers in the industry. After the 
enacment of the Byrd Agreement, free riding is reduced and for some of the fringe firms, 
the marginal private benefit would be high enough to represent an incentive to participate 
in the lobbying action. As well, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of domestic 
firms would lead to more free riding among the fringe firms. Thus, those fringe firms 
with marginal cost of production close to the petitioners’ marginal cost of production will 
find it beneficial not to free ride. The theoretical model developed represents an 
important contribution to trade policy and it can be easily applied when examining the 
effects of other trade or domestic policies that generate benefits that cannot be 
internalized to the individual initiating the trade action. This research also provides 
insights into what to expect from anti-dumping actions initiated in the US that are often 
faced by firms in Canada. 
 
 
 
 
 
 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAY 1: MARKET INTEGRATION: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE IN THE EU 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
One of the central ideas upon which the European Union (EU) was founded was that 
common economic policies would lead to the integration of spatially separated product 
markets. In particular, the principles of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) were 
designed to ensure that agricultural and food markets in Europe would become 
integrated. These principles supported free trade within the EU, and specified centralized 
budgets and common external tariffs. Even after accession to the EU, however, when 
formal barriers to trade in agricultural goods were removed, for many countries barriers 
to market integration remained. Among factors that might further impede market 
integration in the EU are the absence of arbitrage mechanisms among agricultural 
markets in the member states, along with barriers to efficient arbitrage (imperfect 
information, risk aversion) and imperfect competition in these markets (Zanias, 1993).  
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Stylized facts about trade tell us that one of the outcomes that should result from a 
regional trade agreement is increased market integration among the member states. 
Market integration then becomes a necessary, but not sufficient condition to ensure the 
movement of resources from inefficient into efficient industries among those countries 
engaged in trade liberalization. It is this movement of resources that provide the gains 
from trade. If market integration does not arise, trade-liberalizing initiatives cannot 
function as predicted (Moodley et al. 2000).  
 
Market integration can be measured in different ways, including the movement of goods 
or tracking investment flows (Moodley et al, 2000). In this paper, our definition of 
market integration is founded on the law of one price (LOP). Markets are considered 
spatially integrated for a specific good if there is a causal relationship among prices in 
different markets. An absolute version of LOP states that market prices will equalize 
between regions as long as transport costs, trade restrictions and other transaction costs 
are taken into account. 
 
Market integration captures a long-run relationship between spatially separated prices. 
Thus, even when prices temporarily deviate from each other in the short-run, they should 
still be consistent with the notion of an integrated market. A central concept in 
understanding market integration is spatial arbitrage: as price increases in one region, 
product will eventually be imported into that region from a region with lower prices. This 
creates a shortage in the exporting region, and, as a result, the good’s price increases in 
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the exporting region as well. Spatial arbitrage explains why prices of homogenous goods 
will track together in spatially separated markets. 
 
To date, most applied econometric trade studies have concentrated on testing market 
integration rather than adherence to the LOP. Considering LOP, we offer that prices of 
similar goods actually moving together across spatially distinct markets is a better 
indication of market integration than examining whether or not prices equalize across 
regions (Flacker and Goodwin, 2000).  
 
Figure 1.1 is based on barley prices for Germany and Finland for the period Jan 1995 – 
Dec 2004 and is an illustration of integrated market prices. Throughout the time period 
shown, prices in each market follow the same pattern.  
 
Figure 1.1 Example of integrated markets 
Figure 1 
Figure 2.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
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Conversely, Figure 1.2 is based on rye prices in Germany and Finland for the period Jan 
1975 – Dec 1994, and it is an example of non-integrated market prices. It is easy to see 
that the two price series in Figure 1.2 possess distinct patterns over the chosen time 
interval.  
 
Figure 1.2 Example of non- integrated markets 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
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1) Are agricultural markets in these three new acceding countries integrated with those in 
the EU?; and 2) Is there evidence of market integration in the pre-EU and/or post-EU 
period? The second part of this study will concentrate on the analysis of the acceding 
countries individually to determine if their agricultural markets were integrated with the 
other acceding countries in the pre-EU and/or post-EU period.  
 
Since there are several particular issues of policy that could impact price integration in 
the chosen markets, we expect some variation in our price cointegration results. In 
addition, the products chosen for analysis differ with respect to their relative importance. 
For instance, minimum price support is offered only for rye, wheat and barley, while 
exports of oats from Finland and Sweden are highly subsidized. The final product 
(potatoes) chosen for this analysis is not covered by CAP policies.  
 
A finding of price convergence for rye, soft wheat and barley markets after these 
countries joined the EU could be influenced by minimum price supports. Colman (1985) 
showed that common intervention prices might have helped market integration, but 
without efficient arbitrage, full market integration would not be possible as the 
transmission of price policy is necessarily imperfect. Alternatively, price convergence 
might be observed because these new EU members gained open access to the German 
market, the biggest producer of barley and rye in the EU.  
 
Finding non-convergence in prices for oats might be explained by the small traded 
quantities of this commodity within the EU. During the period of analysis, oats were used 
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primarily on farm for animal feed in the country of origin. Alternately, the emergence of 
Eastern European markets after 1989 created the possibility of new EU trade with these 
agricultural markets, and they are among the biggest producers of oats in the world. 
 
In summary, with respect to agricultural prices among these three acceding countries, if 
we find that they do not share a common long-run equilibrium over both periods, this 
situation could be explained by high price supports offered by governments in the pre-EU 
period, coupled with access to a set of larger and new markets subsequent to joining the 
EU.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II highlights the most important characteristics 
of the agri-food sector in the three countries that acceded to the EU in 1995 (Austria, Finland 
and Sweden). Section III reviews contributions to market integration and price 
transmission literature. Section IV describes the data used in the analysis along with the 
methodology, while the last section will present and describe the empirical results. The 
chapter ends with a series of concluding remarks.  
 
1.2 The EU Agricultural Sector 
The primary objective for creating a common agricultural market within the EU was to 
facilitate movement of goods and factors of production between EU member states. It 
was this idea of a common market that influenced the initial design of CAP. CAP was 
established in 1957 and it was focused on the development of a set of common policy 
instruments along with setting common prices (i.e. target, threshold and intervention 
prices). Common prices were set with respect to a common currency and this situation 
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influenced each member country in different ways, with specific effects depending on 
market exchange rates.  
 
Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCA’s) were introduced in the EU and became a 
means to tax or subsidize exports, compensating for currency fluctuations and facilitating 
agricultural trade among the EU countries (Zanias, 1993). MCA’s were used for more 
than twenty years and preserved protection levels in member states at previous exchange 
rates, thus impeding free trade and market integration. Even though they were supposed 
to be temporary measures, MCA’s became a source of conflict among the member 
countries. The MCAs were replaced by the European Currency Unit (ECU) in 1979 as 
part of the European Monetary system (EMS). The ECU represented a basket of the EC 
member countries’ currencies. It was mostly introduced to determine the 
overvaluation/undervaluation of individual currencies and, as well, it represented a unit 
of account for the central banks that were participating in the EMS. Even the ECU was an 
artificial denomination, its use in private commercial transactions developed rapidly as 
the ECU exchange rate was more stable than those of the currencies included in ECU 
(Plummer, 2006). The agricultural ECU was 14% more valuable than the ECU. However, 
in January 1999 the euro replaced the ECU on a one-for-one basis. This represented the 
first stage of the European Monetary Unification (EMU).  
 
Through the McSharry reforms of 1992, guaranteed agricultural prices were replaced 
with a new system of direct compensating payments for farmers, activated if prices fell 
below a certain level. The CAP was further reformed under Agenda 2000. These reforms 
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came into effect in March 2003 and production subsidies were replaced with a set of 
direct payments, linked with standards on food safety, animal rights and environmental 
concerns. The newest element of this latest reform is the introduction of the “Single Farm 
Payment”, which replaces a vast array of direct payment schemes. 
 
To date, there have been some difficulties associated with the accession process in the 
EU agricultural sector. These stem from differential levels of farm support along with 
particular regional circumstances, including extreme climate and geophysical conditions 
which characterize agriculture in some acceding countries. Austria, Finland and Sweden 
became full members of EU in 1995. 
 
Austria is one of the wealthiest European countries, with a highly developed economy 
possessing an important service sector (65% in 2002). Just 17% of 
Austria’s land is arable, a situation that motivates highly intensive forms of crop 
production. Agriculture, however, does not play a very important role in the economy, 
accounting only for 2% of GDP. As shown in Appendix A, Table 1.A.1, for the 
agricultural products considered in this analysis, rye accounts for the highest production 
in Austria as a percentage of production in EU-15. Traditionally, Austria is an agri-food 
importer, but in recent years its agri-food exports increased faster than its imports. The 
main trading partners for Austrian agri-food products are its EU neighbors. Germany is at 
the top of this list, accounting for 42% of Austrian imports and 35.9% of exports in 2003 
(Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2004). 
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Finland is the northernmost agricultural producer in the EU, and only 6% of the total land 
area is considered to be arable. The main crops produced in Finland are barley and oats 
(Appendix A, Table 1.A.2). Due to its climate, agriculture does not occupy an important 
role in the Finnish economy, contributing to about 3% of the GDP (Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada, 2004). The main trading partner for Finnish agri-food products is also 
Germany. 
 
Finally, Sweden is the third largest country by area in Western Europe, but only 6% of its 
land is arable. Crop production is dominant in central Sweden, with the main crops 
produced being cereals and fodder crops. As can be seen in Appendix A, Table 1.A.3, 
barley, wheat and oats represent the main crops produced in Sweden. Agriculture 
accounts for just 2% of GDP (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2004). The most 
important trading partners are EU countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Germany. 
 
The accession to the EU affected the agricultural sector of these three countries in 
different ways. Firstly, under the Accession Agreement, new members had to adjust their 
prices to EU levels. This adjustment caused a price drop of about 40 to 45 percent in the 
cereal, livestock and dairy sectors in Austria and Finland. The situation was different in 
Sweden, where agricultural support declined significantly after 1991 and the gap between 
domestic and international prices was smaller1. After accession, cereal prices in Sweden 
increased, dairy prices remained stable, while in the livestock sector prices decreased 
sharply. Secondly, as a result of lowered prices for agricultural products, farmers in the 
                                                 
1 Sweden reduced its agricultural support primarily through currency devaluation in this time period. 
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three new EU member countries faced increased competition from more efficient EU 
producers. 
 
1.3 Price transmission and market integration 
There is a considerable literature in international economics that examines market 
integration across countries by testing the law of one price (LOP) or absolute purchasing 
power parity (PPP) at an aggregate level2. The LOP is based on the idea of international 
commodity arbitrage in efficient markets, implying that each good has a single price 
expressed in a common currency throughout the world (Isard, 1977). PPP also implies 
that by aggregating all the goods, the overall price index between two countries should be 
the same, after conversion to the same currency. Many studies have shown that the 
behavior implied by LOP is not often observed.  
 
Ardeni (1989) showed that one of the shortcomings of earlier empirical studies in finding 
evidence that supports perfect arbitrage for commodity prices is the failure to consider 
the time-series properties of the analyzed variables (nonstationarity) and by the improper 
use of transformations on these variables (first differences). The failure of LOP in his 
study is explained by institutional factors, including cost of arbitrage, errors in data and in 
the definition of prices. 
 
Engel (1993) measures the variation in the price of the same good across countries and 
the variation of different goods within a country. He shows that the first type of variation, 
which rejects the LOP is usually larger than the second variation.  
                                                 
2 An early example can be found in Casel, 1918. 
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Engel and Rogers (1996) provided some explanations for deviations from LOP observed 
in the data. They showed that even the distance between markets could explain most of 
the variation in prices of similar goods in different areas, when considering two cities 
located in different countries, the variation of the prices is much higher than for two 
equidistant cities in the same country. They suggest this could be due to sticky nominal 
prices.   
 
Another large body of research has applied various quantitative techniques to measure 
market and price integration. Gordon et al. (1993) examined the nature of integration for 
the British and French lamb market during the period 1983-1986. To test for price 
integration, they employed a Holmes and Hutton causality test (Holmes and Hutton, 
1988) , a modified version of the Granger causality testing procedure (Granger, 1969). 
They reached the conclusion that the markets are integrated for the specified period, but 
the response of one price to the change in the other price was surprisingly slow. Slow 
adjustments in prices may be explained by non-tariff barriers, differences in product 
quality as well as uncertainty surrounding the final price received.  
 
Zanias (1993) tested the LOP using time series data on four agricultural products 
produced within the European Community. The products chosen (soft wheat, dairy milk, 
potatoes and pig carcasses) are very different in terms of product characteristics and the 
policy framework within which their markets operate. Zanias found that a single price 
existed in soft wheat markets, but suggested this was the result of minimum intervention 
prices and efficient arbitrage. With milk, the markets were not found to be integrated. 
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This result was explained by the importance of non-tariff barriers in milk markets and by 
imperfect competition in this industry. For potatoes and pig carcasses, the lack of 
consistent data series did not allow the inclusion of many countries, so among those 
included, the results differed from case to case.  
 
Diakosavvas (1995) examined market integration between Australian and U.S. beef 
prices at the farmgate level. He tested for cointegration and used a time-varying 
parameter estimation procedure with a Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960). This method is 
useful because it describes both the extent and timing of convergence. His cointegration 
analysis found that the two markets are cointegrated (although not fully), whereas the 
time-varying procedure indicated that the convergence between prices did not increase 
substantially over time. He concluded that Australian beef could not be adopted as a 
world price in empirical analysis.  
 
Moodley et al. (2000) evaluated the Canada-US Trade Agreement (CUSTA) from the 
perspective of market integration. Previous work indicated that markets in US and 
Canada were not integrated before CUSTA, so this empirical work addressed two basic 
questions - were these markets integrated, and was there evidence of market convergence 
after CUSTA? The latter could be interpreted as evidence that the trade agreement had 
critical effects on the product markets. The methodology they used was based on the 
Johansen maximum likelihood procedure (Johansen, 1988) using a Kalman filter. Their 
analysis found that a cointegrated price system existed after the introduction of CUSTA. 
Additionally, their approach showed that price convergence occurred before the 
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introduction of CUSTA, leading them to conclude that it was likely easier to ratify 
CUSTA given that many of the expected trade adjustments in these markets had already 
taken place.  
 
Subsequently, Mohanty and Langley (2003) examined grain (wheat and barley) price 
integration between the US and Canada, using cointegration analysis and an error 
correction model. They tested whether policy changes, such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) affected 
the degree of integration between these grain markets. They found that the markets are in 
fact integrated, and that the post-NAFTA and post-WGTA periods were characterized by 
improved market integration.  
 
A number of studies on market integration and price transmission (both spatially and 
vertically) have highlighted several factors that impede price transmission. For example, 
border and domestic policies in the form of price support mechanisms weaken the link 
between international and domestic markets. Different agricultural policy instruments as 
well as exchange rate policies hinder the full transmission of international price signals 
(Knetter, 1993). Other policies among the border measures are non-tariff barriers, which 
may have strong effects on the price transmission phenomenon (Zanias, 1993; Thompson 
et. al., 2002). 
 
Apart from policies, domestic markets can also be partly insulated by large marketing 
margins that arise due to high transport and transaction costs. This factor has strong 
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effects, especially in developing countries where poor infrastructure and transport 
services give rise to large marketing margins due to high costs of delivering traded 
commodities. High transfer costs hinder the transmission of price signals, as they may 
prevent or discourage arbitrage (Sexton, Kling and Carman, 1991; Badiane and Shively, 
1998). Market power can also hinder market integration, in the sense that the price 
differences between international and domestic prices may be higher than those 
determined by transfer costs alone (Dhar and Cotteril, 1998). This literature also 
concentrates on the extent to which changes in exchange rates facilitate price 
discrimination among destinations (Froot and Klemperer, 1989; Knetter, 1993). 
 
There is a large body of literature that tests the co-movement of prices using different 
econometric techniques. The latest advances in econometrics, including cointegration and 
error correction models became a standard tool in analyzing the spatial market 
integration. There are also criticisms regarding these time series methods: they are linear 
tests for market integration, while there can be non-linearities in market relationships 
driven by arbitrage conditions, discontinuous trade, unsynchronized price cycles and non-
stationary transfer costs (Blauch, 1997; Barret and Li, 2002). Even if there is some merit 
to the above criticism, as long as the framework tested is appropriate and the results are 
interpreted correctly, the time series analysis provides useful insights into co-movement 
of prices. Time series models have small data requirements (only prices) compared with 
other methodologies and they are important in signaling market failures and the direction 
and magnitude of welfare effects of different trade policies. Cointegration and error 
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correction models represent an analytical tool that helps testing the co-movement and 
completeness of adjustment and the dynamics of changes (speed of adjustment).  
Different methods were used in the literature to capture the non-linear price relationships. 
Goodwin and Pigot (2001) used an asymmetric, threshold autoregression and error 
correction model to evaluate the spatial price linkages among regional corn and soybean 
markets in North Carolina. Serra, Gil and Goodwin (2006) concentrated on a non-
parametric method to analyze price transmission in the EU pork markets during the time 
period 1994-2004. They compared the results obtained using a parametric technique 
(threshold model) with the results from a non-parametric technique (local polynomial 
model). Both methods showed that the EU pork markets are spatially integrated, however 
the non-parametric technique suggested a higher degree of price transmission. 
 
1.4 Description of the data and empirical methodology 
Empirical analysis is conducted for a few key agricultural commodities from Austria, 
Sweden and Finland. We study price movements in rye, soft wheat, barley, oats and 
potatoes.  
 
The first four products listed above are heavily supported by CAP, while the fifth product 
(potatoes) is not. Note that the EU is by far the largest single exporter of rye, with the 
vast majority of production coming from Germany. Rye production has become an 
important issue for EU policymakers, with the intervention price support being €101.31/t 
in 2001-2002 – the same as the intervention price for wheat and barley. The major 
exporters of barley are the EU, Russia and the Ukraine. Among the EU producers of 
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barley, most of the production comes from France, Germany and Spain. In Finland, 
barley and oats are the main crops produced, while in Sweden, cereal crops and fodder 
crops are the most important, with emphasis on barley, wheat and oats.  
 
Unlike the situation for wheat, barley and rye, the EU does not offer an intervention price 
nor maintain intervention stocks for oats. However, in recognition of the importance of 
the oats trade to Sweden and Finland, special provisions were made when they joined the 
EU for subsidies on their oats exports (as of 1997). We note that oats are still a very 
thinly traded commodity, being mostly used on farm for animal feed in their country of 
origin. However, human consumption is an important part of distribution in the UK, 
Germany and the US. Within the EU, Finland, Sweden and Germany are the main 
producers of oats and, in general, trade of oats is limited to intra-EU trade and exports 
from Finland and Sweden to the US (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004).  
 
The absolute producer price series comprise monthly data, collected for a period of thirty 
years, from 1975:1 – 2004:12. The data for 1975:1 – 1994:12 were obtained from the 
boards of agriculture in each country and were expressed in their respective national 
currencies. For the period 1995:1 – 2004:12, the data were extracted from Eurostat and 
were expressed in EUROS. The data were all converted to ECUs using the market 
exchange rates from Eurostat. One additional characteristic of the data is that from 
1999:1, Austria and Finland joined the monetary union, while Sweden kept its own 
currency. So starting with 1999:1, the prices in Austria and Finland are expressed in 
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EUROS at the fixed exchange rate, while the prices in Sweden are expressed using a 
flexible market exchange rate.  
 
Since the first question to be addressed is whether the three acceding countries’ markets 
and the EU market are integrated, a reference EU producer price should be used. As there 
is no dominant EU price, we chose German producer prices because Germany is the most 
important trading partner for the three countries. The producer price series for Germany 
are loaded from Eurostat and are expressed in ECU until 1995, and in EUROS after 1995.  
 
With producer prices ptaus, ptfin, ptsw and ptger for each agricultural product in the four 
countries under study, and with eaus, efin, and esw as the corresponding exchange rates, the 
following price series will be tested for cointegration:  
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Given that the data employed in the analysis are expressed in logarithms, the estimated 
parameters will be directly interpreted as “transmission elasticities”, for one price with 
respect to another. The cointegration of these commodity prices across countries will be 
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tested using time-series techniques. First, we pretest all variables to assess their order of 
integration. The data are plotted to see if a linear trend is present and, afterwards, a unit 
root test will be applied for both periods (1975:01-1994:12 and 1995:01-2004:12) to 
check if the variables are stationary. Cointegration analysis consists of two steps; first, 
the cointegrating relationship is investigated to see if prices are related by a long-run 
relationship; second, to determine if two countries belong to the same market, an 
adjustment process to short-run shocks must be investigated. 
 
Cointegration analysis (Engle and Granger, 1987) provides methods for dealing with 
nonstationary variables. If a linear combination of integrated variables is stationary, the 
variables are said to be co-integrated. This can be formally stated in the following 
manner: the components of the variable vector )x,...,x,x(x ntttt 21=  are cointegrated of 
order b,d  if all the components of tx  are integrated of order d  and there is a vector 
),...,,( nβββ=β 21 such that the linear combination ∑
=
β
n
i
iti x
1
is integrated of order bd − , 
where 0>b  (Enders, 2004). The cointegrated vector defines the long-run relationship 
among the nonstationary variables. Obviously, cointegration does not mean that the 
variables cannot deviate from the long-run equilibrium, but we expect that the deviations 
will be temporary and market forces will bring the variables to their cointegrated 
equilibrium.   
 
There are two established methods to test for cointegration. There is the well-known 
Engle and Granger (1987) methodology, which determines whether the residuals of the 
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equilibrium relationship are stationary, while the Johansen (1988) and Stock-Watson 
(1988) methodologies determine the number of the cointegrated vectors. For this 
analysis, the Johansen procedure will be used to determine if a long-run relationship 
between the prices under consideration exists.  
 
It is also well known that such results are quite sensitive to the lag length chosen. Most 
commonly, one estimates a vector autoregression using the undifferenced data, and then a 
number of tests (Akaike, Schwartz or Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria)3 allow the 
choice of the right lag length. The last two are preferred over Akaike because they 
penalize to a greater degree as more variables are introduced.  
 
Finding a cointegrated system does not exclude the possibility of observing short-run 
deviation of the individual series. The short-run dynamics of the prices can be modeled 
using an error-correction model. Vector autoregression (VAR)4 is commonly used for 
forecasting systems of interrelated time series. While a vector error correction (VEC) 
model is a restricted VAR that has cointegration restrictions built into the specification, 
the VEC specification restricts the long-run behavior of the endogenous variables to 
converge to their cointegrating relationships while allowing short-run dynamics.  
 
1.5 Empirical results 
The first step in estimation is to test whether the individual price series have unit roots. 
The existence of unit roots is evaluated using a Phillips-Perron test (Phillips and Perron, 
                                                 
3 See Akaike (1974,1976), Schwartz (1978) and Hannan-Quinn (1979) 
4 See Greene (2003) 
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1988). This test is non-parametric and it is considered more powerful as it is robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.  
The Phillips-Perron test is shown in Eq. (1.1): 
 
∑
=
−− ε+Δφ+γ+δ=Δ
l
j
tjitjittit ppp
1
1          (1.1) 
 
where Δ is the difference operator, δt can be either 0 or μ (intercept) or μ+βT (intercept 
plus time trend). The null hypothesis is that the series has unit root, where this is based on 
the significance of a γ t-statistic. The results of Phillips-Perron test are sensitive to the 
functional form chosen in Eq. (1.1) - the inclusion of a time trend and intercept being 
crucial. On the basis of our log-level series plots (see Appendix A, Figure 1.B.1-1.B.10), 
we will determine if a time trend is present in the data-generating process.  
 
For the sample period 1975:01-1994:12, a model with intercept and linear trend was 
assumed for rye, soft wheat, barley and oats in Austria, Finland and Sweden, while for 
potatoes we used a model without a linear trend. Even though the price series for the 
period 1995:01-2004:12 show a decreasing trend, a model without trend was assumed as 
we know that after joining the EU, the products were under CAP restrictions and these 
prices were not determined by market conditions. The same situation is applied for 
Germany for the whole sample, as Germany has been a long-time member of the EU. In 
addition, the plots in Appendix 1 show evidence of seasonality for rye, soft wheat, barley 
and oats in case of Austria for the period 1975:01-1994:12. So before our market 
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integration tests are performed, the series are adjusted for seasonality using the Census 
X12-ARIMA algorithm (US Census Bureau). 
 
Table 1.1 reports the results for unit root test in individual prices for the sample period 
1975:01-1994:12. In column three of Table 1.1, the Phillips-Perron statistic for each log-
level price series is reported.  
 
Table 1.1:Unit root results using Phillips-Perron test for the period 1975:01-1994:12 
                                             Phillips-Perron test statistics 
Product Variable Levels First difference 
PAUS 1.391938 -18.12459** 
PFIN -1.26604 -12.6864** 
PSW -0.968481 -13.06892** 
 
RYE 
PGER -1.89526 -9.90374** 
PAUS 1.999242 -17.39801** 
PFIN -0.85251 -13.9149** 
PSW -1.259256 -13.17305** 
 
SOFT WHEAT 
PGER -2.13023 -11.1439** 
PAUS -0.397064 -18.16899** 
PFIN -0.7355 -11.7298** 
PSW -1.145253 -12.91914** 
 
BARLEY 
PGER -2.03728 -8.52152** 
PAUS -0.115277 -16.95419** 
PFIN -0.67439 -12.4998** 
PSW -1.246490 -13.11995** 
 
OATS 
PGER -1.96146 -9.15561** 
PAUS -4.30075** - 
PFIN -4.01324** - 
PSW -5.78775** - 
 
POTATOES 
PGER -3.8403** - 
* (**) Indicates rejection of null hypothesis of nonstationarity or unit roots at 5% (1%) significance level. 
Critical value considering a trend is -3.428819 (-3.997083), while without a trend is -2.873492 (-
3.457747). 
PAUS=natural logarithm of Austrian product price 
PFIN=natural logarithm of Finnish product price 
PSW=natural logarithm of Swedish product price 
PGER=natural logarithm of German product price 
 
Save for the four potato price series, the null hypothesis of unit root is accepted. In 
column four of Table 1.1, the Phillips-Perron statistic is reported for the individual price 
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series in first differences. From this, we conclude that the prices of rye, soft wheat, barley 
and oats are integrated of order 1 (I(1)), while the prices for potatoes are integrated of 
order 0 (I(0)). For this sample period, cointegration analysis can be applied to rye, soft 
wheat, barley and oats. .  
 
The same stepwise procedure described above is applied for the price series for the period 
1995:01-2004:12. The results are reported in Table 1.2.  
 
Table 1.2 Unit root results using Phillips-Perron test for the period 1995:01-2004:12 
                                             Phillips-Perron test statistics 
Product Variable Levels First difference 
PAUS -2.059131 -12.14050** 
PFIN -1.371684 -12.54577** 
PSW -1.833217 -8.882729** 
 
RYE 
PGER -2.770590 -16.08212** 
PAUS -2.759568 -8.033900** 
PFIN -0.652043 -12.31182** 
PSW -2.303182 -10.05821** 
 
SOFT WHEAT 
PGER -2.330827 -6.707567** 
PAUS -1.934424 -9.004237** 
PFIN -1.360947 -10.58690** 
PSW -1.850434 -9.621257** 
 
BARLEY 
PGER -2.298978 -4.909118** 
PAUS -2.170823 -14.45530** 
PFIN -1.220573 -6.786966** 
PSW -0.852152 -10.27385** 
 
OATS 
PGER -1.764156 -10.09480** 
PAUS -2.933975* - 
PFIN   -3.852493** - 
PSW   -3.756979** - 
 
POTATOES 
PGER -2.608746 -5.730786** 
* (**) Indicates rejection of null hypothesis of nonstationarity or unit roots at 5% (1%) significance level. 
Critical value is -2.885863 (-3.486064). 
PAUS=natural logarithm of Austrian product price 
PFIN=natural logarithm of Finnish product price 
PSW=natural logarithm of Swedish product price 
PGER=natural logarithm of German product price 
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Once again, the price series for rye, soft wheat, barley and oats are integrated of order 1 
(I(1)), while the price series for potatoes are integrated of order 0 (I(0)). In this light, 
long-run relationships will be investigated and estimated for all the series that have been 
identified as integrated of the first order. 
 
Cointegration analysis cannot be applied in case of potatoes, as this method is useful only 
in models with non-stationary variables and, thus, there is no long-run convergence 
between potatoes’ prices. The movement of prices in case of potatoes can be analyzed 
using normal estimation techniques (regression).  
 
Next, we test whether nonstationary variables are cointegrated using the Johansen 
procedure. Johansen (1988, 1995) develops a maximum likelihood estimation procedure, 
which relies on the relationship between the rank of a matrix and its characteristics roots. 
In fact, the Johansen procedure has some advantages over the regression procedure of 
Engle and Granger. First, it does not assume that the cointegrated vector is unique and, 
second, it allows testing of restricted versions of the cointegrated vectors along with the 
speed of adjustment parameters.  
 
Consider first the univariate case: 
 
ttt yay ε+= −11                                                                                                   (1.2) 
 
Subtracting 1−ty from both sides yields 
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ttt y)a(y ε+−=Δ −11 1                (1.3) 
If  011 =−a , the process ty has a unit root. The process can be generalized to the 
multivariate case: 
 
ttt XAX Ε+= −11                                                                                                (1.4) 
 
where tX  and tΕ  are (nx1) vectors and 1A  is a (nxn) matrix of parameters. Subtracting 
1−tX  from both sides as in Eq. (1.3) yields 
 
ttttt XX)IA(X Ε+Π=Ε+−=Δ −− 111                                                             (1.5) 
 
where I  is (nxn) identity matrix and IA −=Π 1 . The rank of Π  shows us the number of 
cointegrating vectors. If the rank of Π  is zero, as in the univariate case, there is no 
stationary linear combination in X . Thus, the variables are not cointegrated. However, if 
the rank of Π  matrix is different than zero, at least one linear combination of the 
variables in X exists which is stationary.  
 
The multivariate model can also be generalized to account for higher-order 
autoregressive process. 
 
tptpttt XA...XAXAX Ε++++= −−− 2211                                                        (1.6) 
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Adding and subtracting 1+− ptp XA to the right-hand side of Eq. (1.6) yields 
 
tptpptppttt XAX)AA(...XAXAX Ε+Δ−++++= +−+−−−− 1112211               (1.7) 
 
Continuing the process of adding and subtracting terms, the result is 
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. As in Eq. (1.5), the rank of the matrix Π  
tells us the number of independent cointegrating vectors. The rank of the matrix Π  
equals the number of its characteristics roots different than zero. For a rank between 1 
and n, there are multiple cointegrating vectors.  
 
As the variables of interest are represented by prices, Eq. (1.2) is estimated using the 
Johansen method: 
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The optimal lag length is determined by minimizing the Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC) among the estimated VARs from 1 to 24 lags (Enders, 2004). However, for 
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samples of 100-200 observations, SIC and Hannah-Quinn Criterion perform almost 
equally well. As E-views5 reports the first difference lag order, in running the 
cointegration analysis the lag number will be reduced by one.  
 
The next step before proceeding with Johansen estimation is to determine the correct set 
of deterministic regressors in Eq. (1.9), as the cointegrating equations may have 
intercepts and deterministic trends. Choosing an option on constants and trends affects 
cointegration test results (by imposing inappropriate restrictions or loss of the power of 
the test by including irrelevant variables). 
 
Selecting appropriate options for trends and intercepts requires a careful evaluation of the 
type of variables in the model, examining plots of the data, and understanding what 
theory indicates about the model and the behavior of variables. With respect to the 
cointegration analysis of price series for sample period 1975:01-1994:12, we specified 
our series with linear trends and our cointegrating equations only with intercepts. For 
sample period 1995:01-2004:12, when the data do not have a deterministic trend, we test 
for the presence of an intercept in the cointegrating vector versus the alternative of an 
unrestricted drift term. The test for the presence of an intercept in the cointegrating vector 
is done by estimating the unrestricted and the restricted forms of the model in Eq. (1.9). 
The ordered characteristics roots of the unrestricted Π  matrix are denoted 
by n
^^^
,...,, λλλ 21 , while the characteristics roots of the restricted model by
*
n
^*^*^
,...,, λλλ 21 . 
                                                 
5 EViews is a software package that provides tools for data analysis, regression, and forecasting and it has 
an object-oriented design. 
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Assuming that the unrestricted form of the model (i.e. no intercept) has r nonzero 
characteristics roots, the test statistic 
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has a 2χ distribution with ( )rn − degrees of freedom, where n represents the number of 
variables (Enders, 2004). The null hypothesis, which is the presence of an intercept, is 
accepted for small values of the test statistic.  
 
In this analysis, the presence of an intercept is tested for those cases where the 
unrestricted form (i.e. no intercept) of the model has nonzero characteristics roots. The 
results are presented in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3 Test for the presence of an intercept in the cointegrating vector (1995:01-
2004:12) 
Product Cointegrating vectors Test statistic 
Chi-
square Conclusion 
  Restricteda Unrestrictedb    
PGER, PAUS  r=1 r=1 1.76 3.84 Intercept 
PGER, PFIN r=1 r=1 1.71 3.84 Intercept 
PGER, PSW r=1 r=1 2.28 3.84 Intercept RYE 
PAUS, PFIN, 
PSW 
r=0 r=1 (5%) 0.97 5.99 Intercept 
PGER, PAUS  r=0 r=1 (5%) 8.72 3.84 No intercept 
PGER, PFIN r=0 r=1 (5%) 0.93 3.84 Intercept 
PGER, PSW r=1 (5%) r=1 (5%) 7.28 3.84 No intercept 
SOFT 
WHEAT 
PAUS, PFIN, 
PSW 
r=1 (5%) 
r=0 (1%) 
r=2 (5%) 
r=1 (1%) 
0.63 
0.80 
3.84 
5.99 Intercept 
PGER, PAUS  r=1 r=1 (5%) 5.79 3.84 No intercept 
PGER, PFIN r=1 (5%) r=1 (5%) 5.63 3.84 No intercept 
PGER, PSW r=1 r=1 4.4 3.84 No intercept BARLEY 
PAUS, PFIN, 
PSW 
r=0 r=0 - - Intercept 
PGER, PAUS  
r=1 (5%) 
r=0 (1%) r=1 1.91 3.84 Intercept 
PGER, PFIN r=0 r=1 (5%) 3.43 3.84 Intercept 
PGER, PSW r=0 r=0 - - Intercept 
OATS 
PAUS, PFIN, 
PSW 
r=0 r=2 (5%) 0.17 3.84 Intercept 
a the model has an intercept 
b the model does not have an intercept 
 
As Table 1.3 shows, the null hypothesis of an intercept in the cointegrating vector is 
rejected in several cases. As the number of optimal lags and the correct deterministic 
regressors from Eq. (1.9) are determined, the cointegrating relationship is estimated using 
the Johansen procedure. It was shown by Johansen, that two procedures can be used to 
test for the number of significant vectors, r , the Trace test and the Maximum Eigenvalue 
test. The Trace statistic tests the null hypothesis that the number of distinct cointegrating 
vectors is less than or equal to r against a general alternative. 
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where i
^λ are the estimated characteristics roots (eigenvalues) obtained from the 
estimation of Π  matrix and T is the number of usable observations.  
 
The Maximum Eigenvalue statistic tests the null that the number of cointegrating vectors 
is r  against the alternative of 1+r  cointegrating vectors.  
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In case that the results of traceλ and maxλ  are in conflict, the result of maxλ would be 
preferred, as the statistic has a specific alternative hypothesis (Enders, 2004). The critical 
values for the trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics are reported by 
Osterwald-Lenum (1992). Johansen procedure treats all the variables included in Eq. 
(1.9) as endogenous, thus avoiding an arbitrary assumption of exogeneity. 
 
The cointegration analysis is conducted for both the pre- and post-EU periods in these 
countries (i.e. 1975:01 to 1994:12 and 1995:01 to 2004:12). Test results are listed in 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5.  
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Table 1.4 Johansen cointegration test for pre EU period 
 
Product 
 
Variables 
 
Null 
hypothesis 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
statistics 
 
Critical values 
 
Null 
hypothesis 
 
Trace 
statistics 
 
Critical values 
    5% 1%   5% 1% 
r = 0  14.32419*  14.07  18.63 r = 0  16.72869*  15.41  20.04 PGER; PAUS  r = 1  2.404502   3.76   6.65 r <1  2.404502   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  6.861240  14.07  18.63 r = 0  8.470600  15.41  20.04 PGER; PFIN  r = 1  1.609360   3.76   6.65 r <1  1.609360   3.76   6.65 
r = 0 6.780094  15.67  20.20 r = 0  9.381943  19.96  24.60 PGER; PSW  r = 1  2.601848   9.24  12.97 r <1  2.601848   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  16.76746  20.97  25.52 r = 0  24.13477  29.68  35.65 
r = 1  5.095585  14.07  18.63 r <1  7.367310  15.41  20.04 
RYE 
PAUS;PFIN; 
PSW r = 2  2.271725   3.76   6.65 r <2  2.271725   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  14.12487*  14.07  18.63 r = 0  16.17749*  15.41  20.04 PGER; PAUS  r = 1  2.052613   3.76   6.65 r <1  2.052613   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  9.201595  14.07  18.63 r = 0  12.34198  15.41  20.04 PGER; PFIN  r = 1  3.140382   3.76   6.65 r <1  3.140382   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  10.65503  15.67  20.20 r = 0  13.02903  19.96  24.60 PGER; PSW  r = 1  2.373999   9.24  12.97 r <1  2.373999   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  18.63476  20.97  25.52 r = 0  32.37041*  29.68  35.65 
r = 1  11.61126  14.07  18.63 r <1  13.73564  15.41  20.04 
SOFT 
WHEAT 
PAUS;PFIN; 
PSW r = 2  2.124388   3.76   6.65 r <2  2.124388   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  23.25085**  14.07  18.63 r = 0  26.47401**  15.41  20.04 PGER; PAUS  r = 1  3.223160   3.76   6.65 r <1  3.223160   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  9.127694  14.07  18.63 r = 0  11.97395  15.41  20.04 PGER; PFIN  r = 1  2.846252   3.76   6.65 r <1  2.846252   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  10.36354  15.67  20.20 r = 0  13.47736  19.96  24.60 PGER; PSW  r = 1  3.113817   9.24  12.97 r <1  3.113817   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  16.23317  20.97  25.52 r = 0  26.54422  29.68  35.65 
r = 1  8.905791  14.07  18.63 r <1  10.31104  15.41  20.04 
BARLEY 
PAUS;PFIN; 
PSW r = 2  1.405250   3.76   6.65 r <2  1.405250   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  13.56934  14.07  18.63 r = 0  15.89471*  15.41  20.04 PGER; PAUS  r = 1  2.325369   3.76   6.65 r <1  2.325369   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  7.417295  14.07  18.63 r = 0  10.31587  15.41  20.04 PGER; PFIN  r = 1  2.898573   3.76   6.65 r <1  2.898573   3.76   6.65 
r = 0  7.938016  15.67  20.20 r = 0  11.19545  19.96  24.60 PGER; PSW  r = 1  3.257434   9.24  12.97 r <1  3.257434   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  18.48395  20.97  25.52 r = 0  31.36059*  29.68  35.65 
r = 1  11.00145  14.07  18.63 r <1  12.87664  15.41  20.04 
OATS 
PAUS;PFIN; 
PSW r = 2  1.875190   3.76   6.65 r <2  1.875190   3.76   6.65 
*(**) indicates rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) significance level. 
PAUS=natural logarithm of Austrian product price 
PFIN=natural logarithm of Finnish product price 
PSW=natural logarithm of Swedish product price 
PGER=natural logarithm of German product price 
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Table 1.5  Johansen cointegration test for post EU period 
 
Product 
 
Variables 
 
Null hypothesis 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
statistics 
 
Critical values 
 
Null 
hypothesis 
 
Trace 
statistics 
 
Critical 
values 
    5% 1%   5% 1% 
r = 0  29.27685**  15.67  20.20 r = 0  31.67487**  19.96  24.60 PGER; PAUS  r = 1  2.398024   9.24  12.97 r <1  2.398024   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  27.35790**  15.67  20.20 r = 0  29.46642**  19.96  24.60 PGER; PFIN  r = 1  2.108525   9.24  12.97 r <1  2.108525   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  26.56315**  15.67  20.20 r = 0  29.62237**  19.96  24.60 PGER; PSW  r = 1  3.059219   9.24  12.97 r <1  3.059219   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  19.46638  22.00  26.81 r = 0  29.14376  34.91  41.07 
r = 1  8.171255  15.67  20.20 r <1  9.677386  19.96  24.60 
RYE 
PAUS;PFIN; 
PSW r = 2  1.506131   9.24  12.97 r <2  1.506131   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  11.92683*  11.44  15.69 r = 0  12.55025*  12.53  16.31 PGER; PAUS  r = 1  0.623417   3.84   6.51 r <1  0.623417   3.84   6.51 
r = 0  13.56540  15.67  20.20 r = 0  15.18045  19.96  24.60 PGER; PFIN  r = 1  1.615052   9.24  12.97 r <1  1.615052   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  15.25212*  11.44  15.69 r = 0  15.40898*  12.53  16.31 PGER; PSW  r = 1  0.156858   3.84   6.51 r <1  0.156858   3.84   6.51 
r = 0  26.04667*  22.00  26.81 r = 0  40.74322*  34.91  41.07 
r = 1  11.85768  15.67  20.20 r <1  14.69656  19.96  24.60 
SOFT 
WHEAT 
PAUS;PFIN; 
PSW r = 2  2.838877   9.24  12.97 r <2  2.838877   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  12.72486*  11.44  15.69 r = 0  13.39576*  12.53  16.31 PGER; PAUS  r = 1  0.670897   3.84   6.51 r <1  0.670897   3.84   6.51 
r = 0  14.75417*  11.44  15.69 r = 0  14.75501*  12.53  16.31 PGER; PFIN  r = 1  0.000832   3.84   6.51 r <1  0.000832   3.84   6.51 
r = 0  24.19633**  11.44  15.69 r = 0  24.49687**  12.53  16.31 PGER; PSW  r = 1  0.300541   3.84   6.51 r <1  0.300541   3.84   6.51 
r = 0  17.05145  22.00  26.81 r = 0  36.40928*  34.91  41.07 
r = 1  14.52906  15.67  20.20 r <1  19.35783  19.96  24.60 
BARLE
Y 
PAUS;PFIN; 
PSW r = 2  4.828767   9.24  12.97 r <2  4.828767   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  19.81510*  15.67  20.20 r = 0  22.68128*  19.96  24.60 PGER; PAUS  r = 1  2.866175   9.24  12.97 r <1  2.866175   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  11.74989  15.67  20.20 r = 0  15.57570  19.96  24.60 PGER; PFIN  r = 1  3.825813   9.24  12.97 r <1  3.825813   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  10.39560  15.67  20.20 r = 0  12.17894  19.96  24.60 PGER; PSW  r = 1  1.783334   9.24  12.97 r <1  1.783334   9.24  12.97 
r = 0  19.90930  22.00  26.81 r = 0  36.84807*  34.91  41.07 
r = 1  15.67184  15.67  20.20 r <1  16.93878  19.96  24.60 
OATS 
PAUS;PFIN; 
PSW r = 2  1.266940   9.24  12.97 r <2  1.266940   9.24  12.97 
*(**) indicates rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) significance level. 
PAUS=natural logarithm of Austrian product price 
PFIN=natural logarithm of Finnish product price 
PSW=natural logarithm of Swedish product price 
PGER=natural logarithm of German product price 
 
In particular, Tables 1.4 and 1.5 address questions germane to this chapter. First, with 
respect to cointegration between each new acceding country’s product price and prices in 
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Germany, both tests accepted the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors for the 
pre-EU sample period. The only exception was found with the price pair (PGER, PAUS) in 
the case of rye, soft wheat and barley. In these cases, the null was rejected, providing 
evidence that prices were cointegrated even before Austria joined the EU.  
 
For the post-EU period, the null of zero cointegrating vectors was rejected in many of the 
cases. The only cases for which cointegration was not observed were for the pair (PGER, 
PFIN) for soft wheat, along with price pairs (PGER, PFIN) and (PGER, PSW) for oats. These 
results are evidence of agricultural price cointegration after the three countries joined EU. 
With the exception of oats, where cointegration appears only in case of Austria, for the 
rest of the chosen products, producer prices in the three countries share a long-run 
relationship with the EU price (PGER). The convergence in prices might be also influenced 
by the operation at minimum intervention prices (Zanias, 1993), even the price support 
was reduced as a result of the MacSharry based reforms (Hubbard and Ritson, 1997) and 
Agenda 2000 (van Meijl, 2002) reforms.  
 
There still exists the possibility that producer prices in each country’s market deviate 
from the long-run equilibrium, but the deviations will be temporary. Short-run dynamics 
will be examined in the final segment of the analysis. 
 
We note that an interesting situation concerns cointegration results among the three 
acceding countries. The producer prices in these countries do not share a long-run 
equilibrium in two periods, and this is evidence of no market integration (except for soft 
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wheat in the post-EU period). This could be explained by the fact that producer prices in 
the three acceding countries were highly supported by government in the pre-EU period, 
meaning that prices were not the product of market forces. Being small agricultural 
markets, by joining the EU these countries suddenly had access to wider markets and the 
price discipline that this entailed. Consider also that each of these countries increased 
agricultural trade with former Eastern European countries around the time of their EU 
integration (Breuss, 2005). 
 
Provided that one or more cointegrating relationships exists, the final step of empirical 
work involves the estimation of a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model containing the 
cointegrating relationship(s) and lagged first differences of the variables in the 
cointegrating relationship(s).  
 
According to the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987), between 
two cointegrated variables, tx and ty , a valid error correction representation exists given 
by 
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where Δ  denotes the first-order time difference, the lag lengths 1,...,4i ,pi = are chosen 
such that )',( ttt 21 εε=ε are i.i.d.(independently and identically distributed).β  is the 
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cointegrating parameter and iα are the loading or speed of adjustment parameters. The 
second term in each equation represents the disequilibrium levels of ty and tx in the 
previous period.  
 
As the variables of interest in our case are represented by the prices, Eq. (1.13) would 
become 
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As we have shown before, itpΔ is stationary, thus the left hand side of Eq. (1.14) is I(0). 
To be able to estimate the model, the right-hand side of Eq. (1.14) should be I(0) as well. 
Given that itε is stationary and the lagged differences of prices are stationary as well, it 
follows that the linear combination 11 −− β− t,jt,i pp  must also be stationary and this takes 
place when the two prices are cointegrated with the cointegrating vector ),( β−1 . Hence, 
all the variables of the model are stationary and the normal estimation techniques will 
bring non-spurious results.  
 
Large values for the speed of adjustment parameters, iα , show that the response to the 
previous period’s deviation from long-run equilibrium is fast, while very small values 
show unresponsiveness of prices to last period’s equilibrium error. At least one of the 
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speed of adjustment parameters should be different than zero, otherwise there is no long-
run equilibrium relationship among prices.  
 
Tables 1.6-1.9 report the results of our error correction model estimates. The first rows 
show the normalized cointegrating vector parameters, while the last rows list the 
estimated speed of adjustment parameters. The cointegrating vectors are normalized with 
respect to the Austrian, Finnish or Swedish prices, as Germany represents the dominant 
agricultural market and it is unlikely that markets in Germany would react to price 
movements in these smaller markets. 
 
A key item to note here is that the lag structure of prices for all estimated models in the 
post-EU period is short, never exceeding a 1-month lag (in levels). This indicates that any 
deviations from long-run equilibrium in these markets are restored quickly by market 
forces (Gordon, Hannesson, Kerr, 2001). The estimated results for the other terms of 
error correction model in case of lag length greater than 0 are presented in Appendix C.  
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a) Rye market 
 
Table 1.6 Error correction estimates for rye: 1995:01-2004:12 
Cointegration Equations 
PAUS(-1)a  1.000000 PFIN(-1) 1.000000 PSW(-1) 1.000000 
PGER(-1) 
-1.093492* 
 (0.16146)b PGER(-1) 
-0.877316* 
(0.11076) PGER(-1) 
-0.914093* 
(0.11555) 
Constant 0.256788  (0.38347) Constant 
-0.560613* 
(0.26305) Constant 
-0.242092 
(0.27443) 
D(PGER)c D(PGER) D(PGER) 
0.265304* 
 (0.05546) 
0.351577* 
(0.08587) 
0.427597* 
(0.08029) 
D(PAUS) D(PFIN) D(PSW) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.119234* 
 (0.04737) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.068847* 
(0.02894) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.004842 
(0.03178) 
PAUS=natural logarithm of Austrian product price 
PFIN=natural logarithm of Finnish product price 
PSW=natural logarithm of Swedish product price 
PGER=natural logarithm of German product price 
a P(-1) = one period lagged price 
b Standard errors are in the parentheses  
c D(P) = first difference price 
* indicates statistical significance at 5% 
 
As the cointegration test showed, there is one cointegrating vector for each of the 
pairs )P,(P );P,P();P,P( SWGERFINGERAUSGER , so error correction estimation was 
applied only in these three cases. The optimal lag length used in the cointegration 
regression for rye market is zero in levels. 
 
The cointegrating regression of prices in Austria on prices in Germany (plus a constant) 
indicates that when prices in Germany rise by one percent, the corresponding Austrian 
price decreases by 1.09 percent in the long run. In case of each of (Germany, Finland) 
and (Germany, Sweden), results show that for a one percent increase in German price, the 
Finnish price decreases by 0.88 percent, while the Swedish price falls by 0.91 percent. 
One economic interpretation of the inclusion of the intercept term might be price 
 42  
differences between the time series in the long run, which may fully incorporate 
transportation costs.  
 
An important finding is the statistical significance of the error correction or speed of 
adjustment term in most of the cases. This suggests that the prices tend to always return 
to their long-run relationship from any deviations from their normal relationships. 
However, higher values for the speeds of adjustment parameters are observed for 
Germany in all three cointegration equations, meaning that the adjustment process is 
relatively fast with about 26%, 35% and, respectively, 43% of divergence from the long-
run equilibrium being corrected monthly. This result might be explained by the fact that 
Germany is the biggest producer of rye in EU as well as the biggest exporter, and, thus, 
the adjustment to the equilibrium level is obtained much faster. In case of Austria and 
Finland, the adjustment process is pretty slow with 12% and, respectively, 7% of 
divergence being corrected each month. The error correction term in case of Sweden is 
not statistically significant, meaning that the Swedish price is unresponsive to last 
period’s equilibrium error. One factor that might influence the result obtained in case of 
Sweden is the flexible exchange rate as Sweden did not join the Monetary Union together 
with the other two countries.  
 
In case of rye, the prices for (Germany, Austria) are also cointegrated before 1995. The 
results of our error correction estimation are presented in Table 1.C.1 in Appendix C. The 
long-run transmission elasticity implied in the cointegrated vector decreased from 2.39 in 
the pre-EU period to 1.09 in the post-EU period. This suggests market integration 
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decreased during the post-EU period. Conversely, the optimal lag length for the pre-EU 
model is 14, showing that the temporary deviations from the long-run equilibrium are 
restored more slowly in the pre-EU period than in the post-EU period. The same 
conclusion is apparent when we compare the speed of adjustment parameters in the two 
periods.  
 
Summarizing these findings, it is evident that rye prices in the EU and the three acceding 
countries are cointegrated, and these markets have a long run relationship. This result 
supports our supposition about an integrated European market for certain agricultural 
products. Examining the short run response to the long run equilibrium we can see that, 
in general, the adjustments are very quick.  
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b) Soft wheat market 
 
Table 1.7 Error correction estimates for soft wheat: 1995:01-2004:12 
Cointegration Equations 
PAUS(-1)a 1.000000 PSW(-1) 1.000000 PAUS(-1) 1.000000 
PFIN(-1) 
-0.689137* 
(0.22949) PGER(-1) 
 
-0.972424* 
(0.00623)b 
PGER(-1) 
 
-1.000682* 
(0.00552) PSW(-1) 
-0.472887* 
(0.19538) 
Constant - Constant - Constant  0.570488  (0.45386) 
D(PGER)c D(PGER) D(PAUS) 
   
0.114771* 
(0.05061) 
    0.139076* 
(0.05588) 
 -
0.135377* 
 (0.04856) 
D(PFIN) 
D(PAUS) D(PSW)  0.074235* 
(0.02358) 
D(PSW) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.087057 
(0.06020) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.068971 
(0.06117) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
 0.103298* 
(0.04864) 
PAUS=natural logarithm of Austrian product price 
PFIN=natural logarithm of Finnish product price 
PSW=natural logarithm of Swedish product price 
PGER=natural logarithm of German product price 
a P(-1) = one period lagged price 
b Standard errors are in the parentheses  
c D(P) = first difference price 
* indicates statistical significance at 5% 
 
Cointegration testing showed that there is one cointegrating vector in each of the price 
pairs )P ,P ,(P ),P,(P ),P,P( SWFINAUSSWGERAUSGER . The optimal lag length used in the 
cointegrating regression between prices in Germany and the two acceding countries for 
soft wheat is one in levels, while for the cointegrating regression among the three 
acceding countries, the chosen lag length is zero in levels. 
 
The normalized cointegrating vectors show that for a one percent increase in German 
price, the long run Austrian price will decrease by 0.97 percent and the long run Swedish 
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price by 1.00 percent.6 As the Finnish and Swedish price increase by one percent, the 
Austrian price, respectively, decreases by 0.69 and 0.47 percent.  
 
Tables 1.C.2 and 1.C.3 in Appendix C provide the results of vector error correction 
estimation for Germany-Austria and Germany-Sweden. The results using price in 
Germany as the dependent variable indicate that a one percent increase in prices in 
Austria and Sweden in the preceding period yield, respectively, an increase of 0.40 
percent and a decrease of 0.03 percent of the price level in Germany in the present period. 
However, the Swedish estimate is not statistically significant, so we conclude that the 
price in Germany reacts only to price changes in Austria that occurred in the previous 
time period. The speed of adjustment parameter estimates further imply that a deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium in Austria and in Sweden in the preceding time period was 
adjusted for, respectively, by 11 percent and 14 percent in Germany in the following 
period.  
 
Turning our attention to the results when Austrian and Swedish prices are used as 
dependant variables, we find that for a one percent increase in the German price in the 
preceding period, the Austrian price increased by 0.23 percent in the current period, while 
the Swedish price increased by 0.35 percent. In both equations, the speed of adjustment 
parameters are not statistically significant. Regarding the short-run relationship among 
Austria, Finland and Sweden, all adjustment parameters are statistically significant.  
 
                                                 
6 In case of Austria, Finland and Sweden, the cointegrating vector was normalized with respect to the 
Austrian price. 
 46  
We find that prices for soft wheat in Germany and Austria are cointegrated even before 
1995. The results of error correction estimation are presented in Table 1.C.4 in Appendix 
C. Long-run transmission elasticities decreased from 2.42 in the pre-EU period to 0.97 in 
the post-EU time period, indicating that integration decreased during the post-EU period. 
The optimal lag length for the pre-EU model is 13, which together with the speed of 
adjustment parameters, is evidence that the temporary deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium were restored more slowly in the pre-EU period than in the post-EU period.  
 
Summarizing the soft wheat results, there is evidence of market integration except for the 
Finnish market. When examining the short-run dynamics, the speed of adjustment 
increased in the post-EU period compared with the pre-EU period. For the pair of 
(Germany, Austria) there was evidence of market integration before Austria joined the 
EU, meaning that the prices were in the process of convergence prior to joining the EU 
(Moodley et.al., 2000). The results of the error correction model show that adjustment 
was faster in the post-EU period, while the level of market integration has decreased, 
meaning that even the long run equilibrium is restored slower in the post-EU time period, 
the short run adjustments are faster.  
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c) Barley 
 
Table 1.8  Error correction estimates for barley: 1995:01-2004:12 
Cointegration Equations 
PAUS(-1)a  1.000000 PFIN(-1) 1.000000 PSW(-1) 1.000000 
PGER(-1) 
-0.981450* 
 (0.00686)b PGER(-1) 
-1.046173* 
(0.00797) PGER(-1) 
-1.007382* 
(0.00447) 
D(PGER)c D(PGER) D(PGER) 
  0.063043 
 (0.05046) 
    0.147313* 
(0.03801) 
   
0.216457* 
(0.05133) 
D(PAUS) D(PFIN) D(PSW) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.109280 
 (0.05966) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.011666 
(0.02679) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.063640 
(0.04772) 
PAUS=natural logarithm of Austrian product price 
PFIN=natural logarithm of Finnish product price 
PSW=natural logarithm of Swedish product price 
PGER=natural logarithm of German product price 
a P(-1) = one period lagged price 
b Standard errors are in the parentheses  
c D(P) = first difference price 
* indicates statistical significance at 5% 
 
According to the Johansen test results, cointegration relationships for barley were found 
for the following price pairs )P,)(PP,(P ),P,P( SWGERFINGERAUSGER . The optimal lag 
length used in the error correction model for the barley market is unity in levels.  
 
The cointegrating vectors in Table 1.8 indicate that for a one percent increase in the 
German price, the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish prices decreased in the long-run by, 
respectively, 0.98, 1.05 and 1.01 percent. Tables 1.C.5, 1.C.6 and 1.C.7 from Appendix C 
show our estimates of the short-run parameters. Considering the equation where German 
price is the dependant variable, we find German prices did not react to price changes in 
Austria, Finland and Sweden - all the estimates are insignificant. The speed of adjustment 
parameter estimates imply that a deviation from the long-run equilibrium in Finland in 
the preceding time period is adjusted by 15 percent in Germany the following period, 
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while for a temporary price deviation in Sweden, the price in Germany is adjusted by 22 
percent in the next period. Germany does not react to short-run deviations in Austrian 
price, as the speed of adjustment is insignificant. Looking at the other short-run equation 
estimates, German price in a prior period influences barley prices in Austria, Finland and 
Sweden in the subsequent period, and the speed of adjustment parameters are all 
insignificant.  
 
In case of barley, prices for (Germany, Austria) were cointegrated even before Austria 
joined the EU in 1995. Error correction estimates are presented in Table 1.C.8 in 
Appendix C. Optimal lag length for the model is 2, and the speed of adjustment 
parameters as well as the long-run transmission elasticities show that even though the two 
markets were integrated before 1995, the degree of market integration did increase after 
Austria joined the EU.  
 
Summarizing these results for barley, prices are cointegrated in the post-EU period, and 
we interpret this as evidence of long-run equilibrium. With respect to the short-run 
dynamics, in general, there is no evidence of adjustment, as the parameter estimates are 
insignificant.  
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d) Oats 
 
Table 1.9 Error correction estimates for oats: 1995:01-2004:12 
Cointegration Equations 
PAUS(-1)a  1.000000 
PGER(-1) 
-1.091145* 
 (0.18899)b 
Constant  0.261235 (0.44067) 
D(PGER)c 
 0.051527 
 (0.04062) 
D(PAUS) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.198938* 
 (0.04808) 
PAUS=natural logarithm of Austrian product price 
PFIN=natural logarithm of Finnish product price 
PSW=natural logarithm of Swedish product price 
PGER=natural logarithm of German product price 
a P(-1) = one period lagged price 
b Standard errors are in the parentheses  
c D(P) = first difference price 
* indicates statistical significance at 5% 
 
In case of oats, there is only one cointegrating vector and that is for the pair of prices 
( AUSGER P ,P ). Note that the optimal lag length chosen for the oats market is zero in 
levels. The cointegrated vector shows that for a one percent change in the German price, 
the Austrian price decreased by 1.091 percent in the long-run. In turn, the speed of 
adjustment parameter estimates imply that a deviation from price equilibrium in Germany 
in the preceding time period is adjusted by 20 percent in Austria the following period, 
while Germany does not react to short-run deviations in Austrian price (speed of 
adjustment is insignificant). We conclude that the European market for oats did not 
become integrated with the inclusion of these countries into the EU. 
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1.6 Summary and conclusions 
The study of market integration is important with respect to evaluating the success of 
particular trade agreements. The process of price transmission from one market to 
another is central in understanding the extent of the integration of economic agents into 
the market process. Conversely, the absence of market integration has important 
implications for economic welfare. Incomplete price transmission arises from either trade 
barriers or other protectionist policies, or can be due simply to transaction costs such as 
poor transport and communication infrastructure. This results in a reduction in the price 
information available to economic agents and consequently can lead to decisions that 
contribute to economically inefficient outcomes. 
 
In theory, spatial price determination models suggest that if two markets are linked by 
trade in a free market regime, excess demand or supply shocks in one market will have an 
equal impact on price in both markets. In general, the existence of import tariffs allows 
price changes to be fully transmitted to other markets in relative terms. However, with a 
prohibitively high tariff, changes in one price would be only partly (if at all) transmitted 
to the other market. Furthermore, this price will likely be close to the autarky (no trade) 
price level and will prohibit all opportunities for spatial arbitrage. Regarding price 
support policies such as intervention mechanisms and floor prices, changes in one price 
will have no effect on the other market only when the price falls below that level at which 
the floor price has been set. However, any changes in the price above the floor price level 
will be transmitted to the other market. Apart from such policies, there are other factors 
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that can impede market integration, for example high transfer costs and non-competitive 
behavior.  
 
The primary objective for the formation of CAP was the integration of agricultural 
markets in this spatial sense. The Treaty of Rome from 1958 established that “The 
Common Market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products” (Article 
38) and eventually, all the barriers to trade between member states will be eliminated 
(Ritson, 1997). In turn, the two guiding principles of the Single European Market (SEM) 
are non-discrimination and mutual recognition. As mutual recognition proved to be 
insufficient, common harmonization directives were adopted. These were focused on 
health, safety, and environmental protection. Finally, an important obstacle for the 
existence of increased market integration is the insistence of some member states 
(especially the UK) on having national sovereignty over important macroeconomic 
matters (e.g. monetary policy, fiscal measures).  
 
The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union (EU) is assessed 
from the perspective of market integration in key agricultural sectors. The analysis 
addresses two important questions in this regard: 1) are the markets in these three new 
acceding countries integrated with those in the EU and 2) are the three markets integrated 
among each other? If we found market integration only in the post-EU period, this would 
represent strong evidence that the accession to the single market had an important effect 
on these agricultural goods markets.  
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Upon accession, the new members had to adopt EU laws and regulations, including 
agricultural policies and external tariff levels. Under the Accession Agreement, the new 
members were required to align their prices to EU levels and this adjustment led to a 
price drop of about 40 to 45 percent in the cereal, livestock and dairy sectors in Austria 
and Finland. The overall effect on the farm sector in Sweden was not as severe because 
Sweden had already reformed its agricultural sector in 1991-1992 by lowering prices and 
reducing subsidies. For Sweden, cereal prices increased and dairy prices remained stable, 
while prices in the livestock sector dropped sharply. On the other hand, many farmers in 
these new member states began to face competition from more efficient EU producers. 
These two factors led to reduced farm production and self-sufficiency in some key 
sectors, with increased dependence on outside suppliers. 
 
With this in mind, our empirical investigation examines a set of important agricultural 
products (rye, soft wheat, barley, oats and potatoes) for two time periods. The sub-
samples include the time from 1975:01-1994:12 (the pre-EU period) and 1995:01-
2004:12 (post-EU period). The existence of market integration both between the 
countries and within the EU is examined using time-series tests. Observing a long-run 
equilibrium between prices does not exclude the possibility of short-run deviations in the 
individual series. Thus, part of this analysis consists of estimating an error correction 
model to check for long-run impacts of price deviations.  
 
We found that cointegration analysis could be applied to four of these products (rye, soft 
wheat, barley and oats), while for a fifth product (potatoes) standard estimation 
 53  
techniques can be applied because this price variable was stationary. In turn, we found 
that the prices of these commodities were highly cointegrated after the three countries 
joined EU. Of the four markets tested, the rye and barley markets proved to be most 
tightly integrated with the German (EU) market, while the oats market was the least 
integrated.  
 
These results are somewhat unexpected, as all four products (except for potatoes) are 
under CAP support. A minimum price support is offered only for wheat, barley and rye, 
while exports of oats from Finland and Sweden are highly subsidized. Thus the observed 
convergence in prices for rye, soft wheat and barley might be influenced by operation at a 
minimum price, even thought this situation would not likely be observed without markets 
being linked through efficient arbitrage. On the other hand, oats are thinly traded and we 
might expect that efficient arbitrage does not take place. Since Germany is the biggest 
producer of barley and rye in the EU, after joining the EU, the three new members had 
full access to this large market. Alternately, access to markets in Eastern Europe after 
1989 was accompanied by asymmetric tariff liberalization with the Europe Agreements. 
This created new “emerging agricultural markets” in the immediate neighborhood, 
including Russia, Poland or the Ukraine, which are each among the biggest producers of 
oats in the world. 
 
In the pre-EU period, cointegration among prices was found for rye, soft wheat and 
barley between Austria and Germany. This can be explained by the fact that the two 
countries are actually neighboring countries with a reasonably open border and strong 
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transportation ties. Furthermore, oat production was not significant in any of the countries 
under consideration, and it appears that price arbitrage in this commodity does not take 
place. 
 
Even though the countries under study were part of the European Free Trade Agreement 
(EFTA) before joining EU, there was certainly no evidence of market integration for 
agricultural products in the pre-EU period. Based on our findings, we expect that the 
situation would be the same in case of the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEEC), which joined EU in 2004 (plus Romania and Bulgaria in 2007). However, the 
situation in these latter countries is different compared to our sample in three ways. 
Firstly, agriculture makes up a large share of employment - the two largest CEEC 
countries alone (Poland and Romania) contain almost half the agricultural area as the EU-
15. Secondly, CAP would clearly be applied in stages to the new members over a ten-
year period, rendering the transition as smooth as possible. Lastly, CAP itself will be 
reformed further as a result of World Trade Organization’s (WTO) liberalizing measures 
pertaining to agriculture.  
 
Given that the main objective of the EU was the establishment of an integrated market, it 
is quite surprising that the European agricultural markets have not received a great deal of 
attention in the literature. The results of a survey carried in the EU regarding the market 
integration for different consumer goods were that borders are still playing an important 
role in Europe and there are 15 separate markets for supermarket goods (European 
Commission, 2002). Finding convergence in prices for different European commodities 
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would represent strong evidence that the single EU market is functioning well, while non-
convergence in prices would send a signal to the policy makers that there are still barriers 
to trade among the EU countries.  
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APPENDIX A – PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES IN AUSTRIA, FINLAND AND SWEDEN 
 
Table 1.A.1 Production of agricultural commodities in Austria (1990-2005) as percentage of production in EU-15  
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
Table 1.A.2  Production of agricultural commodities in Finland (1990-2005) as percentage of production in EU-15  
FINLAND 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Cereals 2.18% 1.74% 1.43% 1.85% 1.93% 1.85% 2.06% 1.82% 1.30% 1.41% 1.89% 1.81% 1.84% 1.99% 1.58% 1.79% 
Soft wheat 
and spelt 0.77% 0.52% 0.27% 0.47% 0.44% 0.47% 0.55% 0.53% 0.42% 0.28% 0.56% 0.59% 0.60% 0.83% 0.78% 0.85% 
Rye and 
meslin 4.14% 0.56% 0.68% 1.33% 0.44% 0.93% 1.50% 0.78% 0.77% 0.43% 1.96% 1.01% 1.52% 2.23% 1.27% 0.96% 
Barley 3.09% 3.15% 2.82% 3.55% 4.26% 4.06% 3.53% 3.83% 2.55% 3.22% 3.86% 3.71% 3.62% 3.64% 3.32% 4.71% 
Oats and 
summer 
cereal 
mixture 
18.69% 14.70% 16.50% 16.18% 16.16% 17.63% 16.94% 17.30% 14.49% 15.47% 19.84% 19.68% 20.13% 18.07% 14.57% 19.84% 
Potatoes 1.79% 1.48% 1.32% 1.61% 1.73% 1.83% 1.52% 1.58% 1.37% 1.64% 1.62% 1.64% 1.69% 1.51% 1.30% 1.54% 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
AUSTRIA 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Cereals 2.68% 2.56% 2.39% 2.34% 2.52% 2.48% 2.62% 2.40% 2.24% 2.36% 2.08% 2.39% 2.22% 2.25% 2.32% 2.14% 
Soft wheat 
and spelt 1.64% 1.60% 1.62% 1.28% 1.57% 1.57% 1.44% 1.49% 1.35% 1.48% 1.33% 1.76% 1.47% 1.38% 1.62% 1.49% 
Rye and 
meslin 7.16% 7.44% 7.73% 6.83% 7.03% 5.28% 2.81% 3.48% 3.76% 4.05% 3.41% 3.47% 3.71% 4.33% 4.56% 4.67% 
Barley 2.73% 2.52% 2.85% 2.32% 2.72% 2.45% 2.06% 2.40% 2.35% 2.37% 1.66% 2.11% 1.79% 1.89% 1.94% 2.02% 
Oats and 
summer 
cereal 
mixture 
3.54% 3.68% 3.79% 3.17% 3.02% 3.09% 2.58% 3.24% 2.94% 2.93% 2.02% 2.37% 1.85% 2.10% 2.30% 2.48% 
Potatoes 1.61% 1.75% 1.45% 1.83% 1.42% 1.66% 1.53% 1.42% 1.50% 1.47% 1.43% 1.55% 1.48% 1.37% 1.45% 1.59% 
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Table 1.A.3 Production of agricultural commodities in Sweden (1990-2005) as percentage of production in EU-15  
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SWEDEN 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Cereals 3.29% 2.64% 2.05% 2.80% 2.42% 2.67% 3.32% 2.87% 2.64% 2.42% 2.62% 2.66% 2.55% 2.82% 2.41% 2.22% 
Soft wheat 
and spelt 2.76% 1.79% 1.79% 2.27% 1.74% 1.93% 2.45% 2.35% 2.38% 1.86% 2.51% 2.82% 2.24% 2.78% 2.40% 2.42% 
Rye and 
meslin 5.67% 3.27% 3.49% 4.87% 3.42% 3.33% 2.87% 2.28% 2.50% 2.12% 3.39% 2.85% 2.67% 3.62% 2.72% 3.02% 
Barley 3.81% 3.42% 2.67% 3.53% 3.81% 4.13% 4.01% 3.98% 3.27% 3.80% 3.18% 3.42% 3.70% 3.32% 3.26% 3.68% 
Oats and 
summer 
cereal 
mixture 
19.62% 20.22% 14.57% 18.32% 15.02% 15.87% 17.47% 18.72% 17.62% 17.41% 17.26% 15.64% 16.47% 16.30% 13.92% 13.49% 
Potatoes 2.77% 2.27% 2.47% 2.64% 2.53% 2.46% 2.38% 2.54% 2.77% 2.05% 2.02% 2.07% 1.98% 2.09% 2.05% 1.96% 
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APPENDIX B – AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES’ PRICES 
 
Figure 1.B.1 Log-level prices for rye. Sample: 1975:01-1994:12 
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Figure 1.B.2 Log-level prices for rye. Sample 1995:01-2004:12 
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Figure 1.B.3 Log-level prices for soft wheat. Sample: 1975:01-1994:12 
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Figure 1.B.4 Log-level prices for soft wheat. Sample: 1995:01-2004:12 
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Figure 1.B.3 Log-level prices for barley. Sample: 1975:01-1994:12 
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Figure 1.B.4 Log-level prices for barley. Sample: 1995:01-2004:12 
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Figure 1.B.5 Log-level prices for oats. Sample: 1975:01-1994:12 
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Figure 1.B.6 Log-level prices for oats. Sample: 1995:01-2004:12 
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Figure 1.B.7 Log-level prices for potatoes. Sample: 1975:01-1994:12 
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Figure 1.B.8 Log-level prices for potatoes. Sample: 1995:01-2004:12 
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APPENDIX C – VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION RESULTS 
 
Table 1.C.1  Vector Error Correction Estimates for rye (1975:01-1994:12) 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
LNAUSTRIA_SA(-1)  1.000000  
   
LNGERMANY(-1) -2.387617  
  (0.56146)  
 [-4.25249]  
   
C  3.656612  
Error Correction: D(PAUS) D(PGER)) 
Speed of adjustment -0.011612  0.012073 
  (0.00375)  (0.00737) 
 [-3.09888] [ 1.63745] 
   
D(PAUS(-1)) -0.126906  0.675871 
  (0.07041)  (0.13854) 
 [-1.80241] [ 4.87851] 
   
D(PAUS(-2)) -0.099763 -0.385448 
  (0.07279)  (0.14323) 
 [-1.37055] [-2.69118] 
   
D(PAUS(-3)) -0.058438 -0.074546 
  (0.06856)  (0.13491) 
 [-0.85231] [-0.55256] 
   
D(PAUS(-4)) -0.104268  0.120293 
  (0.06855)  (0.13489) 
 [-1.52102] [ 0.89181] 
   
D(PAUS(-5)) -0.150286 -0.005727 
  (0.06724)  (0.13231) 
 [-2.23500] [-0.04329] 
   
D(PAUS(-6)) -0.229130 -0.112938 
  (0.09506)  (0.18705) 
 [-2.41034] [-0.60379] 
   
D(PAUS(-7)) -0.123595 -0.032965 
  (0.09625)  (0.18940) 
 [-1.28404] [-0.17405] 
 64  
   
D(PAUS(-8))  0.017453  0.116843 
  (0.10118)  (0.19908) 
 [ 0.17250] [ 0.58692] 
   
D(PAUS(-9))  0.055998  0.225313 
  (0.10206)  (0.20082) 
 [ 0.54867] [ 1.12196] 
   
D(PAUS(-10)) -0.025946  0.071016 
  (0.10395)  (0.20453) 
 [-0.24961] [ 0.34722] 
   
D(PAUS(-11)) -0.217969  0.109319 
  (0.10630)  (0.20915) 
 [-2.05059] [ 0.52267] 
   
D(PAUS(-12))  0.556090  0.181020 
  (0.10910)  (0.21467) 
 [ 5.09712] [ 0.84325] 
   
D(PAUS(-13)) -0.035260  0.530963 
  (0.11422)  (0.22475) 
 [-0.30870] [ 2.36245] 
   
D(PGER(-1))  0.014111  0.467657 
  (0.03376)  (0.06642) 
 [ 0.41803] [ 7.04073] 
   
D(PGER(-2))  0.001134 -0.112275 
  (0.02742)  (0.05396) 
 [ 0.04134] [-2.08089] 
   
D(PGER(-3)) -0.011060  0.026159 
  (0.02742)  (0.05395) 
 [-0.40341] [ 0.48491] 
   
D(PGER(-4))  0.005033 -0.056608 
  (0.02745)  (0.05402) 
 [ 0.18334] [-1.04799] 
   
D(PGER(-5))  0.024471 -0.020859 
  (0.02911)  (0.05728) 
 [ 0.84061] [-0.36416] 
   
D(PGER(-6))  0.037602 -0.029301 
 65  
  (0.02928)  (0.05762) 
 [ 1.28407] [-0.50852] 
   
D(PGER(-7))  0.011365 -0.027965 
  (0.02931)  (0.05767) 
 [ 0.38777] [-0.48490] 
   
D(PGER(-8))  0.005972 -0.045203 
  (0.02923)  (0.05752) 
 [ 0.20430] [-0.78584] 
   
D(PGER(-9))  0.068548 -0.035023 
  (0.02922)  (0.05750) 
 [ 2.34564] [-0.60908] 
   
D(PGER(-10))  0.077384 -0.073441 
  (0.02958)  (0.05821) 
 [ 2.61595] [-1.26174] 
   
D(PGER(-11)) -0.137512  0.020725 
  (0.03007)  (0.05917) 
 [-4.57289] [ 0.35026] 
   
D(PGER(-12))  0.074316  0.670344 
  (0.03121)  (0.06140) 
 [ 2.38152] [ 10.9174] 
   
D(PGER(-13)) -0.033486 -0.299393 
  (0.03610)  (0.07104) 
 [-0.92747] [-4.21433] 
   
C  0.001015 -0.002104 
  (0.00079)  (0.00156) 
 [ 1.28394] [-1.35218] 
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Table 1.C.2 Vector Error Correction Estimates for soft wheat (1995:01-2004:12)
Error Correction: D(PAUS) D(PGER)) 
Speed of adjustment -0.087057  0.114771 
  (0.06020)  (0.05061) 
 [-1.44608] [ 2.26753] 
   
D(PAUS(-1))  0.222827  0.405043 
  (0.10163)  (0.08545) 
 [ 2.19250] [ 4.74026] 
   
D(PGER(-1))  0.233453  0.250344 
  (0.10119)  (0.08508) 
 [ 2.30705] [ 2.94255] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.C.3 Vector Error Correction Estimates for soft wheat (1995:01-2004:12)
Error Correction: D(PSW) D(PGER) 
Speed of adjustment -0.068971  0.139076 
  (0.06117)  (0.05588) 
 [-1.12755] [ 2.48886] 
   
D(PSW(-1)) -0.117207 -0.031205 
  (0.11109)  (0.10148) 
 [-1.05510] [-0.30750] 
   
D(PGER(-1))  0.349963  0.496069 
  (0.11294)  (0.10317) 
 [ 3.09879] [ 4.80829] 
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Table 1.C.4 Vector Error Correction Estimates for soft wheat (1975:01-1994:12)
 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
LNAUSTRIA_SA(-1)  1.000000  
   
LNGERMANY(-1) -2.416728  
  (0.54232)  
 [-4.45626]  
   
C  3.767258  
Error Correction: D(PAUS) D(PGER) 
Speed of adjustment -0.010627  0.014279 
  (0.00322)  (0.00949) 
 [-3.30275] [ 1.50536] 
   
D(PAUS(-1)) -0.178970  0.333223 
  (0.06675)  (0.19679) 
 [-2.68101] [ 1.69332] 
   
D(PAUS(-2)) -0.148675 -0.566570 
  (0.06773)  (0.19966) 
 [-2.19515] [-2.83769] 
   
D(PAUS(-3)) -0.098320 -0.500195 
  (0.06743)  (0.19879) 
 [-1.45801] [-2.51618] 
   
D(PAUS(-4)) -0.099454 -0.147368 
  (0.06469)  (0.19069) 
 [-1.53749] [-0.77282] 
   
D(PAUS(-5))  0.012428 -0.012874 
  (0.06455)  (0.19029) 
 [ 0.19253] [-0.06766] 
   
D(PAUS(-6))  0.114219  0.011183 
  (0.06597)  (0.19448) 
 [ 1.73133] [ 0.05750] 
   
D(PAUS(-7))  0.098130 -0.003978 
  (0.07258)  (0.21397) 
 [ 1.35198] [-0.01859] 
   
D(PAUS(-8))  0.042332  0.168170 
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  (0.08061)  (0.23763) 
 [ 0.52513] [ 0.70768] 
   
D(PAUS(-9))  0.024980  0.362271 
  (0.08052)  (0.23736) 
 [ 0.31024] [ 1.52625] 
   
D(PAUS(-10)) -0.108174  0.285960 
  (0.08041)  (0.23705) 
 [-1.34525] [ 1.20634] 
   
D(PAUS(-11)) -0.223024  0.325951 
  (0.08074)  (0.23803) 
 [-2.76209] [ 1.36938] 
   
D(PAUS(-12))  0.333601  0.161101 
  (0.08103)  (0.23887) 
 [ 4.11702] [ 0.67443] 
   
D(PGER(-1))  0.001347  0.157004 
  (0.01829)  (0.05392) 
 [ 0.07366] [ 2.91164] 
   
D(PGER(-2)) -0.014468 -0.038365 
  (0.01855)  (0.05468) 
 [-0.78005] [-0.70168] 
   
D(PGER(-3))  0.003364  0.011552 
  (0.01846)  (0.05443) 
 [ 0.18221] [ 0.21222] 
   
D(PGER(-4))  0.007926 -0.015719 
  (0.01833)  (0.05402) 
 [ 0.43250] [-0.29097] 
   
D(PGER(-5))  0.007313 -0.014779 
  (0.01861)  (0.05486) 
 [ 0.39297] [-0.26938] 
   
D(PGER(-6))  0.011278 -0.013131 
  (0.01866)  (0.05501) 
 [ 0.60440] [-0.23872] 
   
D(PGER(-7)) -0.001966 -0.005729 
  (0.01855)  (0.05470) 
 [-0.10598] [-0.10474] 
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D(PGER(-8)) -0.008374  0.000198 
  (0.01844)  (0.05435) 
 [-0.45414] [ 0.00364] 
   
D(PGER(-9))  0.063622 -0.034585 
  (0.01833)  (0.05402) 
 [ 3.47175] [-0.64020] 
   
D(PGER(-10))  0.068360 -0.042602 
  (0.01872)  (0.05517) 
 [ 3.65240] [-0.77213] 
   
D(PGER(-11)) -0.018444  0.013641 
  (0.01919)  (0.05657) 
 [-0.96106] [ 0.24111] 
   
D(PGER(-12))  0.029311  0.764172 
  (0.01875)  (0.05526) 
 [ 1.56354] [ 13.8278] 
   
C  0.000617 -0.001051 
  (0.00062)  (0.00182) 
 [ 1.00085] [-0.57812] 
 
 
 
Table 1.C.5 Vector Error Correction Estimates for barley (1995:01-2004:12) 
Error Correction: D(PGER) D(PAUS) 
Speed of adjustment   0.063043 -0.109280 
  (0.05046)  (0.05966) 
 [1.24928] [-1.83161] 
   
D(PGER(-1))  0.541971  0.305387 
  (0.10493)  (0.12406) 
 [ 5.16521] [ 2.46169] 
   
D(PAUS(-1))  0.050180 -0.001733 
  (0.09868)  (0.11667) 
 [ 0.50853] [-0.01485] 
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Table 1.C.6 Vector Error Correction Estimates for barley (1995:01-2004:12) 
Error Correction: D(PGER) D(PFIN) 
Speed of adjustment   0.147313  -0.011666 
  (0.03801)  (0.02679) 
   [3.87588] [ -0.43552] 
   
D(PGER(-1))  0.660829  0.529290 
  (0.08215)  (0.05790) 
 [ 8.04406] [ 9.14148] 
   
D(PFIN(-1)) -0.084987 -0.061421 
  (0.10442)  (0.07359) 
 [-0.81390] [-0.83459] 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.C.7 Vector Error Correction Estimates for barley (1995:01-2004:12) 
Error Correction: D(PGER) D(PSW) 
Speed of adjustment   0.216457  -0.063640 
  (0.05133)  (0.04772) 
   [4.21707]   [-1.33371] 
   
D(PGER(-1))  0.699600  0.431634 
  (0.08666)  (0.08056) 
 [ 8.07289] [ 5.35786] 
   
D(PSW(-1)) -0.105737 -0.124872 
  (0.09800)  (0.09110) 
 [-1.07899] [-1.37073] 
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Table 1.C.8 Vector Error Correction Estimates for barley (1975:01-1994:12) 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
PAUS(-1)  1.000000  
   
PGER(-1) -0.598883  
  (0.09587)  
 [-6.24692]  
   
C -1.423289  
D(P )Error Correction: D(PAUS) D(PGER) 
Speed of adjustment -0.037273  0.099145 
  (0.01036)  (0.02928) 
 [-3.59706] [ 3.38587] 
   
D(PAUS(-1)) -0.139047  0.226207 
  (0.06381)  (0.18032) 
 [-2.17907] [ 1.25448] 
   
D(PGER(-1)) -0.028750  0.494149 
  (0.02082)  (0.05884) 
 [-1.38071] [ 8.39783] 
   
C  0.000296 -6.57E-05 
  (0.00067)  (0.00188) 
 [ 0.44498] [-0.03490] 
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ESSAY 2: SUBSIDIZATION OF THE BIOFUEL 
INDUSTRY: SECURITY VS. CLEAN AIR? 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Today, countries face critical decisions regarding both climate change mitigation and 
energy security. Agriculture will likely play a role both in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) and dependence on imported oil from economically and politically 
volatile areas since a range of crops can be used as inputs for the production of substitute 
biofuels. In addition to these two main benefits, there is a hope that a vibrant biofuel 
industry will contribute to rural development by creating new markets for agricultural 
commodities, expanding employment in the rural sector and increasing farm income.  
 
In light of these developments, governments around the world are supporting the 
establishment of a biofuels industry. Biofuel production is expanding rapidly and it is at 
varying levels of development in different countries. In addition, governments heavily 
subsidize the industry since at the current level of industry development and historic 
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fossil fuel price levels, the cost of biofuels is still considerably greater than fossil fuel 
alternatives. In North America, the US and Canada possess very different motivations 
with respect to biofuel development. For the US, the key factor appears to be energy 
security, whereas within Canada increased use of biofuels is directly related to possible 
Kyoto commitments. Given these very different motivations, the optimal level of 
subsidies will likely be different in the two countries. This situation has the potential to 
create trade problems in the future. 
 
If we assume that subsidizing development of the biofuel industry in the present is 
equivalent to buying an option on its use for future objectives – energy security or 
reduced GHG emissions – an economic model can be developed to examine whether or 
not the same government policy (subsidization) will yield different results (different level 
of subsidies) if the option is based on different current objectives. The theoretical model 
will be developed using financial option value theory, while optimal levels of energy 
subsidy will be generated using numerical simulations in future research. The possibility 
of trade problems and trade disputes over this issue will also be analyzed within the 
framework of current international trade law.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section II, the characteristics of biofuel industry 
are presented with respect to the industries in Canada and US. In Section III, we conduct 
a brief literature review of option theory. The next section illustrates the results, followed 
by some potential empirical analysis. The paper will end with trade and policy 
implications and some concluding remarks. 
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2.2 Biofuels Market Characteristics 
It is important to summarize the main characteristics of the biofuels industry in North 
America as the markets are at different levels of development in the US and Canada. By 
outlining the uncertainties that characterize the two markets and the main motivations of 
each country in developing its market, our impetus in studying and applying the real 
option theory for determining the optimal levels of subsidies that the governments should 
use in stimulating the market’s development will be explained. Using data from the 
biofuels’ market, the real option models will be quantified in future research and 
conclusions will be drawn about the main trade conflicts pertaining to biofuels that will 
be likely to appear in the near future.  There are two primary types of biofuels: ethanol 
and biodiesel. Since production of biodiesel is currently far short of domestic 
requirements in both the US and Canada, this research will concentrate on ethanol 
market. 
 
2.2.1 Ethanol Market 
Fuel ethanol is a high octane, water-free alcohol produced from any biological feedstock 
that contains sugar, or any materials that can be converted into sugar (starch, cellulose). 
Most of the world’s ethanol is produced from sugar cane or sugar beets. Fuel ethanol can 
be used by itself as a fuel, but, normally, it is blended with gasoline in concentrations of 
5, 10 up to 85 percent (commonly known as gasohol). The most common blend contains 
10 percent ethanol (E10). Ethanol is obtained through two production processes: wet 
milling and dry milling. The difference between the two methods of production lies in the 
initial treatment of the grain. 
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The two main advantages of using ethanol are, first, that it reduces the dependence on 
imports of foreign oil and, second, it has environmental benefits, including reduction of 
greenhouse gases and ground level ozone (Table 2.1). Other secondary advantages of 
ethanol are that it is completely biodegradable. As well, being renewable, it helps to 
conserve resources. Finally, it could lead to the creation of new markets for agricultural 
commodities, helping rural development by creating new jobs in rural sector and by 
increasing farm income.  
 
Table 2.1 Emission reductions from ethanol blends 
Emission Low-level blends (E10) High-level blends (E85) 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 25-30% decrease 25-30% decrease 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 10% decrease up to 100% decrease 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) 5% increase/decrease up to 20% decrease 
Volatile Organic Carbons 
(VOC):   
Exhaust 7% decrease 30% or more decrease 
Evaporative - decrease 
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) and 
particulate matter Decrease significant decrease 
Aldehydes 30-50% increase (but negligible due to catalytic converter) - 
Aromatics (Benzene and 
Butadiene) Decrease more than 50% decrease 
Source: Canadian Renewable Fuels Association 
 
At present, the major disadvantage of ethanol is its high production cost. Without being 
highly subsidized, an ethanol market would not exist. Even with a high level of support 
from federal and state/provincial governments, the cost of ethanol is higher than the price 
of gasoline. Simply put, ethanol produced from a grain feedstock using conventional 
conversion processes is not likely to compete with gasoline unless world oil price rises 
considerably. Other secondary disadvantages are its high volatility - limiting its use in hot 
weather, that it has lower energy content per litre than gasoline and that it has the 
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potential to impair engine operation and generate corrosion in fuel system components in 
the case of phase separation7. 
 
There are varying estimates of the potential energy and GHG emissions impacts of 
ethanol. Assumptions pertaining to overall fuel production process efficiency, the type of 
process energy used, estimates of vehicle fuel economy, the types of GHG considered, 
the land use etc. differ (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2 Energy and GHG impacts of ethanol: estimates from corn and wheat to ethanol 
studies 
 Feedstock Ethanol 
production 
efficiency 
(litres/tone 
of feedstock) 
Fuel process 
energy 
efficiency 
(energy 
in/out) 
Well-to-wheels GHG emissions: 
compared to base (gasoline) 
vehicle (per km traveled)  
 Fraction of base 
vehicle 
% reduction 
GM/ANL, 2001 Corn 372.8 0.50 n/a n/a 
GM/ANL, 2001 Corn 417.6 0.55 n/a n/a 
Pimentel, 
2001/91 
Corn 384.8 1.65 1.30 -30% 
Levelton, 2000 Corn 470.0 0.67 0.62 38% 
Wang, 2001 Corn-dry 
mill 
387.7 0.54 0.68 32% 
Wang, 2001 Corn-wet 
mill 
372.8 0.57 0.75 25% 
Levy, 1993 Corn 367.1 0.85 0.67 33% 
Levy, 1993 Corn 366.4 0.95 0.70 30% 
Marland, 1991 Corn 372.8 0.78 0.79 21% 
Levington, 2000 Wheat 348.9 0.90 0.71 29% 
ETSU, 1996 Wheat 346.5 0.98 0.53 47% 
EC, 1994 Wheat 385.4 1.03 0.81 19% 
Levy, 1993 Wheat 349.0 0.81 0.68 32% 
Levy, 1993 Wheat 348.8 0.81 0.65 35% 
Source: IEA, 2004 
 
Niven (2005) reviews the literature on environmental impact of ethanol and he 
determined that E10 reduces GHG emissions only slightly, by 1% to 5%, when the 
                                                 
7 The phase separation can occur if excessive water is absorbed by ethanol. The result would be a mixture 
of alcohol and water in the bottom of a fuel tank.  
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complete fuel life-cycle is considered, including ethanol production, transportation and 
combustion. Even E10 is slightly more environmentally friendly than pure gasoline, its 
reduced energy content leads to increased consumption of fuel, which results in an 
overall increase in GHG emissions. He points out as well that the choice of feedstock 
does not have an important impact on emission reductions. However, for E20, the GHG 
emission reductions are between 2% and 11%, while for E85, the reduction is substantial 
from 19% to 70%. Niven’s (2005) review also suggests that ethanol production increases 
the risk of soil and groundwater contamination and the production of smog.  
 
The net energy value of ethanol (NEV) is calculated as “its fuel energy minus the energy 
used for its production and transportation” (Niven, 2005, 11). Thus, Niven (2005) 
presents the results regarding the NEV of different studies sourced mainly from the US 
and mostly for ethanol produced from corn (Figure 2.1). Several studies have suggested 
that the energy balance is negative, with an upward trend of NEV over time, which might 
be the result of different assumptions or an improvement in the ethanol manufacturing 
process over time. 
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Figure 2.1 Net energy value of ethanol as a percentage of its fuel energy, showing results 
of many studies 
 
Source: Niven, 2005 
 
Another study by Pimentel (2003) has concluded that it takes 29% more energy to 
produce a gallon of ethanol than the content of energy in one gallon of ethanol, without 
taking into account energy needed to transport the ethanol. Other conclusions of Pimentel 
(2003) are that corn based ethanol causes greater soil erosion than the ethanol produced 
from other crops, it requires more nitrogen than other crops, thus contributing to ground-
water contamination. A final criticism is related to the quantity of waste-water arising 
from the production of ethanol. However, the debate regarding the environmental 
benefits and energy balance of ethanol continues. Different assumptions, different crops, 
different researchers reach to different results.  
 
In the US, the primary feedstock for ethanol is corn. Currently, there are 95 commercial 
ethanol plants in the US and other 33 under construction, with most of them concentrated 
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in the Midwest states (Olfert and Weseen, 2007). Production of ethanol increased from 
175 millions gallons in 1980 to 3.5 billion gallons in 2004, 4.2 billion gallons in 2005 and 
4.8 billion gallons in 2006 (RFA, 2005a). The increase in production can be explained by 
the high level of support offered by the US federal and state governments for the 
development of the industry, as well as through the ban on the use of MTBE (methyl 
tertiary-butyl ether) as a gasoline additive in some states (California, New York and 
Connecticut) as of January 2004 (the federal ban of MTBE was postponed for 10 years). 
Through the Energy Policy Act of 2005, programs and policies were created that are 
intended to increase and diversify domestic energy production. The 2005 Act includes a 
renewable fuels standard (RFS) provision, which requires a minimum amount of 
renewable fuel each year. This starts at 4 billion gallons in 2006, reaching 7.5 billion 
gallons in 2012. After this time, the production of renewable fuel is expected to grow at 
roughly the same rate as gasoline production (Duffield and Collins, 2006). 
 
Currently, there is a federal tax exemption of 5.1 US cents per US gallon (1.34 US 
cents/litre) for ethanol/gasoline blends that are 10 percent ethanol. For lower ethanol 
blends, the tax exemption is reduced proportionally. Thus, the tax exemption for 1 US 
gallon of ethanol is 51 US cents (5.1 US cents per blended gallon). In 1998, the Federal 
tax exemption was 5.4 US cents per blended gallon and it was extended until 2008, but 
was reduced to 5.3 US cents per blended gallon in 2001, to 5.2 US cents in 2004 and 5.1 
US cents in 2005. The tax exemption of 5.1 US cents per blended gallon was 
subsequently extended until December 2010. In addition to the subsidies that the 
government provides for biofuels, producers are protected from foreign competition 
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through tariffs. Thus, the US ad valorem tariff is 2.5% of the product value plus 54 US 
cents per gallon as a secondary duty (RFA, 2005b).  The secondary duty is mostly 
targeted for the Brazilian imports of ethanol (Olfert and Weseen, 2007). 
 
In addition to the federal tax exemption, at least 30 states have decided to subsidize the 
ethanol industry in different ways. The incentive for ethanol production ranges from 5 US 
cents/gallon to 30 US cents/gallon. At least three states, Minnesota, Montana and Hawaii, 
have ethanol consumption mandates (Olfert and Weseen, 2007). Another method is to 
offer an exemption from gasoline taxes when a blended product is sold. Direct subsidies 
to the producers of ethanol are also used. In addition, some states provide low-interest 
loans and require government vehicles to use ethanol. However, it was estimated that the 
total subsidies for ethanol production in the US amount to US $2.5 billion per year 
(Olfert and Weseen, 2007). Differing reasons for providing subsidies to the ethanol 
industry are provided by state governments (i.e. rural development, supporting prices 
etc). These state level motivations differ from the principal rationale of the US 
government with respect to subsidizing the biofuels industry – energy security. 
 
In different periods of time, various arguments have been offered to justify federal 
subsidization of alternative fuels. In the early 1970s, oil price and supply shocks were 
held responsible (Klass, 1995). In the 1980s, the “farm crisis” provided another argument 
for the development and use of corn-based ethanol (Duncan, 2004). The 1990 Clean Air 
Act Amendments (CAAA90) gave ethanol another boost because it can be used as a 
clean-air additive. To reduce the amount of carbon monoxide being released into the 
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environment, the US Congress mandated the use of oxygenated fuels. The oxygen level 
from gasoline is increased if it is blended with methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) or 
with ethanol. While ethanol is more expensive than MTBE, the level of oxygen that is 
produced by ethanol in gasoline is twice the level of oxygen produced by MTBE. Thus, 
ethanol competes with MTBE for the wintertime oxygenate market. Recently, research 
has shown that MTBE can contaminate the ground water and, as a result, some states 
banned the use of MTBE. One problem is that most of the production of ethanol takes 
place in the US Midwest and the greatest use of oxygenated fuels is in the large 
metropolitan areas on the east and west coasts. Ethanol has to be transported by rail and 
blended at the location of use, which increases the costs of using it. Rask (1998) 
estimated the supply and demand for ethanol in the US for the period 1984-1993. He 
showed that without the high level of support from the government, high transport costs 
make ethanol less competitive in these clean-air markets. He concluded that US corn 
based ethanol will not play an important role as a clean-fuel.   
 
In this century, oil price shocks are again being used as an argument for the development 
of a steady supply of alternative fuels. It is well known that oil prices have been 
characterized by high volatility over the last 25 years. In this period, the price of crude oil 
increased considerably compared with the late 1990s. Crude oil prices have been between 
$22 and $28 per barrel for the OPEC basket price for most of 2003, reaching an average 
expected level of $27 per barrel in 2004 (Figure 2.2). However, in August 2005, the price 
of oil rose to over $60/barrel; during 2006 the price of oil was relatively stable, while in 
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early 2007 it had fallen to between $50 and $60/barrel, followed by an increase to 
$92/barrel in October 2007. 
 
Figure 2.2 Crude Oil Prices – 2004 dollars (1947-2004) 
 
US 1st Purchase Price (Wellhead)      “World Price” 
Source: WTRG Economics 
 
This behavior is the result of numerous unforeseen natural, economic and political 
events: a sudden decrease of the Venezuelan exports of oil because of the Chavez regime, 
internal conflict in Nigeria and the war in Iraq. Even if the first two situations that created 
the boom in prices are over, the crude oil price is not expected to decrease because of low 
oil inventories, increasing consumption in Asia and instability in Iraq (EIA). Some other 
reasons for the oil price increase starting in 2005 were North Korea’s missile launches, 
the crisis between Israel and Lebanon, the US concern about the Iranian nuclear energy 
and a decline in petroleum reserves.  
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Furthermore, increases in the price of oil are not typically a long-term phenomenon, 
because high real prices deter consumption of oil, increase the consumption of other 
energy sources and spur investments in finding new sources of fossil fuels.  
According to the US EIA, US dependency on foreign oil is estimated to grow from 62% 
in 2002 to more than 77% by 2025. Two thirds of the US petroleum demand was used in 
the transportation sector in 2002, and projections show that this percentage will increase. 
And while the domestic supply of oil in US currently follows a decreasing trend, imports 
are increasing. US oil reserves declined from 39 billion barrels in 1970 to 22.7 billion 
barrels at the end of 2002. Domestic oil production is estimated to decrease further from 
9.2 million barrels per day in 2002 to 8.6 million barrels per day in 2025, while oil 
consumption is expected to rise from 19.6 million barrels per day in 2002 to 28.3 million 
barrels per day in 2025. This decline of US oil reserves and the projected increases in US 
demand for oil make it difficult for the US to increase energy security by using domestic 
oil supply (US Department of Energy).  
 
Terrorist activity and political instability for some major world producers of oil are 
raising questions about the security of oil supply in the US. The US does not currently 
have any control over oil supply disruptions and oil price volatility. In order to keep a 
stable imported oil supply, the US relies on its diplomatic efforts and at times military 
actions. Political analysts have concluded that keeping an uninterrupted oil supply from 
the Persian Gulf, costs the US annually from $0.5 to $70 billion. To this amount, should 
be added the cost of the actual military action in the Persian Gulf: in 1990, the US 
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military action in Persian Gulf cost $61 billion not to mention significant loss of life (US 
Department of Energy).  
 
“President George W. Bush has stated, ‘…America cannot have homeland security 
without energy independence’” (Dinneen, B., RFA President)8. Reducing the 
transportation sector’s reliance on oil, in particular, and improving vehicle fuel efficiency 
using biofuels, would reduce the demand for imported oil (by an estimated 1.6 million 
barrels by 2012) and also energy dependency on a politically volatile part of the world 
(Renewable Fuel Association, 2004 – RFA). Thus, while biofuels cannot eliminate US oil 
dependence anytime soon, the increasing production of biofuels would reduce this 
dependence and improve national response to oil supply disruptions. 
 
In Canada, the development of the fuel ethanol industry has been far slower than in Brazil 
or the US. In Canada, ethanol is obtained from corn (73%), wheat (17%), barley (3%) 
and agricultural and forestry waste (7%). 
 
Canada is a net exporter of petroleum based fuels and, as a result, does not have an 
energy security motivation for promoting biofuels. The domestic production of oil 
increased from 1.8 million barrels per day in 1980 to 3.1 million barrels per day in 2004, 
while the consumption of oil increased from 1.9 million barrels per day in 1980 to 2.3 
million barrels per day in 2004. In 2004, Canada was the world’s seventh-largest oil 
producer and consumer (EIA). However, in 2006, the overall production of Canadian oil 
                                                 
8 “Small producer credit amendment sought in economic stimulus bill”, 
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/ereports/er102401.html 
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was about 1.2 gigabarrels, imports amounted 0.44 gigabarrels, consumption 0.8 
gigabarrels, while exports to the US were 0.84 gigabarrels. In January 2007, proven oil 
reserves in Canada were estimated at 179.2 gigabarrels, after the oil sands deposits in 
Alberta were recognized as oil reserves. Thus, Canada was placed second in proven 
reserves after Saudi Arabia, and the largest supplier of oil to the US. 
 
In December 2002, however, the Government of Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
Under Kyoto, Canada has agreed to a GHG emissions reduction target of 6 percent below 
1990 levels during the period 2008 to 2012. This means Canada was committed to reduce 
240 megatons of GHG emissions (Figure 2.3).   
 
Figure 2.3 Canada’s GHG emissions 
 
Source: Transport Canada (1999) 
 
To support the ratification decision, the Government of Canada released a report entitled 
“Climate Change Plan for Canada” as a framework for action. During 1997 -2002, the 
Government of Canada initiated a series of activities targeting the reduction of GHG 
emissions, including Action Plan 2000. Action Plan 2000 proposed to achieve 65 
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megatons GHG emissions reduction per year during the commitment period 2008-2012. 
Figure 2.4 outlines Canada’s GHG emissions converted to CO2 equivalents by sector. For 
instance, the transportation sector is expected to account for 10% of the total reduction 
(Government of Canada). The 2003 federal budget committed $2 billion to climate 
change, of which $1.3 billion was allocated to a series of concrete environmental policy 
measures to be implemented by the summer 2003.  
 
Figure 2.4 Kyoto Protocol implications transport sector GHG emissions projections: 
1990-2020 
 
Source: Transport Canada, 1999 
 
In order to reduce GHG emissions to the specified level, the government planned to 
increase the production and consumption of ethanol. Table 2.3 shows the production 
capacity for ethanol in Canada. 
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Table 2.3 Ethanol production in Canada 
Plant Name City Province Feedstock Capacity 
Permolex  Red Deer AB Wheat 40,000,000 L 
Husky Energy Lloydminster SK Wheat 130,000,000 L 
Terra Grain Fuels* Belle Plain SK Wheat 150,000,000 L 
Poundmaker Lanigan SK Wheat 12,000,000 L 
NorAmera Bioenergy Weyburn SK Wheat 25,000,000 L 
Husky Energy Minnedosa MB Wheat 10,000,000 L 
Husky Energy* Minnedosa MB Wheat 130,000,000 L 
Iogen  Ottawa ON Wheat Straw 2,000,000 L 
IGPC*  Aylmer ON Corn 150,000,000 L 
Greenfield Ethanol* Hensall ON Corn 200,000,000 L 
Greenfield Ethanol Tiverton ON Corn 26,000,000 L 
Greenfield Ethanol Chatham ON Corn 150,000,000 L 
Greenfield Ethanol* Johnstown ON Corn 200,000,000 L 
Greenfield Ethanol Varennes QC Corn 120,000,000 L 
Collingwood Ethanol* Collingwood ON Corn 50,000,000 L 
Suncor Energy St. Clair ON Corn 200,000,000 L 
* plant currently under construction    
Source: Canadian Renewable Fuels Association 
 
As can be seen, most of ethanol is produced in Ontario and Saskatchewan. On July 15, 
2002, the Saskatchewan’s Ethanol Fuel Act mandated the use of ethanol: starting with 
July 1, 2004, fuel volumes must contain 2.5% ethanol, reaching a percentage of 7.5 by 
April 2005 and the distributors must purchase 30% of ethanol from small plants. Further, 
in Manitoba the Biofuel Act mandates that by September 2005, 85% of the gasoline sold 
in the province should contain 10% ethanol (Berg, 2004).  
 
In terms of consumption, to reach the Kyoto commitments, E10 blends have to reach 
35% market penetration by 2010, which represents 1.33 bln litres per year. With 40% 
CO2 reduction from grain ethanol, this equals the replacement of 1.33 megatons of CO2, 
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which represents approximately 0.5% of the total reduction that Canada is committed to 
achieve (Berg, 2004).  
 
Even if ethanol production became more efficient over the years, it is still not likely to be 
price competitive with the gasoline without a high level of support from the federal and 
provincial governments. In 1991, the cost of producing ethanol dropped to 35% of the 
1980 level and, in 2000s, the price is in the range of $0.35-$0.45/litre (Figure 2.5).  
 
Figure 2.5 Ethanol production cost 
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Source: Climate Change Saskatchewan 
 
The federal government supports the development of the ethanol industry through a 
variety of measures (Climate Change Saskatchewan). These include R&D programs for 
market development of technologies; $0.10 CAD/litre tax exemption for the ethanol 
portion of blended gasoline; the use of ethanol by federal government vehicles and Future 
Fuels initiatives, with an increase of 750 million litres in Canada’s annual capacity to 
produce ethanol, yielding a 25% increase of Canada’s total gasoline supply containing 
10% ethanol. Another major initiative of the federal government is the Ethanol 
Expansion Program (EEP) that was initiated in August 2003. The EEP program supports 
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the development of the ethanol industry in different ways: $140 million as contingent 
loan guarantees, $100 million as direct financing to production facilities, $3 million for 
public awareness and mandated usage (Klein et al, 2004). The federal government 
encouraged farmers’ participation in ethanol production with $200 million under the 
Capital Formation Assistance Program and it invested in R&D $145 million under the 
Agricultural Bioproducts Innovation Program, both initiated in 2006. Also, the 2007 
Federal Budget allocated $2 billion over 7 years to support biofuels production, while the 
2008 Federal Budget gave $10 million over 2 years for R&D on biofuels emissions. 
Except the support for the producers, the federal government implemented a consumption 
mandate of 5% renewable content (ethanol) by 2010.  
 
Provincial support in Canada depends on the goals of each province. For instance, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba are interested in developing their rural economies, while 
British Columbia wants to stimulate the production of cellulose-based ethanol using 
forest wastes. Alberta, on the other hand, has shown little interest in the ethanol industry 
due to the size of the provincial conventional reserves (Klein et al, 2004). Thus, not all 
Canadian provinces have reductions of GHG emissions as an objective for providing 
support to the biofuel industry. Except for the fuel tax exemptions at the provincial level 
outlined in Table 2.4, provincial governments support the development of the industry 
through mandated usage regulations and financial contributions for ethanol start-ups. 
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Table 2.4 Tax exemption for fuel ethanol by province 
Govt. Provincial fuel tax exemptions 
(cents/litre) 
Eligibility for the 
subsidy 
Duration 
 
AB 
 
9.0 
No restriction on 
ethanol source 
5 years after the start-up 
of an ethanol 
production plant 
 
BC 
 
14.5 
For E85 to E100 and E5 
to E25. Ethanol must be 
produced in BC 
- 
ON 14.7 No restriction on 
ethanol source 
Until 2010 
 
SK 
 
15.0 
Ethanol must be 
produced and consumed 
in SK 
5 years 
QC 16 to 20 (under project) Ethanol must be 
produced in QC 
1999-2012 
 
 
MN 
20.0 until Aug. 2007 
15.0, Sept. 2007-Aug. 2010 
10.0, Sept. 2010-Aug. 2013 
(also, 1.5 cents/litre excise tax 
reduction for gasoline blended 
with 10% MN-made ethanol) 
Ethanol must be 
produced and consumed 
in MN 
No duration specified 
Federal 10.0 No restriction on 
ethanol source 
No duration specified 
Source: Klein et al, 2004 
 
The development of the ethanol market in Canada is still impeded by important 
interprovincial barriers to trade that are the result of provincially competitive programs. 
For example, the only ethanol plant in AB would export almost all its production to the 
US, as SK’s tax exemption applies only to ethanol produced and consumed in SK. On the 
other side, SK’s ethanol is sold in AB, as AB does not have any restriction on the ethanol 
source. The only two provinces that do not have any restriction on the source of ethanol 
are AB and ON, but this might change if they would follow the example of the other 
provinces that protect their industry. At the national level, domestic producers are 
protected against the ethanol imports by a tariff of 19 US cents per gallon (RFA, 2005b). 
 
However, in 2006, the new conservative government realized that Canada is not able to 
respect its Kyoto commitments and, in fact, Canada’s GHG emissions are nearly 33% 
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above 1990 levels. In absolute terms, Canada emits approximately 747 Mt CO2 per year 
and the Kyoto commitment would see this capped at 596Mt (Environment Canada, 
2007). 
 
Figure 2.6 The gap between Canada's greenhouse gas emissions and its Kyoto target is 
growing 
 
Source: Office of the Auditor General of Canada 
 
Thus, the government came up with a “made-in-Canada” approach to reduce emissions (2 
billion over 5 years), which includes Canada’s Clean Air Act (CCAA). CCAA proposes 
changes to three existing federal acts: Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), 
which includes regulations related to indoor and outdoor air pollutants and GHG; it 
establishes, monitors and reports air quality objectives; regulates the blending of fuels, 
which represents a step towards meeting the 5% renewable fuel content in motor fuels by 
2010; Energy Efficiency Act (EEA), under which energy efficiency standards and 
labeling requirements are set for a wide range of consumer and commercial products; and 
Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act, under which the government sets 
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mandatory fuel consumption standards. The CCAA does not have short-term 
commitments, but the long-term one is an absolute reduction in GHG between 45-65% 
from 2003 levels by 2050. 
 
In sum, the basic arguments used to justify a high level of governmental support for the 
development of an ethanol market in Canada are, first of all, environmental targets that 
need to be reach and, second, rural development and the need for new markets for 
agricultural products.  
 
2.3 Investment strategies and real options 
Under certainty, there is no option value. Thus, a decision to invest can be made based on 
a simple Net Present Value (NPV) rule - invest when the present discounted value of the 
investment is greater than or equal to the investment cost. Traditional valuation methods 
in capital budgeting, as NPV and other discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques, are 
developed based on value maximization in a world without uncertainty and flexibility.  
 
In reality, however, investment decisions have three important characteristics that fall 
outside the applicability of DCF (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Investments are often 
partially or completely irreversible - the cost of investment is partially sunk; investments 
are often undertaken under uncertainty over the future rewards; and investments can 
typically be postponed to get more information. The latter means that even a project with 
a negative NPV can be valuable as long as the investment can be postponed and new 
favorable information can arrive.  
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2.3.1 Real options and financial options 
By definition, a financial option gives the owner the right, but not the obligation to sell 
(put option) or to purchase (call option) a security at a specified price (strike price) during 
a specified period of time. The seminal work of Black and Scholes (1973) first analyzed 
the valuation of financial options. The Black-Scholes formula prices an European put or 
call option (meaning the option can be exercised only on the expiration date) on a stock 
that does not pay a dividend, and Black-Scholes assumes that the stock price follows a 
geometric Brownian motion9 with constant volatility. One other important assumption of 
this model is that the underlying asset is tradable, allowing for the use of risk-neutral 
valuation.   
 
Subsequent research has shown that the same basic definition of an option can be applied 
to other situations that do not involve the use of a financial asset. Thus, a firm that has the 
opportunity to invest holds an option, which is similar to a financial option. It possesses 
the right, but does not have an obligation to buy or sell an asset at some future time. 
When firms make an irreversible investment, they give up the possibility of waiting for 
new information, which might affect the desirability and timing of the expenditure. This 
lost option is an opportunity cost that should be included in the cost of investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
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Figure 2.7 Mapping an Investment Opportunity onto a Call Option 
    Investment Opportunity            Variable                      Call Option 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Luehrman, T.A. (1998) 
 
Such non-financial options are called “real options”, stressing the strong link with 
financial options (Figure 2.7). The value of a real option increases as the stock price (S), 
time to expiration (t), risk-free rate of return (rf) and variance of returns (σ2) increase, and 
the exercise price (X) decreases.  
 
As discounted-cash-flow (DCF) approaches (e.g. NPV) applied in investment projects 
cannot capture the value of management having the flexibility to revise decisions 
according to the changes and uncertainty that characterize the marketplace, returns from 
the projects will most probably differ from what management expected. As new 
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information arrives, management should be able to adapt to the conditions and to react 
accordingly to minimize losses, so managerial flexibility in this manner is very important 
in an investment. Trigeorgis (1993) defines managerial flexibility as a collection of real 
options - the option to defer, to abandon, to contract, to expand or to switch the 
investment.  
 
Table 2.5 describes the most common categories of encountered real options and the 
industries for which they have been found useful. 
 
Table 2.5 Common Real Options  
Category Description Important in 
Option to defer 
Management holds a lease on (or 
an option to buy) valuable land or 
resources. It can wait (x years) to 
see if output prices justify 
constructing a building or plant, 
or developing a field. 
All natural resource extraction 
industries; real estate 
development; farming; paper 
products. 
Time to build option 
(staged investment) 
Staging investment as a series of 
outlays creates the option to 
abandon the enterprise in 
midstream if new information is 
unfavorable. Each stage can be 
viewed as an option on the value 
of subsequent stages, and valued 
as a compound option.  
All R&D intensive industries, 
especially pharmaceuticals; long-
development capital-intensive 
projects, e.g., large-scale 
construction or energy-generating 
plants; start-up ventures. 
Option to alter operating 
scale (e.g., to expand; to 
contract; to shut-down and 
restart) 
If market conditions are more 
favorable than expected, the firm 
can expand the scale of 
production or accelerate resource 
utilization. Conversely, if 
conditions are less favorable than 
expected, it can reduce the scale 
of operations. In extreme cases, 
production may temporarily halt 
and start up again.  
Natural resource industries such 
as mine operations; facilities 
planning and construction in 
cyclical industries; fashion 
apparel; consumer goods; 
commercial real estate. 
Option to abandon 
If market conditions decline 
severely, management can 
abandon current operations 
permanently and realize the resale 
value of capital equipment and 
other assets in secondhand 
markets. 
Capital intensive industries, such 
as airlines and railroads; financial 
services; new product 
introductions in uncertain 
markets. 
 If prices or demand change, Output shifts: 
 95
 
 
 
 
Option to switch (e.g., 
outputs or inputs) 
management can change the 
output mix of the facility 
(“product” flexibility). 
Alternatively, the same outputs 
can be produced using different 
types of inputs (“process” 
flexibility). 
any good sought in small batches 
or subject to volatile demand, 
e.g., consumer electronics; toys; 
specialty paper; machine parts; 
autos. 
Input shifts: 
all feedstock-dependent facilities, 
e.g., oil; electric power; 
chemicals; crop switching; 
sourcing. 
Growth options 
An early investment (e.g., R&D, 
lease on undeveloped land or oil 
reserves, strategic acquisition, 
information 
network/infrastructure) is a 
prerequisite or link in a chain of 
interrelated projects, opening up 
future growth opportunities (e.g., 
new generation product or 
process, oil reserves, access to 
new market, strengthening of 
core capabilities). Like 
interproject compound options.  
All infrastructure-based or 
strategic industries, especially 
high-tech, R&D, or industries 
with multiple product generations 
or applications (e.g., computers, 
pharmaceutical); multinational 
operations; strategic acquisitions. 
Multiple interacting options 
Real-life projects often involve a 
“collection” of various options, 
both upward-potential enhancing 
calls and downward-protection 
put options present in 
combination. Their combined 
option value may differ from the 
sum of separate option values, 
i.e., they interact. They may also 
interact with financial flexibility 
options.  
Real-life projects in most 
industries discussed above. 
Source: Trigeorgis (2001) 
 
Most of the literature focuses on the boundaries between real options applications and the 
NPV method. For investment choices characterized by high uncertainty and 
irreversibility, real options valuation provides a better characterization of the investment 
decision than an NPV calculation as the former takes into account the possibility of 
delaying the investment (Figure 2.8). 
 
Less literature concentrates on the boundaries between real options applications and path-
dependent investments. According to Adner and Levinthal (2004), activities can be 
 96
characterized as real option processes only when the target market and the technical 
agenda are fixed. Otherwise, investments fit more the characteristics of path-dependent 
processes such as probe and learn, incremental search and innovation journeys.  
 
Figure 2.8 Boundaries of applicability for Net Present Value and Real Options 
 
Source: Adner and Levinthal (2004) 
 
Therefore, a real option application would characterize situations where all the 
opportunities are fixed a priori, before the project begins and, thus, the possibility to 
abandon the investment is clearly articulated (Figure 2.9). The possibility of 
abandonment gives the investment’s flexibility. Thus, as the abandonment decision is less 
clearly defined, the flexibility of the investment is less valid. The authors consider that 
the project abandonment is more complicated by the organizational resource allocation 
and by the different incentives stakeholders have at different levels of organization.  
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On the other side, McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow (2004) consider that there is no 
advantage in differentiating the path-dependent and the real option investments and, in 
fact, they are complementary processes. They take into account four definitions of real 
option: option value as a component of the firm’s total value; an investment proposal 
with optionlike characteristics; choices that may fit different proposals; and options used 
as strategies. This is the first criticism that their paper brings to Adner and Levinthal’s 
(2004) research, which concentrates only on one definition of real options: a project in 
isolation from the other firm’s resources. 
 
Figure 2.9 Boundaries for applicability for Real Options and Path-Dependent 
Opportunities 
 
Source: Adner and Levinthal (2004) 
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However, the main difference between the two papers is that McGrath, Ferrier and 
Mendelow (2004) consider that a project’s flexibility is given by other characteristics 
(and not only by the choice of abandoning the project), such as “changing scale or 
designing for different latter usage” (p. 90). By specifying the abandonment criteria a 
priori, it is considered that knowledge does not evolve and there is no learning. Also, 
flexibility involves the consideration of different courses of action, one of which can be 
exit as well, but not a specification in advance of success or failure. One other important 
distinction between the two papers is that Adner and Levinthal (2004) consider that 
endogenous to the firm’s uncertainty, which is called by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
“technical uncertainty”, creates the pressure to invest and not to wait for new 
information, and, thus, it should not be treated as a real option process. On the other side, 
McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow (2004) outline the fact that both conditions, “wait and 
see”, which characterizes exogenous uncertainty, and “act and see”, which shows 
endogenous uncertainty, are determinants of the economic outcomes and are important 
for the development of the real options.  
 
2.3.2 Literature review 
Option value theory has led to a rich literature pertaining to empirical applications that 
analyze investment opportunities. The method has been utilized in a number of studies of 
the environment and in agriculture. Purvis et al (1995) examined the adoption of free-stall 
dairy housing for Texas producers, using stochastic milk production and feed costs. 
Khanna et al (2000) studied the adoption of site-specific crop management under 
stochastic output prices and expectations of declining fixed costs of the equipment, while 
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Isik (2004) analyzed the impact of the uncertainty in cost-share subsidy policies on the 
adoption of site-specific technologies. With respect to energy policy, Hasset and Metcalf 
(1995) analyzed residential energy investments considering that the energy prices follow 
a Brownian motion, while Millock and Nauges (2004) estimate an option value model on 
a firms’ actual abatement choice, with the major uncertainty facing the firm being the 
future energy price.  
 
The investment problem studied here can be included in a category of real options 
referred to by Trigeorgis (2001) as a time to build option (staged investment). This is 
important for R&D intensive industries and long-development capital-intensive projects. 
The development of a new market (e.g. biofuel market) has the following three 
characteristics: 1) decisions and cash outlays take place sequentially over time; 2) there is 
a maximum rate of investment; and 3) there are no returns until the project is completed 
(Majd and Pindyck, 1987). 
 
This work builds on several related studies in the real options literature. Roberts and 
Weitzman (1981) constructed a model of a “sequential development project” (SDP) 
which has the same features outlined above. By their definition, the project can be 
stopped in any stage and as the investment takes place, the cost of completing the project 
and its uncertainty (variance) are reduced. These authors derive an optimal sequential 
decision rule for R&D or exploration projects and they show that even if NPV is 
negative, the investor should go ahead with the first stages of the project. Weitzman, 
Newey and Rabin (1981) apply the sequential methodology to examine whether the 
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development of liquid synthetic fuels from the coal market should be subsidized by the 
US government. McDonald and Siegel (1986) considered a basic model of irreversible 
investment with two stochastic variables, each of which evolves in geometric Brownian 
motion - the sunk cost and the value of the project. Their results show that the optimal 
investment in this case is reached by waiting until the benefits are twice the investment 
cost. 
 
Grossman and Shapiro (1986) studied optimal dynamic R&D investments considering 
that the total effort to reach a payoff is unknown. Their work concentrates more on the 
rate of investment rather than the decision to invest or not, considering that the rate of 
progress is a concave function of effort. They model the uncertainty in returns as a 
Poisson process with the arrival rate as a function of the cumulative effort expended. 
They find that when uncertainty is introduced in the model, firms prefer risky projects 
rather than the safe ones when both have the same level of expected cost of effort. 
 
Majd and Pindyck (1987) determine an optimal investment rule for a sequential 
investment, when a firm can invest at a maximum rate, and the value of the project 
follows geometric Brownian motion. An important characteristic of their model is that 
expenditure flow can be adjusted as new information arrives. They show that the largest 
effects of time to build appear when uncertainty is very high, the opportunity cost of 
delay is high and when the maximum rate of investment is low.  
 
 101
Emery and McKenzie (1996) evaluated the subsidy granted to the Canadian Pacific 
Railway (CPR) from an “ex ante” perspective. They considered that the “ex post” studies 
which concluded that the subsidy was too large are limited by ignoring the uncertainty 
that existed at that time. They employed a real option approach to see the importance of 
timing in “once-and-for-all” investment decisions in an uncertain environment. They 
concluded that the “ex-ante” value of the subsidy is lower than the required level that it is 
necessary to compensate the company for forgoing its investment options and, also, the 
value of the subsidy is lower as the income stream becomes riskier.  
 
Finally, Schwartz and Moon (2000) analyzed investment in R&D (the development of a 
new drug) considering three sources of uncertainty - uncertainty about investment cost, 
future payoffs and the possibility that a catastrophic event can stop the project. Their 
findings describe not only the value of the project, but also the optimal values for the 
state variables at which the investment should proceed.  
 
The study that has inspired this research is “Investments of uncertain cost” by Robert S. 
Pindick in 1993. Pindyck (1993) exploited the same idea as in Majd and Pindyck (1987) 
with the exception that the cost of completing the project is uncertain as opposed to the 
value of the project. An extension of the paper considers the situation where both, the 
value of the project and the cost of investment, are characterized by uncertainty. Except 
for the uncertain cost, the investment is also considered irreversible, meaning that the 
investment cost is sunk. Thus, in his study, Pindyck (1993) determines a decision rule for 
irreversible investments given the cost uncertainty and allowing for the possibility of 
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abandoning the project midstream. He considered that the cost of completing the project 
includes two different kinds of uncertainty - technical uncertainty, which is related to the 
physical difficulty of completing the project, and this type of uncertainty can be solved 
only by undertaking the project; and input cost uncertainty, which is external to what the 
firm does and it is highly nondiversifiable as it might be related to the general economic 
activity. He makes clear that even both types of uncertainties increase the investment 
opportunity value, technical uncertainty makes investing more attractive10, while input 
uncertainty has the opposite effect11. The optimal investment rule is found using 
contingent claim analysis as the cost’s risk can be spanned by the existing assets. The 
optimal investment rule is that the investment should be undertaken as long as the cost of 
investment is below a critical number. The critical cost level and the investment value 
opportunity are found as solutions of the sequential real option problem. By numerically 
solving the real options model, Pindyck (1993) has concluded that for large industrial 
projects, input cost uncertainty is important, while technical uncertainty does not play a 
major role. For these types of projects, increasing input cost uncertainty will lead to 
investment reductions. On the other hand, for R&D projects, the opposite is true, 
meaning that technical uncertainty plays an important role. Pindyck (1993) applies the 
model for a specific example: the decision to build a nuclear power plant in the context of 
very uncertain market conditions (late 1982, 1983). In order to estimate the expectation, 
variance and variance decomposition of cost, Pindyck (1993) used the Tennessee Valley 
                                                 
10 Even a project with a negative NPV value can still be economically viable as only by investing, the 
information about costs will be revealed and, thus, there is a shadow value that reduces the expected cost of 
investment (the same idea with a shadow value of production from a learning curve). There is no value of 
waiting. 
11 Even a project with a positive NPV value can still be uneconomically viable as the input costs might 
change and there is a value of waiting for new information.  
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Authority (TVA) survey data on individual nuclear plant costs and a cross-section 
regression published by Perl (Pindyck, 1993). His results show that both types of 
uncertainty should be taken into account, but the input cost uncertainty has greater effect 
on the investment decision.   
 
2.4 A Real Option Model of Biofuel Investment by Government 
To our knowledge, there is only one prior study, Emery and McKenzie (1996), which 
uses a real option valuation model to assess a governmental policy. Their study is more 
simplistic, as they consider uncertainty only over the investment’s future returns. Further, 
existing environmental policy analyses study the behavior of firms in those cases when 
investments have environmental benefits.  
To start, a subsidy for the biofuel industry is considered as a normal investment that is 
undertaken by the government, and not by a firm. The goal of government in this case is 
to maximize the investment value of the project. We note that we do not consider any 
benefits that agricultural support programs could bring to producers and consumers 
through increased crop prices or employment. Therefore, this model will capture only the 
primary motives sought after by respective governments - environmental benefits 
(Canada) and decreased energy dependence (the US).  
 
At a given period of time, the value of government investment is measured by the 
increase in the project value due to the new investment. Assuming that without subsidy 
there will be no market for biofuels, the investment value associated with the biofuel 
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industry in the case of no subsidy will be 0. The investment value would appear as in Eq. 
2.1.  
 
 )y(Dy*OSwxQ*P)I(V
~ ++−−= 12                        (2.1) 
    
where, 
V(I) = investment value in a certain time period; 
P = the price of biofuels without subsidy; 
Q = the quantity consumed of biofuels; 
w = per unit cost of inputs; 
x = input quantity used in producing the biofuels; 
~
S = the total subsidy used by governments to help the industry; 
O = the unit price of oil; 
y = the quantity of oil that is replaced by biofuels; 
D = environmental benefit function. 
 
Before describing the real option model, it is important to outline why an NPV analysis 
would not lead to the correct result. As it was mentioned above, the investment problem 
researched in this study is a sequential investment problem that can be temporarily or 
                                                 
12 The model is kept simple to show the main focus of our study, the subsidy. The model can be explained 
as a simple investment problem at a specific point in time, t. Before the market started to be subsidized, the 
costs of investment would be greater than the revenues (obtained from selling the biofuels) and without 
intervention, the market would not be developed. Thus, the government intervenes with the subsidy, which 
will make the net revenues positive. Environmental and energy security benefits are secondary effects of 
the subsidy. 
 
 105
permanently suspended without incurring any cost. Thus, as an example, it is considered 
that the government investment requires a first phase investment cost of $1 mil. Then, 
with a probability of 0.5, the project will be finished and with a probability of 0.5, a 
second phase is required, which costs the government other $7 mil. Considering that the 
benefits of consuming biofuels can be quantified, the completion of the project will yield 
benefits of $2.8 mil. with a probability of 0.5 and $5 mil. with probability 0.5. Thus, the 
expected cost of investment is $4.5 mil., while the expected benefits of the project are 
$3.9 mil. Since the expected cost of the project is higher than the expected benefits, the 
conventional NPV is negative, and, thus, the project would not be undertaken. However, 
the conventional NPV does not take into account the possibility to abandon the project 
after the first phase. If the project is abandoned before the second phase, the expected 
costs will be $1 mil., while the expected benefits will be $1.95 mil. (0.5*$3.9 mil.). Thus, 
the correct NPV is $0.95 mil. and the government can proceed with at least the first 
phase. This simple example shows that the conventional NPV will lead to non-investment 
in the biofuel market and, thus, it is important to consider the investment in a real option 
framework. 
 
On the other hand, following the research by McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow (2004), our 
investment problem fits the characteristics of a real option application. The technical 
uncertainty that characterizes our investment problem, even it does not give any waiting 
value for new information, it is a determinant of the economic outcome. As well the 
government has the possibility of changing the course of action during the investment 
period, including the abandonment solution. 
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Different variables outlined in the model are considered to be stochastic and, thus an 
introduction to stochastic processes is provided. 
 
2.4.1 Stochastic processes 
Stochastic processes are represented by events governed by probabilistic laws (Karlin and 
Taylor, 1981). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) define a stochastic process as “a variable that 
evolves over time in a way that is at least in part random” (p. 60). Thus, the main 
characteristics of a stochastic process are time and randomness.  Stochastic processes can 
be discrete-time processes, when the variables change their values only at discrete points 
in time, in contrast with the continuous-time processes, which are characterized by 
variables that vary continuously over time. Any stochastic variable has a value term (drift 
term) and a random term (volatility term).  
 
A Wiener process (Brownian motion) is a stochastic process that has three characteristics. 
First, it is a Markov process, meaning that the probability distribution of the future values 
of the process depends only on its current value and not on any past values or any other 
current information. Second, it has independent increments, meaning that the change in 
one time interval is independent of any other time interval (nonoverlapping). Third, 
changes in the process are normally distributed over any finite interval of time (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994).  
 
The properties of a Wiener process can be shown formally using an example. 
Considering that zt is a Wiener process, than any change in z corresponding to an 
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infinitesimal time interval or the increment of a Wiener process satisfies the following 
properties: 
 
1. The relationship between the change in the variable and the change in time is: 
 
dtdz tε=              (2.2) 
 
where tε  is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.  
 
2. The random variable tε  is serially uncorrelated: 
 
sfor t 0)( ≠=Ε tsεε             (2.3) 
 
An Ito process is a generalized Wiener process with drift and variance coefficients being 
functions of the current state and time. Thus, given a random variable x, the Ito process 
for the value of the variable is: 
 
dztxbdttxadx ),(),( +=            (2.4) 
 
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process, while a(x,t) and b(x,t) are nonrandom 
functions known as drift and variance respectively. Considering the mean and the 
variance of the increments of this process, they would equal: 
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Two important special cases of Brownian motion that are going to be used in this chapter 
are geometric Brownian motion and mean-reverting processes. For a geometric Brownian 
motion process, the drift term, a(x,t), equals xα  and the standard deviation, b(x,t), equals 
xσ , α and σ  being constants. Thus, 
 
xdzxdtdx σα +=  or dzdt
x
dx σα +=           (2.6) 
 
Geometric Brownian motion is a process with constant expected returns and a constant 
variance of return. The change in a variable modeled using the geometric Brownian 
motion is lognormally distributed. Thus, the expected value of x, in the case that x(0) = 
x0, is given by: 
 
textx α0)]([ =Ε ,            (2.7) 
 
while the variance of x(t) is given by: 
 
)1()]([
222
0 −= tt eextxVar σα            (2.8) 
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Geometric Brownian motion is usually used to model securities prices, interest rates, 
wage rates, output prices and other economic and financial variables (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994).  
 
The mean-reverting process is used in modeling variables that fluctuate randomly in 
short-run, but they tend to revert back to an equilibrium level in long-run. One example 
would be the price of oil, which in short-run fluctuates randomly up and down, being 
affected by external factors such as strengthening or weakening of OPEC cartel or wars 
in oil producing countries, while in the long-run it tends to revert back towards the 
marginal cost of producing oil. Thus, the mean-reversion process is a log-normal 
diffusion process with a variance growing unproportional to the time interval.  
 
The simplest mean-reverting process is known as Geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process 
or the Dixit and Pindyck model and it can be written as (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994): 
 
dzdtxxdx ση +−= − )(                        (2.9) 
 
where η  is the speed of reversion, −x  is the long-run equilibrium at which the random 
variable tends to revert. This process satisfies the Markov property, but it does not have 
independent increments. Thus, the expected value of x, in case that the current value of x 
is x0, is given by: 
 
 110
t
t exxxx
η−−− −+=Ε )()( 0          (2.10) 
 
while the variance of )(
−− xxt  is: 
 
)1(
2
)var( 2
2
t
t exx
η
η
σ −− −=−          (2.11) 
 
A main tool for stochastic calculus is represented by Ito’s Lemma. Ito’s Lemma is used to 
construct differential equations of stochastic variables, and is similar to a Taylor series 
expansion for ordinary calculus. Thus, considering that xi(t), with i from 1 to m, are 
stochastic processes and defining a function F(x1,x2,…,xm,t) that is at least twice 
differentiable in xi and once in t, the total differential of the function F is (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994): 
 
ji
i i j ji
i
i
dxdx
xx
Fdx
x
Fdt
t
FdF ∑ ∑∑ ∂∂∂+∂∂+∂∂=
2
2
1       (2.12) 
 
2.4.2 Variables’ description 
We assume here that P and Q are uncertain. By developing the biofuels market, in the 
future, the price of biofuels would decrease, while the quantity consumed would increase. 
Since prices cannot be negative, we let P follow a process of geometric Brownian motion 
with drift to reflect stochastic innovations as well as any long-term trend in price 
evolution: 
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)t(dz)t(Pdt)t(P)t(dP PPP σ+α=           (2.13)  
     
where Pdz  is the increment of a Wiener process: ),(N~,dtdzP 10εε= ; Pα is the drift 
parameter, which represents the rate of growth, and Pσ is the volatility in the drift 
parameter.  
 
Q also follows a process of geometric Brownian motion to reflect stochastic innovations: 
 
)t(dz)t(Qdt)t(Q)t(dQ QQQ σ+α=                   (2.14) 
  
The parameter Qα  is the expected rate of demand growth, while Qσ  is the standard 
deviation of the expected percentage change in demand. The variable Qdz  is a standard 
Wiener process with zero mean and standard deviation of dt. The relationship between Q 
and P is reflected in dtdzdzE PQQP ρ=][ , where 01 ≤ρ≤− PQ  is the instantaneous 
correlation between Q and P. Clearly, negative correlation implies a downward sloping 
demand curve. 
 
The cost of investment, represented by the subsidy 
~
S , is considered uncertain as well. 
Uncertainty of 
~
S  can be justified by the fact that developing an energy market is a large 
project that takes considerable time. On top of being an uncertain cost, this kind of 
investment is also irreversible. For various reasons, such as insufficient demand for the 
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product or excessive costs, the government cannot recover the money spent on trying to 
develop the ethanol market.  
 
As developed here, the uncertainty in project costs is called technical uncertainty 
(Pindyck, 1993). As mentioned above, technical uncertainty is related to the physical 
difficulty of completing the project, including both time and effort. In fact, the total cost 
of the project can be known only when it is completed. There is no value of waiting in 
this case, as all the information about cost arrives as the investment takes place.  
 
Next, following the investment model of Pindick (1993) we consider the expected cost of 
completing the project )S(ES
~= . Changes in the expected cost of investment S are 
captured using the following controlled diffusion process: 
 
S
/
S dz)IS(IdtdS
21σ+−=                     (2.15) 
 
where I represents the rate of investment, and dzS is a Wiener process. Note in Eq. (2.15) 
the expected cost to completion declines with the rate of investment, and also changes 
stochastically. This functional form for expected cost is very easy to manipulate and 
yields just two solutions - no investment or investment at the maximum rate Im. Notice 
that if I=0, dS=0 and there is no technical uncertainty over the level of S required to 
develop the market. The stochastic term in Eq. (2.15) has a mean of 0, meaning that the 
expected level of S is unbiased. We find that the variance of S is: 
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The solution for the mean and the variance of S (Pindyck, 1993) are presented in 
Appendix A.  
 
Eq. (2.16) shows that as S decreases, uncertainty in S decreases, which reflects a process 
of learning with investment.  
 
Further, the revenue obtained by replacing the imported oil with biofuels: y*O, is 
considered here to be a benefit. The future price of oil, O, is a stochastic variable that can 
be represented either by a simple random walk with a mean reversion or by a random 
walk with mean reversion and a jump process. We offer that the mean-reversion process 
is the natural choice for modeling oil price. Even though oil price suffers short-term 
shocks, historically it has tended to revert back to a normal long-term equilibrium 
(WTRG Economics, Figure 2.2 in our study). The situation where the change in price of 
oil is modeled as a random walk with mean reversion and a jump process in presented in 
Appendix C. 
 
On that note, the simplest mean-reverting process known also as Geometric Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck or Dixit and Pindyck model (Dixit and Pindick, 1994) is: 
 
                        dzdtOO
O
dO
OO
_ σ+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −η=          (2.17) 
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where the first term is the mean-reverting drift, 
−
O  is the long-run equilibrium mean and 
η  is the speed of reversion. The second term represents continuous time uncertainty, 
where Oσ  is the volatility, while dzO is a Wiener increment. 
 
As biofuels are increasingly used as a substitute for oil, there may be a relationship 
between the price of oil and the biofuel quantity consumed. Ceteris paribus, as the price 
of oil increases, the quantity consumed of biofuels should increase as well. Thus, we 
represent the relationship between O and Q by OQρ , the correlation coefficient between 
the two variables, with 10 ≤≤ OQρ .  
 
The last term of Eq. (2.1) above is an environmental benefits function. Each unit of oil 
consumed produces an amount of GHG emissions. Let us assume e is the total emissions 
released by oil consumption, and each unit of oil consumed releases iγ units of GHG 
emissions (CO2, NOx, SO2 etc.). It follows that: i*ye γ= . It is assumed that the 
development of the biofuel industry does not increase the emission coefficient, so 
01 γ≤γ ( 1γ  and 0γ are the emission coefficients both before and after the introduction of 
biofuel) (Millock and Nauges, 2004). Under this specification, a reduction in GHG 
emissions represents an environmental benefit for society. In our case, the environmental 
benefits function is equal to the product between the total reduction in GHG emissions, e, 
and the price per unit of GHG emissions, τ : τ= *e)y(D . 
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As the total emission, e, is a function of the quantity of oil consumed, we consider y to be 
a stochastic variable. The quantity of biofuel consumed is unknown, rendering the 
quantity of oil that it replaces a random variable. Assuming further that y follows a 
Brownian motion process, this leads to the following specification for our stochastic 
environmental benefits function: 
 
)ydzydt(dD yyyi σ+ατγ=          (2.18)  
               
where yα is a drift parameter, yσ is the volatility in the drift parameter, and once again, 
dzy is a Wiener process with the property that dtdz y ε= , ).1,0(~ Nε  
 
Also, the relationship between y and O is reflected in dtdzdzE yOOy ρ=][  where 
01 ≤≤− yOρ  is the instantaneous correlation between y and O. Clearly, negative 
correlation implies a downward sloping demand curve for oil. 
 
We can derive decision rules for irreversible investment knowing that total cost is 
technically uncertain and that the value of the investment represented by returns is 
stochastic. Our decision rule also accounts for the possibility that the project could be 
abandoned. The rule we follow here is that government will invest in developing the 
biofuel market as long as the expected cost of the investment is less than some specified 
critical value (Pindyck, 1993). Furthermore, the investment value function does not 
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include an environmental benefits function in case of the US, while for Canada, this 
function does not include the benefits from imported oil replacement.  
 
Ultimately, this problem is characterized by a compound option. It is a sequential 
investment problem with technical uncertainty. We have a compound option because 
each annual investment, I, creates a new investment option on the present value of cost 
savings from the investment already done, with a diminished exercise price S-I. In fact, 
this kind of investment program can be temporarily or permanently suspended without 
cost. In the following section, optimal investment rules for the US and Canada will be 
derived, results that represent the contribution of this research compared to the previous 
literature. 
 
The technical cost uncertainty increases the value of the investment opportunity. This can 
be explained by the fact that the payoff function is max[O, V], where V represents the 
investment value. The investment opportunity is like a call option; the owner can 
purchase an asset worth an uncertain amount S (the cost of investment) for an uncertain 
‘exercise price’, which is represented by the value of the completed project given by the 
benefits of biofuels. The value of the option is increased by an increase in the variance of 
the price of the underlying asset, thus as the benefits become more and more uncertain, 
the value of the option is increased. However, as Pindyck (1993) has outlined, in these 
types of models, the government has a more complicated compound option given by the 
fact that “it can spend an uncertain amount of money in return for an option to continue 
the partially completed project” (p. 55). 
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2.4.3 Optimal investment rules 
 
2.4.3.1 The case of the US 
The US case shall be considered the general situation as it includes all the variables 
considered stochastic. Using the assumptions outlined above for the US, we want to 
estimate the value of the biofuel investment that the government will maximize. This is 
represented by the investment value: 
 
)t(Sx*w)t(y*)t(O)t(Q*)t(P)I(V
~−−+=         (2.19)  
 
An optimal investment rule can be found using contingent claim analysis. Note that the 
model has five stochastic variables: P, Q, O, y and S. The variables w and x are 
considered deterministic because they do not affect the value of the subsidy. Changes in 
each of the stochastic variables follow a geometric Brownian motion, save for the price 
of oil where we assume first a mean-reverting process, while in Appendix C we use a 
jump-diffusion process. These changes are expressed by the Eq. (2.13), (2.14), (2.17), 
(2.18) and (2.15). Furthermore, we assume that the risks in P, Q, O, y and S are spanned 
by existing assets, an assumption crucial to this method (Trigeorgis, 1993). We can make 
this assumption in this case since the product being developed is closely related to 
commodities (oil) that are usually traded on spot and future markets. So, following Dixit 
and Pindyck (1993), we consider a portfolio for which we hold the option to invest, and 
the opportunity to invest is worth F(P, Q, O, y, S). Appendix B shows that the investment 
opportunity F(P, Q, O, y, S) must satisfy the following stochastic differential equation: 
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Eq. (2.20) is similar to a Bellman equation found using stochastic dynamic programming. 
The only differences are that the riskless interest rate r, which is specified endogenously13 
in our model, is used in place of an exogenously specified discount rate, and the growth 
rateα of the geometric Brownian motion is replaced by δ−r , where δ represents an 
opportunity cost of delaying the construction of the project and keeping the option to 
invest alive (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Thus, in the case of contingent claim analysis, 
δ+α=μ  represents the total expected rate of growth. The total expected rate of return μ  
represents the compensation that investors obtain for taking risk, noting that the critical 
risk here is nondiversifiable risk. The rate-of-return for the price of oil equals 
OOO δημ +−=
−
)( . 
 
Eq. (2.20) is linear in I, so the maximization problem gives us just two solutions: 
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        (2.21)          
 
                                                 
13 We considered an endogenous interest rate as it represents a general situation. However, an optimal 
investment rule can be found using dynamic programming, subject to some exogenous discount rate.  
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Interpreting this solution, we note that government should invest as long as the expected 
cost to complete the project falls below a critical value. The general solution also 
indicates that the market should be developed as long as the total subsidy (the cost of the 
project) is less or equal to the critical value S*(P, Q, O, y). If this is the case, government 
should invest at the maximum rate Im. In the case where the total subsidy is greater than 
S*(P, Q, O, y), investment should not be undertaken. Next, the value of S* can be found 
as part of the solution of F(P, Q, O, y, S). Note as well that Eq. (2.20) is an elliptic partial 
differential equation with a free boundary along the space S*(P, Q, O, y). To determine 
S*(P, Q, O, y) and F(P, Q, O, y, S), we need to solve (20) subject to the following 
boundary conditions: 
 
y)O, Q, V(P,  y,0)O, Q, F(P, =          (2.22) 
                
0
0
=
→
)S,y,O,Q,P(Flim
P
         (2.23) 
                
0
0
=
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)S,y,O,Q,P(Flim
Q
         (2.24)      
       
0
0
=
→
)S,y,O,Q,P(Flim
O
         (2.25)  
                
0
0
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y
         (2.26)  
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1 2 =−−σ )y,O,Q,P,S(FS)y,O,Q,P,S(F *S*S*SS      (2.28) 
     
)S,y,O,Q,P(F  continuous at S*(P, Q, O,y)         (2.29)        
 
To summarize the boundary conditions, Eq. (2.22) implies that at the end of the project, 
when the amount of subsidy would be 0, the payoff would be V(P, Q, O, y) – exactly the 
value of the project. Eq. (2.23), (2.24), (2.25) and (2.26) show that a value of 0 is the 
absorbing barrier for P, Q, O and y, whereas Eq. (2.27) shows that when S is very large, 
the probability of beginning the project in some finite time approaches 0. Eq. (2.28) is 
derived from Eq. (2.20) and is equivalent to the so-called “smooth pasting” condition 
(Pindyck, 1993) that FS(S*, P, Q, O, y) is continuous at S*(P, Q, O, y). Finally, Eq. (2.29) 
is the “value matching” condition, meaning that F(P, Q, O, y, S) is continuous at S*(P, Q, 
O, y).  
 
Eq. (2.20) together with the boundary conditions specified above can be solved 
numerically using simulations. This means finding S*(P, Q, O, y) and F(P, Q, O, y, S) at 
the same time. In order to perform such a simulation, however, we need to obtain relevant 
data. We do not consider the case where the investment rate is 0 as without being 
subsidized, the market for biofuels would not be developed. 
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However, related to the option value, the greater the uncertainty, the greater value of 
opportunity to invest and the larger the maximum expected cost for which investing is 
economical. The option value is also related to the maximum investment rate Im, as the 
maximum rate of investment is larger, the value of the investment opportunity is greater 
because the expected benefits are received earlier and they would be discounted less. In 
the same time, as the investment opportunity is worth more, the critical value of 
investment, S*, will be larger.  
 
2.4.3.2 The case of Canada 
In the case of Canada, the investment value that government will maximize is expressed 
via the following equation: 
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Once again, an optimal investment rule can be found using contingent claim analysis. In 
fact, this equation has four stochastic variables: P, Q, D and S. Once again, changes in 
each variable are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion using the processes in 
Eq. (2.13), (2.14), (2.18) and (2.15), and the risks in P, Q, D and S are spanned by 
existing assets in the same manner as for the US. Finally, the opportunity to invest is 
worth F(P, Q, D, S). 
The partial differential equation objective function that Canada’s investment opportunity 
should satisfy is obtained in the same manner as for the US. Practically, the investment 
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opportunity function for Canada is a special case of the one for the US, by not taking into 
account the price of oil. However, Appendix B shows the steps followed in finding the 
objective function. 
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In this case, the rate-of-return in each variable equals δαμ += . Since Eq. (2.31) is linear 
in I, this maximization problem again yields a corner solution, as follows: 
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Not surprisingly, we obtain the same fundamental investment rule as that found for the 
US. The government should invest at the maximum rate Im as long as ),,(* DQPSS ≤ , 
where S* represents a critical value of subsidy. However, the investment should not be 
continued if ),,(* DQPSS > . The critical value S* can be found as part of the solution of 
F(P, Q, D, S). Once again, Eq. (2.31) is elliptic with a free boundary along the space 
S*(P, Q, D). In this case we have boundary conditions that together with Eq. (2.31) will 
help us finding S*(P, Q, D) and F(P, Q, D, S): 
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)S,D,Q,P(F  continuous at S*(P, Q, D)       (2.39)  
          
Eq. (2.31) together with the boundary conditions shall be solved numerically, by finding 
S*(P, Q, D) and F(P, Q, D, S) at the same time. The value of opportunity to invest will be 
greater as the uncertainty is greater and as the maximum investment rate is larger.  
 
2.4.3.3 Comparison of the optimal investment rules 
The following two partial differential equations were obtained in the two cases studied 
above: 
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a) Canada: 
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b) US (using a mean-reverting process for the change in the price of oil): 
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These two equations, which contain four and, respectively, five stochastic variables, 
should be solved subject to a set of boundary conditions in order to determine the critical 
value of the governmental subsidy and the opportunity to invest. For interpretation and 
comparison purposes, we rewrite the above equations using the multiplication rule for 
stochastic variables. 
 
Thus, since the returns R(t) equal P(t) * Q(t), they would be stochastic and knowing that: 
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from Ito’s Lemma and the processes used to model the change in price and quantity of 
biofuels (Eq. (2.13), (2.14)), we have: 
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Substituting for dP(t) and dQ(t) and rearranging Eq. (2.43), we obtain: 
 
R)dzdz(Rdt)(dR QQPPQPQP σ+σ+σρσ+α+α=      (2.44) 
   
Thus, R follows also a Brownian motion process: 
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Since the environmental benefit function is D(t) = y(t) * γi * τ, representing the product 
between a stochastic variable and two deterministic variables, we can rewrite the change 
in the environmental function as: 
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Thus, the change in D follows a Brownian motion process, where: 
 
yyy dzB σα === Ddz and 1F ;         (2.49)  
 
Following the same method that has been used to calculate the change in biofuels returns, 
the change in the total cost of oil, U = O * y, can be expressed as: 
 
UGUdzCUdtdU +=           (2.50)  
 
Thus, the change in U follows a Brownian motion process, where: 
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Using the derived Eq. (2.45), (2.48) and (2.50), the partial differential equations, which 
will give us the critical values for the subsidy levels in the two countries, become: 
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a) Canada: 
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b) US: 
 
0)()(
2
1
2
1
2
1 22222
=−−+−+−+
++++
rFIIFrUFrRF
OQFSIFUFRF
mmSUURR
OQQOOQmSSSUUURRR
δδ
ρσσσσσ
    (2.53)  
 
As the main question of this study is to check whether the levels of the critical subsidies 
are different in the two countries, we can make some deductions from the above two 
derived equations. From a theoretical point of view, the equations differ from each other 
because of terms related with the price of oil and the environmental function: Eq. (2.52) 
contains terms related to the environmental function, while Eq. (2.53) includes terms 
related with the total cost of oil that is replaced by biofuels.  
 
There are only two situations when these two equations would yield the same solutions 
for the critical values of the subsidy levels: 
 
a) when the total environmental damage created by the consumption of oil and 
the total cost of replaced oil are 0, which means that D(t) = y(t) * γi * τ = 0 and U(t) = y(t) 
* O(t) = 0. The two terms can be 0 at the same time only when the total quantity of oil 
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replaced by biofuels y(t) equals 0, which is equivalent to the fact that there is no 
consumption of biofuels.  Having no consumption of biofuels means that the revenues 
obtained from selling biofuels, R(t) are 0.  
 
Thus, the levels of the critical subsidies would be equal in the two countries when there is 
no demand for biofuels. This situation is not likely to occur, as there is no reason to 
continue to subsidize the market development with a zero demand for the specific 
product. Hence, in this situation, the critical levels of subsidies would equal 0. 
 
b) when the terms related to the total environmental benefits in Canada equal the 
terms related to the total cost of replaced oil in the US. We obtain the following 
equalities: 
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While most of the terms in the above equalities are related via stochastic calculus and 
thus we cannot draw any definitive conclusions for our study, we can concentrate on the 
forth relationship, which shows that the total environmental benefits created by the 
replacement of oil with biofuels equals the total cost of replaced oil. 
 
)t(O*)t(O*)t(y**)t(y)t(U)t(D ii =τγ⇒=τγ⇒=                 (2.55) 
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Eq. (2.55) says that the critical values of subsidies in the two countries are equal when the 
total price of GHG emissions per unit of oil consumed equals the total unit price of oil 
(the unit can be considered to be a barrel). In other words, the two levels of subsidies are 
the same when the price of oil internalizes the externality produced by consuming the oil.  
 
2.5 Possible empirical analysis 
Some data for the model variables are available. However, prior studies indicate that it is 
difficult to estimate a damage cost for CO2 and other greenhouse gases because the 
damage due to global warming is just beginning to occur, so data are not available to 
estimate damage costs. Still, the damage cost of GHG is estimated for US, OECD 
countries, countries of International Energy Agency and for the world.  
 
To this end, Murphy and Delucchi (1998) review the literature on the social cost of motor 
vehicle use in the US. Among all the studies reviewed, only three estimate damage cost 
of GHG emissions. Mackenzie et al (1992) estimated the annual cost for GHG not borne 
by drivers for 1989 at US $27 billion; Ketcham and Komanoff (1992) estimated the 
climate change costs of roadway transportation borne by non-users for 1990 at US $25 
billion and the California Energy Commission (1994) used carbon emissions control 
costs of US $28 per-ton of carbon to represent carbon value.  
 
Tol (1999) estimated the marginal cost of GHG emissions for the world using the FUND 
model. The estimates are between US$9 and US$23/tC, depending on the discount rate.  
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The Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs (2001) in Belgium 
estimated the external costs of transport use in Belgium. Part of the environmental costs 
were represented through the impact from greenhouse gases, which were estimated using 
the Open Framework and the FUND simulation model. Their estimates (Table 2.6) cover 
the period 2000-2009, with costs discounted to the year 2000.  
 
Table 2.6 Recommended marginal costs of GHG emissions 
 Minimum Low Central 
estimates 
High Maximum 
CO2(€/tCO2) 0.1 1.4 2.4 4.1 16.4 
N2O(€/tN2O) 24.3 440.2 748.3 1,272.1 5,242.1 
CH4(€/tCH4) 1.9 28.2 44.9 71.5 257 
N(€/kgN) -5.5 198.2 337 527.9 1,270.2 
S(€/kgS) -35.8 -16.6 -9.8 -5.8 0.0 
Source: Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs, Belgium (2001) 
 
In a subsequent study done by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (2004) in British 
Columbia, vehicle air pollution costs in British Columbia urban areas were assessed 
(Table 2.7). 
 
Table 2.7 Recommended shadow prices (1996 Canadian Cents per km) 
 PM2.5 Ozone CFCs 
(With AC) 
Total 
(With AC) 
 
Total 
(Without AC) 
Light Gasoline 
Vehicle 
0.6-1.0c 0.1c 2.7c 3.4-3.8c 0.7-1.1c 
Light Diesel 
Vehicle 
2.5-6.3c 0.1c 2.7c 5.3-9.1c 2.6-6.4c 
Heavy Gasoline 
Vehicle 
2-4c 0.1c 2.7c 4.8-6.8c 2.1-4.1c 
Heavy Diesel 
Vehicle 
9-27c 0.1c 2.7c 11.8-29.8c 9.1-27.1c 
Source: Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2004  
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The latter study also lists the European Commission estimates of greenhouse gas cost for 
14 countries of US$0.18 to US$0.56 per gallon of gasoline or US$0.009 to US$0.028 per 
mile.  
 
Some of the previous related research has solved real options models with one or two 
uncertain variables. Real option pricing solutions rely on numerical techniques, as only a 
small ratio of partial differential equations have analytical solutions. The numerical 
techniques used in valuing real option models can be classified in three categories. First, 
there are the studies that use the Finite Difference Method (FDM) to solve Partial 
Differential Equations (PDE). By using FDM, the continuous state variables are 
transformed in a network of discrete points (Grigoriu, 2002). Second, this literature 
includes studies that use the so-called lattice method to evaluate real option models. 
Under the lattice method, an appropriate discrete-time model is chosen for a 
corresponding continuous-time model such that both have the same moment generating 
function (Mun, 2003). However, for several state variables, as is the case for our research 
(Canada’s model includes four state variables, while the US’s model has five state 
variables), these real option models suffer from what are called by Dias (2000) the curse 
of dimensionality and the curse of modeling. The curse of dimensionality14 is related to 
the several sources of uncertainty, while the curse of modeling15 refers to the “details 
from the changing practical reality” (Dias, 2000, 1). When using the above mentioned 
                                                 
14 “Curse of dimensionality is the exponential computational time explosion with the problem dimension. 
Consider three state variables (two stochastic variables plus the time), one element of a three-dimensional 
grid has 23 or 8 points, one in each vertex. For 5 state variables, the grid element has 25 points (= 32) 
leading to serious practical problems.” (Dias, 2000, 2) 
15 “Curse of modeling is a problem formulation with an explicit system. Changing some aspects of the 
model is necessary to change all the optimization procedure.” (Dias, 2000, 2) 
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methods, FDE and lattice methods, for models with more than three state variables 
several difficulties arise and they are not very practical. Thus, the third category of 
numerical methods that can be used in valuating real option problems is represented by 
Monte Carlo simulation combined with an optimization method. Monte Carlo simulation 
addresses the problems of the curse of dimensionality and the curse of modeling, but 
leaves open the optimization problem. Thus, Dias (2000) proposed a new method for 
optimization of a Monte Carlo simulation of real options problems, by using an 
evolutionary computing approach and, more specifically, genetic algorithms (GA). A GA 
is a search technique that it is used to find an exact or an approximate solution to an 
optimization problem. GAs were first developed by John Holland in 1975 and they are a 
particular class of evolutionary algorithms that use techniques inspired by evolutionary 
biology. The GA method that could be used in this model is described by Dias (2000). 
Practically, the GA method is used to estimate a threshold curve for a real option 
application together with the real option value. The threshold curve is guessed by the GA 
and each trial is evaluated by a Monte Carlo simulation. As Dias (2000) points out, each 
trial is considered to be an “organism”, while each “fitness” function represents the real 
option value or the so-called “dynamic net present value” (Dias 2000, 8). The simulation 
would be performed only for valid organisms, which are represented by the ones that 
satisfy the restrictions of the model. By using the above specified method, in future 
research we would be able to quantify the optimal levels of subsidies for the US and 
Canada and to draw more specific conclusions regarding the potential for future trade 
disputes.   
 
 133
2.6 Trade and policy implications 
The spectacular increase in biofuels production in recent years leads to questions related 
to the possibility of trading biofuels. Based on the theoretical results obtained in this 
research, another important question is whether or not the levels of subsidies that 
governments use to help the development of this industry would lead to trade disputes in 
the near future. This section outlines the way biofuels are treated under World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules and discusses possible trade disputes that might arise in the 
future.  
 
Before discussing the possible trade disputes that might arise in the biofuel market, it is 
important to outline the level of trade in biofuels. Another important aspect is whether or 
not there is any grounds to believe that countries will be willing to consider it 
advantageous to start trading biofuels.  
 
Presently, most biofuels are produced and consumed in domestic markets. There is a 
limited amount of trade in biofuels - exports of ethanol from Brazil and some intra-EU 
trade of biodiesel (IPC and REIL, 2006). Given some of the reasons for which countries 
boost their production of biofuels, such as energy security, rural development and 
increased opportunities for agricultural commodities, it is quite obvious that the push for 
biofuels production is focused on domestic production and use. However, countries 
interested in the environmental benefits of biofuels, mostly the Kyoto signatories, might 
also look for more cost-efficient producers beyond their borders. Thus, there is a potential 
for trade in biofuels, especially if we take into account the fact that the countries where 
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biofuels can be produced more efficiently and cheaper are not the same as the countries 
where biofuels consumption is being mandated and encouraged (IPC and REIL, 2006). 
The demand for biofuels in developed countries is currently rising, mostly because of 
ambitious biofuels mandates set by governments. However, most of the industrialized 
countries do not have the necessary land availability to meet demand with domestically 
produced biofuels. Those industrialized countries that could satisfy demand with 
domestic supply of biofuels would still not be producing biofuels in the most cost 
efficient or environmentally sustainable ways. On the other side, research has shown that 
the most energy efficient biofuel feedstocks are sugarcane and oil palm trees, which are 
mostly located in developing countries from tropical and sub-tropical regions. Thus, 
developing countries have a comparative advantage in producing biofuels due to the 
longer growing seasons, large areas of arable land and much lower labour costs. Some of 
these countries have already shown an interest in developing local production of biofuels, 
which is mostly seen as a development tool, since their markets for agricultural 
commodities would expand, significant rural development would take place and much of 
their expenditures on fossil fuels would be reduced. At the same time, developing 
countries are in a disadvantaged position compared to developed countries. They do not 
have the financial resources to offer the same government support as the biofuels industry 
receives in the developed countries. They would then have to rely on private investment, 
which leads us to conclude that even if there is a strong potential for broader trade in 
biofuels, there is also a need for a transparent and global trading regime (IPC and REIL, 
2006). 
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Next question is how does the WTO treat biofuels? There are many potential policy 
issues that can arise when countries start trading biofuels. These are related to the level of 
subsidies, market access and tariff classification, different technical barriers to trade that 
can occur based on the product standards and technologies used in the production of 
biofuels and, as well, issues related to trade in biotechnological produced biofuels (Kerr 
and Loppacher, 2005). However, this research concentrates only on the potential trade 
problems that can arise as a result of large levels of governmental support (subsidies) for 
the development of the biofuels market. 
 
The primary problem regarding trade in biofuels is their definition and classification 
under the WTO. Most WTO members are also members of the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) and they use the system of classifications developed by WCO, 
known as Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). Under the 
WTO, tariff levels and the allowable subsidies are negotiated based on this system. 
Ethanol is considered an agricultural product (HS Cap. 22), being classified based on its 
chemical composition as undenatured (220710) and denatured (220720), but is not 
separately classified as fuel ethanol as opposed to ethanol used for other purposes. 
Conversely, biodiesel is considered an industrial product, being classified in HS Cap. 38. 
The definition of these products is a central question. Rules for industrial products 
specified under the WTO Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (SCM) agreement set 
greater constraints on the subsidy levels. Rules for agricultural products specified under 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) place fewer constraints on subsidies. 
Agricultural tariffs are, typically, considerably larger than non agricultural tariffs. The 
 136
classification problem becomes more complicated when considering the possibility that 
some biofuels might be considered environmental goods and thus be subject to 
negotiations related to “Environmental Goods and Services”. However, during the Doha 
Round, little progress was made in these negotiations, including agreement on the 
definition of what would be considered an “environmental good” (IPC and REIL, 2006). 
If the latter are considered “energy goods”, the WTO does not have specific disciplines 
for trade in energy as until recently, major players in energy market, such as Saudi 
Arabia, were not part of the agreement (Selivanova, 2006). Thus, it is commonly 
accepted that with some exceptions, including national security and scarce and potentially 
scarce commodities, energy policies are exempted from discipline (IPC and REIL, 2006). 
Other complications would arise if the US were to attempt to use the “primary” 
exemption in the WTO, claiming that their subsidies for biofuels have been put in place 
for reasons of “national security”. However, this reason would not be claimed by other 
countries, such as Canada, that do not have an energy security problem.  
 
If biofuels were to be categorized as industrial goods, the subsidies would be disciplined 
by the rules of the SCM agreement. SCM agreement divides the subsidies in three 
categories: prohibited, actionable and non-actionable (Figure 2.10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 137
               Figure 2.10 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
                                       Industrial Products 
 
    
As Figure 2.10 shows, a subsidy is considered prohibited if it is contingent on export 
performance or on the use of domestic over imported inputs. They are known as export 
subsidies and local content subsidies. The non-actionable subsidies are represented by 
general subsidies, which are not related to a specific firm or industry and do not distort 
trade, such as subsidies for research activities, for adaptation to new environmental 
requirements and for development of industries in disadvantaged areas (WTO, 1994a). 
The third category, the actionable subsidies are the ones that distort trade in the sense that 
they cause adverse effects to the interests of other countries that are WTO members. One 
basis for actionability is represented by the existence of serious prejudice to the interests 
of other members, meaning that the subsidized product displaces the complainant’s 
exports from the domestic market or from a third market. One criteria for deciding 
whether a subsidy provoked serious prejudice to the interests of another country is the 
size of the subsidy, considering that when the total ad valorem subsidization of a product 
exceeds 5%, serious prejudice has occurred. Other criteria for actionability are 
Prohibited: 
-Export subsidies (not 
the case); 
-Subsidies contingent 
upon use of domestic 
inputs over imported 
inputs. 
 
Non-actionable:  
 
non-trade distorting 
subsidies. 
 
some environmental 
subsidies – but not the 
way they are paid for in 
biofuels
Actionable:  
 
trade distorting 
subsidies. 
 
Ways of addressing: 
-Dispute settlement 
body of WTO; 
-Domestic 
investigation and 
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represented by material injury and nullification and impairment of the benefits of bound 
tariff rates (WTO, 1994a). The WTO members can address an actionable subsidy in two 
ways: by either using the Dispute Settlement of the WTO to have the subsidy withdrawn, 
or by opening a domestic investigation and charging a countervailing duty on imports 
from the specific country. Based on these definitions, the subsidies given for the biofuel 
industry in the US and Canada would fit the category of actionable subsidies, as they are 
clearly larger than 5% of the product value (Kerr and Loppacher, 2005). Thus, if biofuels 
were to be categorized as industrial products at the WTO and the current levels of 
subsidies continue to be given to the industry and are administered in the same way, there 
is a considerable potential for trade disputes in the future.  
 
If biofuels were to be categorized as agricultural goods, they would be governed by the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Under AoA, the subsidies are classified in a 
similar fashion to industrial subsidies, but they face lower constraints and they have 
different definitions (Kerr and Loppacher, 2005) (Figure 2.11). 
 
The subsidies included in the Green box (non-actionable) are the ones that do not or only 
minimally distort trade. They are not targeted at specific products and they are decoupled 
from current output or prices. The box includes government-funded programs like 
environmental protection and regional development programs. The Green box subsidies 
are allowed without limits and no action can be taken against them. The Amber box 
(actionable) includes all the subsidies that are not in the Green box. These subsidies are 
allowed if they are lower than “de minimis” level (5% for developed countries and 10% 
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for developing countries) and the reduction commitment of each country is expressed in 
terms of the “Total Aggregate Measure of Support” (AMS), which is calculated based on 
the specific and non-specific product support. The final box, the Blue box, includes 
Amber box subsidies that satisfy specific conditions; for example farmers who would 
limit their production would get the support. Currently, there are no limits on these 
subsidies (although some countries want to change this). The subsidies included in the 
Blue box are not taken into account when the AMS is calculated (WTO, 2004a).  
 
                                               Figure 2.11 WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
Domestic support 
 
 
Taking into account the definition of each type of subsidy, we could conclude that biofuel 
subsidies can be included in Amber box, being considered actionable subsidies. If 
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governments consider biofuel subsidies to be very important, they will face few 
constraints, as the level of the other Amber subsidies could be cut in order to make room 
for biofuel subsidies within the capped level (Kerr and Loppacher, 2005). 
 
Another issue that can arise is if the governments try to fit biofuel subsidies in the Green 
box, under an environmental program. Thus, they will not be limited or actionable. 
However, in order to be considered payments under an environmental program, certain 
conditions need to hold. In summary, they have to be payments under a clearly-defined 
government environmental or conservation program, they have to be dependent on 
conforming to certain pre-specified activity norms and the payment should be limited to 
the extra cost or loss of income involved in complying with the government program 
(WTO, 1994a). If biofuel subsidies are categorized in the Green box, two main issues 
could arise in a trade dispute. First, there should be enough scientific evidence that 
environmental benefits are provided and they fit within an environmental program and, 
second, there is a question of how the extra costs are measured (Kerr and Loppacher, 
2005). In a trade dispute, each country will likely have a different way of considering 
how much is “enough” scientific evidence and how the extra costs are calculated. 
Therefore, disputes are almost sure to arise in the near future at the WTO. 
 
2.7 Summary and conclusions 
Issues regarding climate change and energy security have led to the continued 
development of alternative fuels. In addition, the agricultural sector views biofuels as a 
future growth area that could help save a declining industry. Thus, development of a large 
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market for biofuel is judged to have two main benefits for North America. The first is a 
reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) for Canada, while we believe the U.S. 
will likely pursue subsidy to reduce dependence on imported oil from economically and 
politically volatile areas. Secondary advantages associated with using biofuels are rural 
development and the creation of new markets for agricultural commodities, leading to 
new jobs in the rural sector. The main disadvantage of using biofuels at the moment is its 
high cost relative to petroleum. Even at current petroleum prices, a biofuel market will 
not grow without being highly subsidized by governments.  
 
This research begins with the biofuel subsidy issue facing the US. Simply put, increased 
use of biofuels will help the US increase energy security. Next, we examine the Canadian 
perspective on biofuels, where we argue that the key factor encouraging subsidy is Kyoto 
commitments. By investing today in a biofuel market, these two governments effectively 
purchase an option for future consumption to meet either Kyoto commitments or 
demands of energy security.  
 
A theoretical real options model is developed to examine how the same governmental 
policy (subsidization) towards this issue under different motivation leads to various levels 
of optimal subsidies. Optimal biofuel subsidy in Canada is a function of price and 
quantity of biofuel consumed, and the quantity of oil that is replaced by biofuel. In 
contrast, the US optimal biofuel subsidy is a function of the same parameters plus the 
price of oil. Interpreting and solving the stochastic differential equations for each country 
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is analytically difficult and needs to be done using numerical methods. The two levels of 
optimal subsidies per capita solved here will be precisely quantified in future research.  
 
Note that if the level of subsidies for the development of biofuels industry in the two 
countries differs considerably, the likeliness of a trade dispute arising increases. Disputes 
will be a function of whether the subsidies are included in the so-called “green box” or 
not. If they are included in the green box being used for environmental reasons, they will 
not be actionable or limited, so there will be no trade problems. In this case, there should 
be scientific evidence that environmental benefits are provided and, second, the industry 
is subsidized because the biofuels are not priced competitively. However, the lack of 
clarity in current trade law in these areas means that future trade disputes are likely to 
arise (Kerr and Loppacher, 2004). 
 
Based on our theoretical model, we conclude that the levels of optimal subsidies in the 
two countries would be different in general, with the exception of two situations: when 
there is no demand for biofuels, in which case we concluded that optimal subsidies would 
be zero, and when the price of oil internalizes the externality which is produced by the 
consumption of oil. In all the other situations, the optimal subsidies would be different, 
increasing the potential for trade problems between the two countries.   
 143
 APPENDIX A – DERIVATION OF MEAN AND VARIANCE FOR 
~
S (Pindyck, 1993) 
 
We know that S(t) follows the following controlled diffusion process: 
 
dz)IS(IdtdS /S
21σ+−=        (2.A.1) 
                           
Following Pindyck (1993), we define the function M(S): 
 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ τ= ∫
T
t
t )t(SIdE)S(M        (2.A.2) 
                           
where T is the first time interval for S=0. We show that the expected value of S, which is 
expressed by M(S) would equal S. 
In order to derive the mean of S, we solve the Kolmogorov backward equation: 
 
 0
2
1 2 =+−σ IIMISM SSSS        (2.A.3) 
                          
subject to the following boundary conditions: 
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=
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         (2.A.4) 
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One clear solution of Eq. (2.A.3) subject to boundary conditions (2.A.4) is M(S)=S. 
 
The variance of S would equal: 
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We consider 
2
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
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⎡ τ= ∫
T
t
t SIdE)S(G and solve Kolmogorov backward equation (Karlin and 
Taylor, 1981): 
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subject to the following boundary conditions: 
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The solution of this equation is: 
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From Eq. (2.A.5) and (2.A.8), we obtain the variance of S: 
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APPENDIX B - CONTINGENT CLAIM ANALYSIS 
 
The US  
Given that the opportunity to invest is worth F(P, Q, O, y, S), n units of the asset with 
price P, m units of the asset with price Q, a units of the asset with price O, b units of the 
asset with price y and c units of the asset with price S are sold short.  
The value of the portfolio is: 
 
 ScybOaQmPnF ***** −−−−−=Φ      (2.B.1) 
              
As P, Q, O, y and S change, also the n, m, a, b and c will change from one short time 
interval to the next. Thus, the composition of the portfolio will continuously be changed. 
For each short time interval dt, we keep n, m, a, b and c fixed. 
 
As no rational investor would hold a long-run position in the project without a dividend 
payment, the short position in this portfolio requires payments of 
by , ,, o yqp aOmQnP δδδδ and cSsδ . δ  represents an opportunity cost of delaying the 
project and keeping the option to invest alive (Dixit and Pindick, 1994). In addition, as 
the investment is taking place a payment stream of I(t) should be paid to hold the 
investment opportunity. Thus, the total value of the portfolio is: 
 
)(
*****
tIcSby
aOmQnPScybOaQmPnF
sy
oqp
−−−
−−−−−−−−−=Φ
δδ
δδδ
      (2.B.2) 
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As a result, the instantaneous change in the value of the portfolio is: 
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Using Ito’s Lemma, we obtain: 
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where: 
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To make the portfolio riskless, we choose SQP FcFmFn ===== ,Fb ,Fa ,, yO . 
 
Thus, the change in the value of the portfolio becomes: 
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Over the time interval (t, t+dt), the holder of the portfolio will have the capital gain: 
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In the same time interval, the cost of the portfolio is: 
 
 dttISdtFydtFOdtFQdtFPdtF SSyyooqQpP )(+++++ δδδδδ   (2.B.9) 
 
The next step is to equate the value of the portfolio over the time interval (t, t+dt) to the 
riskless return: 
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After collecting the terms, we get the basic equation: 
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where,  
 
 ( ) IrS S −=δ−                  (2.B.12) 
            
Canada 
Given that the opportunity to invest is worth F(P, Q, D(y), S), n units of the asset with 
price P, m units of the asset with price Q, a units of the asset with price D(y) and b units 
of the asset with price S are sold short.  
The value of the portfolio is: 
 
 S*b)y(D*aQ*mP*nF −−−−=Φ               (2.B.13) 
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As P, Q, D(y) and S change, also the n, m, a and b will change from one short time 
interval to the next. Thus, the composition of the portfolio will continuously be changed. 
For each short time interval dt, we keep n, m, a and b fixed. 
 
As no rational investor would hold a long-run position in the project without a dividend 
payment, the short position in this portfolio requires payments of 
 ay ,mQ,nP idqp τγδδδ and bSsδ . δ  represents in fact an opportunity cost of delaying the 
project and keeping the option to invest alive (Dixit and Pindick, 1994). In addition, as 
the investment is taking place a payment stream of I(t) should be paid to hold the 
investment opportunity. Thus, the total value of the portfolio is: 
 
 )t(IbSaymQnPS*by*aQ*mP*nF sidqpi −δ−τγδ−δ−δ−−τγ−−−=Φ           
          (2.B.14) 
 
As a result, the instantaneous change in the value of the portfolio is: 
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Using Ito’s Lemma, we obtain: 
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To make the portfolio riskless, we choose SDQP Fb ,Fa ,Fm,Fn ==== . 
Thus, the change in the value of the portfolio becomes: 
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Over the time interval (t, t+dt), the holder of the portfolio will have the capital gain: 
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In the same time interval, the cost of the portfolio is: 
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The next step is to equate the value of the portfolio over the time interval (t, t+dt) to the 
riskless return: 
 
 ( )bSaDmQnPFr −−−−                 (2.B.22) 
     
After collecting the terms, we get the basic equation: 
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where,  
( ) IrS S −=δ−                  (2.B.24) 
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APPENDIX C – JUMP-DIFFUSION MODEL 
 
The jump-diffusion model links changes in price and the arrival of information. This type 
of model combines two types of information: the smooth variation in oil prices due to 
normal information, and the jump in prices caused by abnormal news or information. 
Smooth variation is modeled using a mean-reversion process (a continuous process), 
while jumps are captured with a Poisson process (a discrete time process). In turn, the 
Poisson-jump for petroleum prices can be either positive or negative, depending on the 
specific economic/political conditions. This means price can suffer a sudden increase or 
decrease. Note that the inter-arrival times of successive jumps must be independently and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. Figure 2.C.1 shows how the jump sizes 
for both cases, jump-up and jump-down, are random. 
 
Figure 2.C.1 Random Jumps Distribution 
 
Source: Dias and Rocha (1999) 
 
The rate of change in oil price can be written in the following manner: 
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The first term of Eq. (2.C.1) is a mean-reverting drift, where 
−
O  is the long-run 
equilibrium mean and η  is the speed of reversion. The second term represents continuous 
time uncertainty, where σ  is the volatility and dzO is a Wiener increment. The last term, 
dq, is the jump term, appearing with a probability dtλ (λ  is a Poisson arrival parameter). 
Finally, φ  is the jump size probability distribution, while the expected jump size is 
represented here by k.  
 
Using contingent claim analysis and following the same steps specified in Appendix B, 
the investment opportunity should satisfy the following partial differential equation: 
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Eq. (2.C.2) is linear in I, the rate of investment, and, thus, the maximization problem will 
have a bang-bang solution: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ≥−−=
otherwise
FSFI
tI SSSSm
,0
01
2
1,
)(
2σ
      (2.C.3) 
 155
REFERENCES 
 
Adner, R. and Levinthal, D. A. “What is not a real option: considering boundaries for 
the application of real options to business strategy.” Academy of Management 
Review 29(1) (2004): 74-85. 
 
Berg, C. “World fuel ethanol: analysis and outlook.” 2004. http://www.distill.com/ 
World-Fuel-Ethanol-A&O-2004.html. 
 
Black, F., and M. Scholes. “The pricing of options and corporate liabilities.” Journal of 
Political Economy  May-June (1973): 637-654. 
 
California Energy Commission (CEC). “1993-1994 California Transportation Energy 
Analysis Report.” Draft staff report and technical appendices, P300-94-002, 1994. 
 
Canadian Renewable Fuels Association. http://www.greenfuels.org/. 
 
Climate Change Saskatchewan. “Fueling a new economy.”  
http://www.climatechangesask .ca/downloads/Ethanol.may9.pdf. 
 
Dias, M.A.G. “Real Options Evaluation: Optimization under Uncertainty with Genetic 
Algorithms and Monte Carlo Simulation.” Working Paper, Dept. of Electrical 
Engineering, PUC-Rio, 2000. http://www.puc-rio.br/marco.ind/monte-
carlo.html#mc-ga. 
 
Dias, M.A.G., and K.M.C. Rocha. “Petroleum concessions with extendible options 
using mean reversion with jumps to model the oil prices.” Working paper no. 620, 
Institute for Applied Economic Research, 1999. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=159692. 
 
Dixit, A.K., and R.S. Pindyck. Investment under uncertainty.” New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1994. 
 
Duffield, J.A., and K. Collins. “Evolution of Renewable Energy Policy.” Choices 
Magazine  21(1) (2006). http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2006-1/biofuels/2006-
1-02.htm. 
 
Duncan, M. “U.S. Federal initiatives to support biomass research and development.” 
Journal of Industrial Ecology 7 (3-4)(2004): 193-201. 
 
Emery, Herbert J.C. and McKenzie, Kenneth J. “Damned if you do, damned if you 
don’t: an option value approach to evaluating the subsidy of the CPR mainline.” 
Canadian Journal of Economics XXIX(2)(1996): 255-270. 
 
 156
Energy Information Administration. http://www.eia.doe.gov/. 
 
Environment Canada. “Canada's 2005 Greenhouse Gas Inventory. A Summary of 
Trends.” 2007. 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2005/2005summary_e.cfm. 
 
Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs, Belgium. “The external 
costs of transportation.” 2001. 
http://www.belspo.be/belspo/home/publ/pub_ostc/mobil/rapp04_en.pdf. 
 
Government of Canada. “Action Plan 2000 on Climate Change.”  
http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/english/publications/ap2000/Action_Plan_2000_
en.pdf. 
 
Grigoriu, M. Stochastic Calculus: Applications in Science and Engineering. Boston: 
Birkhäuser, 2002. 
 
Grossman, G.M., and C. Shapiro. “Optimal Dynamic R&D Programs.” Rand Journal 
of Economics 17(4)(1986): 581-593. 
 
Hasset, K. A., and G.E. Metcalf. “Energy tax credits and residential conservation 
investment: Evidence from panel data.” Journal of Public Economics 57(1995): 
201-217. 
 
International Energy Agency. Biofuels for transport: An international perspective. 
OECD, 2004. 
 
International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC) and Renewable 
Energy and International Law (REIL). “WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: 
Opportunities and Constraints in the Creation of a Global Marketplace.” 2006. 
http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/DiscussionPapers/WTO_Disciplines_Biofu
els.pdf. 
 
Isik, M. “Incentives for technology adoption under environmental policy uncertainty: 
Implications for green payment programs.” Environmental and resource 
economics 27(3)(2004): 247-263. 
 
Karlin, S., and H.M. Taylor. A second course in stochastic processes. New York: 
Academic Press, 1981. 
 
Kerr, W.A., and L.J. Loppacher. “Trading biofuels – Will international trade law be a 
constraint?” Current Agriculture, Food and Resource Issues 6 (2005): 50-62. 
 
 157
Ketcham, B. and Komanoff, C. “Win-Win Transportation: A No-Losers Approach to 
Financing Transport in New York City and the Region.” Draft. Transportation 
Alternatives, 1992. 
 
Khanna, M., M. Isik, and A. Winter-Nelson. “Investment in site-specific crop 
management under uncertainty: implications for nitrogen pollution control and 
environmental policy.” Agricultural Economics 24(2000): 9-21. 
 
Klass, D. “Biomass energy in North American policies.” Energy Policy 23 (12)(1995): 
1035-1048. 
 
Klein, K., Romain. R, Olar M. and Bergeron N. “Ethanol and biodiesel in Canada: 
Can they help meet Canada’s Kyoto commitment?” Current Agriculture, Food & 
Resource Issues  5(2004): 221-237. 
 
Luehrman, T.A. “Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the 
Numbers.” Harvard Business Review (1998): 54-67. 
 
Mackenzie, J. J., Dower, R.C. and Chen, D.D.T. “The Going Rate: What It Really 
Costs to Drive.” Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 1992. 
 
Majd, S., and R.S. Pindyck. “Time to build, option value, and investment decisions.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 18(1987): 7-27. 
 
McDonald, R., and D. Siegel. “The value of waiting to invest.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 101(4)(1986): 707-727. 
 
McGrath, R.G., Ferrier, W.J. and Mendelow, A.L. “Real options as engines of choice 
and heterogeneity.” Academy of Management Review 29(1)(2004): 86-101. 
 
Millock, K., and C. Nauges. “Energy price uncertainty and firm abatement investment 
choice.” Paper presented at EAERE thirteen annual conference, Budapest, 
Hungary, 2004. 
 
Mun, J. Real options analysis course: business cases and software applications. New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003. 
 
Murphy, J.J., and M.A. Delucchi. “A review of the literature on the social cost of motor 
vehicle use in the United States.” Journal of Transportation and Statistics 1 
(1)(1998): 15-42. 
 
Niven, R.K. “Ethanol in gasoline: environmental impacts and sustainability review 
article.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 9 (6)(2005): 535-555. 
 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada. “The Commissioner’s perspective-2006.” 
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/c20060900xe03.html. 
 158
 
Olfert, R. and Weseen, S. “Assessing the viability of an ethanol industry in 
Saskatchewan.” The Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy. Public Policy Paper 
48 (2007). 
http://www.uregina.ca/sipp/documents/pdf/PPP48_OlfertWeseen_online.pdf. 
 
Pimentel, D. “Ethanol fuels: energy balance, economics, and environmental impacts are 
negative.” Natural Resources Research 12(2)(2003): 127-134. 
 
Pindyck, R.S. “Investment of uncertain cost.” Journal of Financial Economics 34(1993): 
53-76. 
 
Purvis, A., G. Boggess, C.B. Moss, and J. Holt. “Technology adoption decisions under 
irreversibility and uncertainty: an ex ante approach.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 77(1995): 541-551. 
 
Rask, K. N. “Clean air and renewable fuels: the market for fuel ethanol in the US from 
1984 to 1993.” Energy Economics 20(1998): 325-345. 
 
Renewable Fuels Association. “US fuel ethanol demand.” 2005a. 
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/#C. 
 
Renewable Fuels Association. “Ethanol facts: trade.” 2005b. 
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/resource/facts/trade/. 
 
Renewable Fuels Association. “Synergy in Energy: Ethanol industry outlook in 2004.” 
2004. http://www.ethanolrfa.org/2004outlook.pdf. 
 
Renewable Fuels Association. “Small producer credit amendment sought in economic 
stimulus bill.” Bob Dinneen – RFA President, 2001. 
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/ereports/er102401.html. 
 
Roberts, K., and M.L. Weitzman. “Funding criteria for research, development, and 
exploration projects.” Econometrica 49(1981): 1261-1288. 
 
Schwartz, E.S., and M. Moon. “Evaluating Research and Development Investments.” In 
Project Flexibility, Agency, and Competition, edited by Michael J. Brennan and 
Lenos Trigeorgis, 85-106. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000. 
 
Selivanova, Y. “WTO rules and sustainable energy policies.” Bridges 7(2006): 9-10. 
http://www.trade-
environment.org/page/ictsd/Bridges_Monthly/energy_11_06.pdf. 
 
Transport Canada. “Transportation and climate change: options for action.” 1999. 
http://www.tc.gc.ca/programs/environment/climatechangesubgroups1/OptionsPap
er/English/default.htm. 
 159
 
Tol, R.S.J. “The marginal cost of greenhouse gas emissions.” The Energy Journal 20 
(1)(1999): 61-81. 
 
Trigeorgis, L. “The Nature of Option Interactions and the Valuation of Investments with 
Multiple Real Options.” The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28 
(1)(1993):1-20. 
 
Trigeorgis, L. “Real Options: An Overview.” In Real Options and Investment under 
Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions, edited by Eduardo S. 
Schwartz and Lenos Trigeorgis, 103-134. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2001. 
 
US Department of Energy. http://www.energy.gov. 
 
Victoria Transport Policy Institute. “Transportation Costs and Benefits: Resources for 
measuring transportation costs and benefits.” TDM Encyclopedia, 2004. 
http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm66.htm#_Toc18284958. 
 
Weitzman, M.L., W. Newey, and M. Rabin. “Sequential R&D strategy for synfuels.” 
Bell Journal of Economics 12(2)(1981): 574-590. 
 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (“SCM Agreement”).  1994a. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm. 
 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Domestic support in agriculture: The Boxes. 
2004a. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm. 
 
WTRG Economics. “Oil Price History and Analysis.” http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 160
 
 
 
ESSAY 3: ANTIDUMPING ACTIONS AND FREE 
RIDING 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Anti-dumping (AD) actions are legal measures permitted under Article VI of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While AD was little used in the past, its 
prominence as a trade policy instrument has been increasing rapidly in recent years. 
Historically, traditional users of anti-dumping actions were the United States (US), 
European Union (EU), Canada and Australia, who accounted for more than two-thirds of 
the AD cases between 1990 and 1995. Developing countries became more active in AD 
actions after the adoption of the Antidumping Agreement within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) framework in 1995 (Das, 2003). AD use has increased dramatically 
over the last two decades due to the reduction and even the elimination of most other 
trade policy instruments (tariffs, quotas, variable levies, voluntary export restraints, etc.). 
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In theory, AD actions should be used only in the case of “unfair” trade practices, but in 
practice, due to the way that AD is defined in trade law, they are used for different 
motives – primarily to provide economic protection. Prusa and Skeath (2001) found 
evidence that two types of motives characterize an increase in the number of AD actions, 
for both traditional and new users: economic and strategic motives. Economic motives 
are related to the traditional view of AD as a reaction to “unfair” trade and to the new 
view of AD being a mechanism for providing economic protection. The strategic motives 
are centred on retaliation16 and club17 motives.  
 
The guidelines provided by GATT/WTO anti-dumping code are implemented by each 
member state. The WTO guidelines provide both requirements that must be fulfilled in 
order to impose an AD measure and detailed procedural requirements. The latter governs 
the conduct of AD investigations and the imposition and maintenance of AD measures. 
As the WTO guidelines are somewhat vague, each country interprets them in different 
ways, leading to substantial variation among AD statutes. A failure to respect any of the 
requirements can be taken to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body and the offending 
country may be required to bring the measure into conformity with the Agreement or face 
retaliation if it fails to do so. In the US, two governmental agencies are authorized to 
handle an AD case: the International Trade Administration (ITA), which has the role of 
determining whether there are sales at less than fair value and the International Trade 
Commission (ITC), which determines whether a US industry is or might be materially 
injured. 
                                                 
16 AD is used as a tool to retaliate/punish those countries which have used it in the past. 
17 The traditional users of AD law form a “club” and tend to use the law against each other rather than 
against the non-club members. 
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The cost of conducting an AD case in the US is high, including the administrative costs 
and the cost of hiring a legal counsel, which has the role of proving to the International 
Trade Commission (ITC) that the domestic US industry has been injured by the imports. 
A firm will contribute to AD expenditures as long as the probability of winning the case 
is high and the expected benefits of winning an AD action are higher than the costs. 
Clearly, if a firm realizes that its participation in an AD petition does not increase the 
probability of winning, it will choose not to participate.  There is some empirical 
evidence suggesting that when firms form broad coalitions in an AD case, the chances of 
winning are higher and, as result, the individual costs are smaller.  
 
In this research, the indirect benefits of an AD case are considered to be a public good. 
The exporting firm that dumped goods in the importer’s (home) market would reduce its 
exports to the specific country and all producers in the industry will benefit from the 
increase in price. Only the firms that lobby for protection have to bear the costs, while the 
benefits are shared by all the firms in the industry, leading to the possibility of free riding. 
In this light, Herander and Pupp (1991) define free riding as “a situation where firms 
abstain from contributing to a collectively profitable action” (pp. 136). 
 
Secondly, anti-dumping benefits will be considered a joint product having both public 
and private characteristics. This situation can be applied for US only because of the so-
called Byrd Amendment. This Amendment stipulates that any duties assessed from an 
antidumping case will be shared among the firms that supported the original petitions. 
 163
The outcome of the Byrd Amendment is expected to be that free riding decreases and, in 
addition, that the number of petitions will increase.  
 
Consequently, this chapter will address the following question: Can it be shown 
analitically that an AD petition opens the possibility of free riding when the benefits of an 
AD case are considered a public good or a joint product?  
 
In order to be able to analyze the behaviour of a firm faced with the decision of whether 
or not to participate in an AD action, it is important to understand how dumping is 
defined and how to open an AD case, what the main procedures are and the timetables 
followed in an AD investigation, specifically in the US, and finally, how the Byrd 
Amendment creates an incentive for firms to participate in an AD case.  
 
Given the increased use of AD actions and debate among trade policy analysts, 
economists and politicians regarding the fairness of AD as a trade policy instrument, this 
chapter starts by analyzing definitions of dumping and the tests used in AD 
investigations. This first section is important in understanding why AD actions are used 
as a trade protection instrument. As the chapter concentrates on the US AD 
investigations, the next section reports general statistical information pertaining to AD 
and, specifically, the procedures and timetables for US AD investigations. By outlining 
the main steps of an AD investigation, the reader will get a feeling about the risks and the 
delays that the firms face when operate internationally. The main characteristics of the 
Byrd Amendment are outlined, as well as the effects of the Byrd Amendment on firms’ 
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decisions regarding filing an AD petition. The chapter continues with an AD case-study, 
which highlights the steps in the US investigation procedure and shows which economic 
facts are taken into account when judging whether dumping takes place. After 
understanding how an AD investigation is handled, the research focuses on firms’ 
behavior concerning the decision whether or not to participate in an AD investigation. In 
the next section, the literature on AD, lobbying and free riding is reviewed, followed by a 
discussion of the methodology and results obtained in this research. The study ends with 
a section outlining a potential empirical analysis that would explore the firm’s decision 
regarding participation in an AD case along with a summary and conclusions.  
 
3.2 Dumping 
In theory, AD actions are intended to be used only against exporters suspected of “unfair” 
pricing practices. “Unfair” pricing practices are considered situations in which the 
products are exported at less than normal or fair value, and the domestic industry is 
injured or likely to be injured by the unfairly priced imports. Normal value is defined as 
the price of like goods in the exporter’s country or, alternatively, the average cost of the 
exporting firm.  
 
The GATT Antidumping Agreement defines dumping in three ways: 
Article 2.1: For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being 
dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal 
value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than 
the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for like product when destined for 
consumption in the exporting country. 
 
Article 2.2: When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in 
the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market 
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situation or the low volume of sales in the domestic market of the exporting country, such 
sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by 
comparison with a comparable price of like product when exported to an appropriate 
third country, provided that this price is representative, or with the cost of production in 
the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general 
costs and for profits.  
 
Thus, AD actions should combat international price discrimination or selling below cost. 
Both price discrimination and selling below cost are, however, normal business practices 
domestically: legal profit maximizing/loss minimizing strategies of firms.  
 
The first definition, according to Article 2.1, can be called the “price discrimination” 
definition18. A firm can be accused of dumping if it sells a product in a foreign market at 
a price lower than the price in the home market. Price discrimination is a normal business 
practice that a profit-maximizing firm follows when it faces different demand curves in 
different markets. Therefore, selling at different prices in different markets might be 
evidence of market power, but not necessarily of unfair pricing being practiced against 
domestic firms.  
 
The second definition in Article 2.2, the so called “selling below cost” definition, allows 
proof of dumping if the price charged by the firm in the importer’s market is less than the 
exporting firm’s cost of production plus “administrative, selling and general costs”. Firms 
often sell below cost in the short-run either because markets are depressed or because 
they want to dispose of inventory. Selling below cost domestically is not an “unfair” 
business practice, as firms continue to operate while minimizing their losses.  
                                                 
18 The second definition – the “third market test” is simply a variation of the price discrimination definition 
and will not be considered further. 
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However, selling at different prices in different markets and selling below cost are 
characteristics of predatory pricing, which is an “unfair” business practice in domestic 
competition laws in a number of countries. Price discrimination and selling below cost 
represent necessary conditions for predatory pricing to occur, but they are not sufficient 
conditions. It can be shown that in the short-run, a price-discriminating monopolist could 
lose money in both markets19. While waiting for markets to recover, the firm will price to 
minimize its losses and not to drive out the competitors in the lower-priced market. It is 
also possible that a firm can cover a cost in the high-priced market, but not in the low-
priced market. In addition, when judging if a firm is predatory pricing, it is important to 
know that firms do not maximize profits in the short-run. Thus, the short-run profit 
maximizing models that predict a firm’s pricing strategy are not applicable because, in 
the case of predatory pricing, the firm must endure a long period of losses in forcing 
competitors out of business. Finally, it might be impossible for these firms to avoid the 
competitors’ re-entry when price is raised after monopolizing the market (Kerr, 2001; 
McGee, 1958).  
 
Graphically, situations where activities defined as dumping are instead simple profit 
maximizing activities are illustrated in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 (Kerr, 2006). In the 
figures below, DH represents the domestic demand, DF is the foreign demand and both 
demand functions are downward sloping suggesting that the firm has some degree of 
market power in both markets.  The profit maximizing output (QT) is determined by 
setting total marginal revenue (MRT=MRH +MRF) equal to marginal cost (MC). The 
quantities that the firm provides in each market (QH and QF) lie at the intersection 
                                                 
19 Of course, if adverse market conditions persist, then the firm will have to exit both markets. 
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between marginal cost for which the total quantity is produced and the marginal revenue 
curves in each market.  The firm will charge price PH in the home market and PF in the 
foreign market, prices being found at the intersection of quantity provided in the market 
and the respective demand curves20. Figure 3.1 shows the situation where the firm price 
discriminates and makes profit in both markets. In this case, as the price in the foreign 
market is lower than the price in the home market, the firm could be accused of dumping 
even while simply following a profit maximization strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Consider the monopolist’s problem of selecting the output level in the two markets: home and foreign. In 
each market k, the firm’s revenue is given by: kkkkk qqpqR *)()( = , where pk is the price charged in 
market k and qk is the output produced in market k. Thus, the firm’s profit maximization problem is: 
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1111 . Thus, the monopolist will charge the same price in the two 
countries only when the price elasticities of the demand curves in the two countries are the same. The total 
revenue is increased when the higher price is charged in the country that has the least-elastic demand 
(Friedman, 2002). 
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Figure 3.1 International price discrimination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3.2, the firm makes profit in the home market and losses in the foreign market, 
but there is no “unfair” pricing strategy, as the firm is maximizing profit/minimizing 
losses in the short-run. According to the situation depicted in Figure 3.2, this firm could 
be accused of dumping both on the price-discrimination and selling below cost 
definitions, as there are profits available in the home market that could potentially be 
used to cross-subsidize the losses in foreign market. Finally, figure 3.3 shows the case in 
which the firm incurs losses in both markets, but, again, this firm can be accused of 
dumping according to both definitions. From the firm’s perspective, this situation might 
represent a best short-run strategy in cases when markets become depressed after the firm 
has made fixed investments in plant and equipment, but output cannot be sustained in the 
long-run. Clearly, in the long-run this firm will be obliged to exit. 
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Figure 3.2 Price discrimination and selling below cost: profit in home market and losses 
in foreign market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Figure 3.3 Price discrimination and selling below cost: losses in both markets 
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In most of the trade literature AD is considered as an instrument of protection – simply a 
means of restricting imports. The poor economic rationale behind dumping allows 
protectionist interests to threaten foreign competitors and to use existing domestic 
mechanisms for harassment, through the costs required to prepare legal defences as well 
as a loss of revenues from temporary reductions in market access. There is substantial 
evidence that AD is used even in the absence of any actual dumping. As a result, the 
decision to file an AD petition can be viewed as purely a rent-seeking activity. For 
instance, AD actions can be used to reduce imports when international markets decline. 
Considering that if the importing market is depressed, prices would decrease and many 
firms would sell below cost. Politicians would be pressed by industry for trade protection 
and, at the same time, domestic firms would complain that they are being injured by the 
imports. In the US, for example, politicians can deflect requests for protection by sending 
the complainants to ITC to open an AD case. The ITC can undertake a quick preliminary 
investigation that can conclude there is a possibility that the US firms are experiencing 
substantial damage caused by imports at unfairly low prices. If a positive preliminary 
determination of dumping is reached, a temporary AD duty will be imposed on imports 
from the offending firm or firms. Further, a full investigation would follow in order to 
assess if dumping actually occurred. In the case where it is found that no dumping took 
place, the foreign firms get back money paid as AD duty, but until the full investigation is 
over, the foreign firms access to the importer’s market is inhibited. Hence, even if 
dumping is not occurring, the domestic firm gets short-term protection. 
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We cannot conclude that the substantial increase in AD activity can be explained just by 
the growth of “unfair” trade. Information on AD actions and the main motives for the 
increase in the number of AD cases will be outlined in the next section. 
 
3.3 The use of antidumping actions and AD investigation procedure 
 
3.3.1 AD statistics 
The first antidumping legislation was put in place in Canada in 1904 and the 1947 GATT 
also included antidumping provisions (Kerr, 2001). Dumping was defined as price 
discrimination in the original GATT and that definition has remained unchanged. For the 
pre-1980 period, there was no exact accounting of AD activity as under GATT 
regulations, countries were not obliged to report AD actions – which were carried out by 
domestic institutions in importing countries. However, during this time, AD disputes 
were very rare because the GATT rules for imposing duties were difficult to satisfy. 
Further, tariffs in general were higher and, as a result, industries were less exposed to 
import competition. The major users of AD at the time were the US, EU, Australia, 
Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. On average, two or three dozen cases were filed 
each year. Existing information shows that only 5% of AD cases resulted in duties being 
imposed until the early 1970s (Blonigen and Prusa, 2001).  
 
The Tokyo Round, which concluded in 1979, brought many changes to AD law, two of 
which were very important. First, the definition of dumping was expanded to include 
sales below cost and not only price discrimination. The second change was the removal 
of one important piece of evidence that was required before duties were imposed – to 
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demonstrate that the dumped imports are the main cause for material injury. The latter 
provision was also part of the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code. As a result, during 
1980s alone, there were more than 1600 AD cases filed worldwide, with 99% being filed 
by US, EU, Australia and Canada (Finger, 1993). Starting with the early 1990s, 
developing countries (i.e., new users) started to file more and more cases - over half of 
AD petitions were filed by developing countries by the mid-1990s. Finger et al. (2000) 
have found that between 1995, when the WTO came into effect, and 2000, developing 
countries initiated 559 cases compared to 463 cases by developed countries (Table 3.1). 
And between 1995 and 2003, there were 2416 antidumping cases initiated worldwide 
(Young and Wainio, 2005). As Blonigen and Prusa (2001) suggest, the increase in AD 
activity cannot be explained by an increase in “unfair” trade, rather it is simply a result of 
weakening the AD requirements. Other researchers found two additional reasons to 
explain the growth in AD disputes. Ongoing tariff liberalization, which leads to more 
trade, in turn led to increased stress for import competing industries. The second reason is 
that safeguards are considered unsatisfactory by firms facing declining international 
competitiveness (Hansen and Prusa, 1995; Miranda, Torres and Ruiz, 1998; Finger, Ng 
and Wangchuk, 2000). Prusa (1992) argues that the increase in AD activity takes place 
because of the in terrorem effect, which means that by harassing the foreign rivals 
through antidumping, the domestic industry receives benefits.  
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Table 3.1 Numbers and percentages of antidumping initiations 
by country group, 1995-1999 
By/Against 
Industrial 
Economiesa 
Developing 
Economiesb 
China, 
PRCc 
Transition 
Economiesd 
All 
Economies
Numbers of Antidumping Initiations 
Industrial 
Economies 127 274 54 62 463 
Developing 
Economies 178 282 82 99 559 
Transition 
Economies 3 1 1 3 7 
All Economies 308 557 137 164 1029 
Percentages of Antidumping Initiations 
Industrial 
Economies 27 59 12 13 100 
Developing 
Economies 32 50 15 18 100 
Transition 
Economies 43 14 14 43 100 
All Economies 30 54 13 16 100 
a Include USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and 15 European 
Union members. 
b All other economies excluding industrial economies and transition economies. 
c Exclude Hong Kong, China; Macau, China; and Chinese Taipei. 
d Include 27 transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Source: Finger et. al. (2000) 
 
In the case of the US, the number of AD cases grew from 223 in the pre-1980 period 
(starting with 1955) to 1024 in the post-1980 period. From the total number of petitions 
filed, an affirmative decision was reached in 45% of cases in the pre-1980 era, compared 
to 67% in the post-1980 period. Figure 3.4 shows the total number of US AD cases for 
the period 1980-2004 and the final decision for each of them. In the same period of time, 
the top two countries that were cited in US AD cases were China and Japan, followed by 
Korea, Germany and Taiwan. Canada is in sixth place (Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.4 Antidumping case summary, by number of cases, fiscal years 1980-2004 
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Source: US International Trade Commission (USITC) (2005b) 
 
Figure 3.5 Top ten countries cited in antidumping cases, by number of cases, fiscal years 
1980-2004, cumulative 
 
 
Source: US International Trade Commission (USITC) (2005b) 
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The trend in AD during the 1990s shows that the US became from the worlds’ most 
prolific user of AD law the second most investigated country after China (Prusa and 
Skeath, 2001). 
 
In the US, one agency handles dumping determination (ITA) and another handles injury 
determination (ITC), while other countries such as the EU and Australia have a single 
agency that makes both determinations. This bifurcated approach has the advantage that 
the outcome is more objective as the two different agencies should reach the same 
conclusion. For example, in the US, ITA has issued only three negative less than fair 
value (LTFV) determinations in the past decade (out of almost 400 determinations). The 
advantage of the unified approach is that it reduces the resources required and avoids 
conflicting results (Blonigen and Prusa, 2001). The next section will describe the main 
steps of an AD investigation process in the US, including a description of the statutory 
timetable. 
 
3.3.2 US investigation procedure 
If domestic producers believe that foreign competitors are dumping merchandise in their 
market, a home firm or a coalition of firms can initiate an AD case. Each country has its 
own procedures regarding AD cases. The WTO guidelines leave room for considerable 
latitude in the design of domestic AD institutions and procedures and member states 
apply the guidelines in their own way. There are some key similarities and differences 
among the members’ arrangements for dealing with dumping (Blonigen and Prusa, 
2001). The US investigation procedure is the focus of this section. 
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The two US governmental organizations responsible for carrying out AD cases are the 
US Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration (ITA) and US 
International Trade Commission (ITC). ITA determines whether there are sales at less 
than fair value, while ITC determines whether a US industry is or might be materially 
injured. Fair value is expressed by the foreign firm’s domestic price after adjustments for 
differences in the products, purchased quantities or the sale circumstances that are taken 
into account. When there is no domestic market for the exported good, the price of the 
product in a third market would be considered and, finally, in absence of domestic and 
third market sales, a constructed value is used, which is calculated as the cost plus profit 
– an approximation of average total cost. Injury can take the form of depressed prices; 
lost sales; decline in sales, reduced market share, lower profits, reduced productivity, 
lower than expected return on investment; decreased production capacity; increased 
imports from the specific exporter; decreased employment, falling wages, mounting 
inventories and constraints in the ability to raise capital (ITA).  
 
In the US, a petition can be filed on behalf of the industry if “(i) the domestic producers 
or workers who support the petition account for at least 25 percent of the total production 
of the domestic like product, and (ii) the domestic producers or workers who support the 
petition account for more than 50 percent of the production of the domestic like product 
produced by that portion of the industry expressing support for or opposition to the 
petition.” (US International Trade Commission, “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Handbook”, 2005a, pp.16). Thus, the number of firms that participate in a petition plays 
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an important role in reaching a conclusion, (i.e. that the domestic industry is harmed) and 
ultimately whether to impose an AD duty against foreign exporters or not.  
 
According to ITC, the investigation process has five steps: (1) initiation of the 
investigation by ITA; (2) the preliminary phase of the ITC’s investigation; (3) the 
preliminary phase of the ITA’s investigation; (4) the final phase of the ITA’s 
investigation; and (5) the final phase of the ITC’s investigation. Except for stage 3, a 
negative determination by either organization leads to termination of the proceedings. 
The interested party should file a petition with both the ITA and the ITC. In stage 1, the 
ITA should determine in 20 days if the case contains the elements and information 
necessary for the imposition of a duty. In stage 2, within 45 days, the ITC should make a 
material injury determination. The preliminary phase of ITC determination can be broken 
into six stages: (1) institution of the investigation and scheduling of the preliminary 
phase; (2) questionnaires; (3) staff conference and briefs; (4) staff report and memoranda; 
(5) briefing and vote; and (6) determination and views of the Commission. In stage 3, 
within 160 days after the petition was submitted, the ITA makes a preliminary 
determination whether there is reasonable information to believe that imports are being 
sold at less than fair value. If the evaluation of the ITA is affirmative, after publishing the 
notice of determination in Federal Register, all the subjected imports are liquidated and 
the importers are required to post a cash deposit or a bond on the estimated weighted 
dumping margin. Within 235 days after the date the petition was filed, in Stage 4, the 
ITA is required to make a final determination whether or not the imports are sold at less 
than fair value. In stage 5, within 280 days after the date of filing the petition, the ITC 
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should determine whether or not the US industry is materially injured by the respective 
imports. The final phase of the Commission’s investigation may be broken down into 
eight stages: (1) scheduling of the final phase; (2) questionnaires; (3) pre-hearing staff 
report; (4) hearing and briefs; (5) final staff report and memoranda; (6) closing of the 
record and final comments by parties; (7) briefing and vote; and (8) determination and 
views of the Commission. The statutory timetable for an AD investigation is presented in 
Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6: Statutory timetable for antidumping investigations (in days) 
 
 
Source: US International Trade Commission (USITC)[a]
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After a maximum of five years from the publication of a decision regarding an 
antidumping investigation, the two commissions, ITA and ITC, conduct a review, called 
a “sunset review”, to determine whether the annulment of an AD order would lead to the 
continuation or repetition of dumping and of material injury. Again, the ITA determines 
if the dumping will continue or recur and the ITC would determine if the material injury 
would continue or recur. If both agencies reach affirmative answers, the order is 
continued for another five years, otherwise the order is revoked.  The timetable for the 
sunset review is presented in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 Timetable for five-year reviews 
ACTION/EVENT DAY 
Notice of institution published in the Federal Register 0 
Entries of appearance/APO applications 21 
Responses to notice of institution 50 
Comments on appropriateness of expedited review 75 
Notice of expedited or full review 95 
Source: US International Trade Commission (USITC) (1998) 
 
In case the interested parties do not respond or they give inadequate responses to the 
notice of initiation, the ITA and ITC take a final decision in a short time. These reviews 
are named “expedited” reviews (Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3 Expedited Review 
ACTION/EVENT DAY 
Commerce expedited determination (if issued) 120 
Staff report to Commission and parties 122 
Written submission on merits by parties 127 
Commission vote 140 
Commission determination and views transmitted to Commerce 150 
Source: US International Trade Commission (USITC) (1998) 
 
In cases where the interested parties respond adequately to the notice of initiation, both 
commissions will conduct reviews that are called “full” reviews (Table 3.4).  
 
Table 3.4 Full Review 
ACTION/EVENT DAY 
New entries of appearance/APO applications 180 
Draft questionnaires to parties for comment 190 
Party comments on draft questionnaires 205 
Questionnaires mail date 225 
Commerce subsidy/dumping determination 240 
Questionnaires return date 255 
Prehearing report to Commission and parties 285 
Prehearing briefs 295 
Hearing 305 
Posthearing briefs 315 
Staff report to Commission and parties 330 
Final party comments 340 
Commission vote 348 
Commission determination and views transmitted to Commerce 360 
Source: US International Trade Commission (USITC)(1998) 
 
Sunset reviews were introduced in the antidumping and countervailing duty laws in the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act approved in late 1994. All the antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders issued after January 1, 1995 are reviewed five years after they 
became effective. All antidumping and countervailing duties orders issued before 1995 
were reviewed starting in July 1998 and completed in February 2001. The five-year 
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reviews for the pre-1995 orders are known as “transition” reviews. Out of 309 cases of 
transition reviews, 53% were not revoked, while 47% of cases were cancelled by either 
one of the commissions. Regarding the non-transition reviews, there are a total number of 
114 cases, with 71% not being revoked, 28% cancelled by either commission and 1% 
terminated (Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7 Five-year review investigations, outcomes by number of cases, fiscal years 
1998-2004 
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Source: US International Trade Commission (2005b) 
 
In the US, any AD duties collected are deposited in the General Fund of the US Treasury. 
However, according to a new bill titled “The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act” (CDSOA), which was enacted in 2000, the AD duties are shared among the AD 
petitioners. This bill, which is also known as “Byrd Amendment”, is outlined in the next 
section. 
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3.4 Byrd Amendment 
In January 1999, Senator Mike DeWine of Ohio introduced a bill titled “The Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act” (CDSOA). The bill stipulated that any duties assessed 
from an AD case should be distributed on an annual basis to “the affected domestic 
producers for qualifying expenditures” (USITC [b]), which means that the duties will be 
shared among the companies that supported the original petitions. Senator Byrd 
sponsored the bill in the senate, which was enacted on October 28, 2000 as part of the 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2001. This is why the law is called Byrd amendment. 
 
The Byrd amendment is applied in cases where foreign products continues to be 
subsidized or dumped in the US market after an AD or CV duty has already been 
assessed. According to this law, the revenues collected from an AD or CVD case are 
distributed to the producers hurt by unfair trade, represented by petitioners and interested 
parties, and they are not deposited in the General Fund of the US Treasury as had 
previously been the case. The affected producers are represented by any “manufacturer, 
producer, farmer, rancher or worker representative (including associations of these 
individuals)” that was a petitioner or interested party in support of an AD or CVD 
petition and remains in operation21. Thus, the CDSOA does not consider eligible for 
duties distribution those companies that did not agree with the opening of a petition, 
those that ended the production of a product covered by an order and those that were 
acquired by companies who were against a petition. The expenses that are incurred by the 
affected producers between the issuing of an AD or CVD order and its termination and 
                                                 
21 19 U.S.C. 1675 c(b)(1) 
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that are offset by the duties include “manufacturing facilities, equipment, research and 
development, personnel training, acquisition of technology, health care benefits for 
employees paid by the employer, pension benefits for employees paid by the employer, 
environmental equipment, training, or technology, acquisition of raw materials and other 
inputs and working capital or other funds needed to maintain production”22.  
 
There are two agencies that implement CDSOA: the US International Trade Commission 
(ITC), which has the responsibility of developing a list with all eligible producers and US 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which has the responsibility of annually 
distributing the collected duties to the eligible producers. Also CBP has the responsibility 
for establishing the procedures for the distribution of payments and to publish in the 
Federal Register a notice of intent to distribute payments and a list with all the eligible 
domestic producers (US Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2005). A “Clearing 
Account” is established for each individual AD and CVD order under which the CBP 
places all estimated AD and CVD that are deposited with the CBP. When the duties are 
paid, the funds are distributed in “Special Accounts” opened for each individual case, 
from which the disbursements are made to the individual claimants. As the offset 
payments that will be distributed are limited by the funds available in the Special 
Accounts, the actual payment can cover only a small proportion compared to what is 
claimed (Grimmett and Jones, 2005). If the amount collected for a specific order is 
insufficient to pay everything that it was claimed, a pro rata share would be given to each 
claimant (Table 3.5). According to the pro rata formula, the individual disbursement 
percentage is determined based on the qualifying expenditures submitted. Thus, this 
                                                 
22 19 U.S.C. 1675 c(b)(4) 
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creates an incentive for producers to claim as many expenses as possible compared with 
the other producers, potentially giving them a larger share of funds (GAO, 2005). 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the total amounts disbursed represented maximum of 0.02 
percentage from the total amount claimed over the years, while the claims increased from 
almost 1.2 trillion dollars in 2001 to more than 3 trillion dollars in 2006, suggesting an 
incentive exists for producers to claim more. Most of the total disbursement in 2004, 
93%, was given to producers of ball bearings, steel, petroleum wax candles, cement, food 
products, computer chips, polyester fiber, pencils, softwood lumber and industrial belts 
(Grimmett and Jones, 2005).  
 
The CBP distributes the payments within 60 days of the first day of the next fiscal year 
and, also, a final annual report with all claims and disbursements has to be completed 
after all the payments have been made for the fiscal year.  
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Table 3.5 Key distributions under the Byrd Amendment 2001-2006 
 (dollars) 
 
*An additional US$50 million pending distribution as of 1 March 2004. 
Parentheses indicate refunds to importers.  
Sources: Harris and Devadoss, 2005; Grimmett and Jones, 2005, US Customs and Border Protection. 
Case no.   Commodity/origin   2001 2002 2003*   2004 2005 2006 
A-122-838  Softwood lumber/Canada   - 24,016  5,306,436  3,229,963 - 
A-201-802  Gray portland cement and clinker/Mexico 3,253,895  3,564  2,112 21,293,059 2,185,990 - 
A-201-822  Stainless steel sheet and strip/Mexico 34,034 5,240,895 3,376,035 5,805,231 5,369,130 - 
A-421-805  Aramid fiber/Netherlands - 7,121,070 (153,560) (7,943) 1,027,367 - 
A-428-201  Ball bearings/Germany 7,506,014 23,499,893 6,394,952 4,613,618 7,583,602 20,850,712 
A-428-203  Cylindrical roller bearings/Germany 7,225,640 9,951,095 3,567,701 4,592,228 6,378,469 26,451,117 
A-475-818  Pasta/Italy 17,533,483 4,674,035 1,792,345 1,549,947 6,124,402 5,748,606 
A-549-813  Canned pineapple/Thailand 1,792,483 530,693 5,394,993 1,658,695 3,065,874 1,409,609 
A-559-201  Ball bearings/Singapore 6,871,336 50,988 61,580 - - - 
A-570-504  Petroleum wax candles/China 18,317,982 69,536,244 3,325,043 51,391,920 21,523,740 1,609,741 
A-570-840  Manganese metal/China - 6,274,365 - - - - 
A-570-848  Crawfish tail meat/China - 7,468,892 9,763,987 8,183,566 2,198,146 4,545,131 
A-580-809  Circular welded nonalloy steel pipe/Korea 2,730,659 2,269,488 464,129 5,982,092 646,956 525,094 
A-580-812  DRAMs of 1 megabit and above/Korea 5,117,438 14,413,121 1,823,572 11,946,020 176,194 1,032,265 
A-588-015  Television receivers/Japan 24,311,452 9,016,052 (111,534) 197,019 264,943 - 
A-588-054  Tapered roller bearings <= 4 inches/Japan 731,926 7,894,347 18,188,461 1,874,270 2,177,014 1,612,061 
A-588-201  Ball bearings/Japan 51,447,879 55,266,544 39,419,202 35,358,173 47,810,802 40,090,301 
A-588-604  Tapered roller bearings over 4 
inches/Japan 
5,176,911 14,378,990 33,740,298 15,695,328 14,552,104 2,366,033 
A-588-807  Industrial belts/Japan 7,525,799 2,710,171 601,579 5,118,547 1,420,261 4,021,479 
A-588-835  Oil country tubular goods/Japan - 7,130,662 1,699,066 1,167,223 76,454 1,707,963 
A-588-845  Stainless steel sheet and strip/Japan 6,636,053 19,694 4,697,297 3,945,532 3,598,564 5,616,517 
  Total amount disbursed  231,201,891  329,871,464  190,247,425  284,044,599  226,051,863 379,981,933 
  Total certified claims 1,189,592,904,866 1,416,828,122,356 1,187,504,594,797 1,948,769,519,521 3,217,704,150,597 3,248,848,697,167 
  % Disbursed 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.001 0.01 
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In December 2000, nine WTO members, the EU, Australia, Brazil, Chile, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Thailand, brought complaints about CDSOA to the WTO, 
being followed in May 2001 by Canada and Mexico. These countries claimed that 
CDSOA is inconsistent with following WTO elements: Antidumping Agreement, 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and other WTO obligations. The 
WTO reached the conclusion that CDSOA is not consistent with the US WTO 
obligations as it creates a “specific action against” dumping and subsidization and it gives 
an incentive for domestic producers to file or participate in antidumping and countervail 
petitions. The US agreed to comply with the WTO ruling. The compliance period expired 
on December 27, 2003, but US did not change or repeal the law. Thus, in January 2004, 
eight complainants, Brazil, Chile, EU, India, Japan, Korea, Canada and Mexico, asked 
the WTO Dispute Settlement for the right to retaliate. The rest of the complainants, 
Australia, Indonesia and Thailand, extended the compliance period for US until 
December 27, 2004.  
 
WTO gave authorization to the eight members to impose additional import duties on US 
exports in an amount equal to 72% of the CDSOA disbursement for the preceding year 
based on the amount of AD or CV duties collected on that member’s products each year. 
Thus, on May 1, 2005 the EU and Canada started to apply an additional 15% customs 
duty on certain products from US. In particular, the EU imposed retaliatory duties on 
certain apparel, binders and notebooks, crane trucks, sweet corn and wire spectacle 
frames, while Canada imposed its duties on live swine, ornamental fish, oysters, as well 
as certain cigarettes and fish items. On August 18, 2005, Mexico decided to start 
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applying additional duties of 30% on some prepared milk products, 20% on wine and 9% 
on chewing gum, while on September 1, 2005, Japan began imposing 15% additional 
duty on 15 categories of US goods: seven types of ball bearings, three types of flat-rolled 
steel products, navigational instruments, machinery accessories, printing machines, 
forklift trucks and industrial belts. The remaining four members might suspend the 
concessions, while the three members that did not request the right to retaliate have 
entered into agreements with US, for which they will not ask for the suspension of 
concessions, but will keep the right to retaliate at any point in the future (Grimmett and 
Jones, 2005). 
 
There are many supporters of CDSOA in the US Congress. Even more provisions to the 
law were introduced to ensure the full liquidation of the collected duties. At the same 
time, there are many members of Congress who are opposed to CDSOA and want to 
repeal the law.  In response to their efforts to repeal the law in 2004 and 2005, more than 
half of the Senate Appropriations Committee members were against the repealing the 
law. As a result, on April 26, 2004, US negotiators partially complied with the demands 
of the CDSOA supporters by proposing to the WTO that negotiators should consider “the 
right of WTO members to distribute monies collected from antidumping and 
countervailing duties” as part of Doha Round (Grimmett and Jones, 2005). However, on 
February 1, 2006, the Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act, which includes a provision that repeals the CDSOA starting October 2007.  
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There are contradictory opinions regarding the CDSOA among economists and policy 
makers. Some believe that CDSOA increases economic efficiency, while others think it is 
worth a small amount of inefficiency to preserve US industries and jobs affected by 
“unfair” trade. 
 
The first criticism brought against CDSOA is that there will be a greater incentive for 
domestic industries to petition for an AD investigation. This might occur for two reasons. 
First, the tariff revenue distributed to firms would increase the total benefit of filing a 
petition and, thus, it is more likely that a set of firms will have positive net benefits from 
funding the AD petition. The second reason is related to the way the funds are 
distributed. As the duties are distributed only among the firms that actively supported the 
petition, Byrd would likely diminish the free rider problem when petitions are launched. 
The data suggest that the number of AD cases did not increase (2000 – 35 cases, 2001 – 
92 cases, 2002 – 35 cases, 2003 – 35 cases, 2004 – 34 cases)23, but the average 
proportion of firms participating in a petition increased from 40.4 % between 1980 and 
2000 to 46.3 percent following passage of Byrd Amendment (2001-2003) (Olson, 2005).  
 
CDSOA can also encourage inefficient production. As the distribution of benefits is 
unequal within an industry, some firms have an advantage over the other domestic, as 
well as global, competitors. Usually an AD petition is filed by less efficient firms in the 
industry, and, thus, the duties are distributed among these specific firms, which would 
normally increase their production. This increase in production might also lower the 
                                                 
23 Of course, there are many reasons why petitions are launched. Hence, the role of the Byrd Amendment 
cannot be determined, ceteris paribus.  
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market price and, as result, output of other firms in the industry would decrease. Thus, 
the more efficient firms in the industry would be adversely affected, while the inefficient 
ones receive a benefit and increase production (CBO, 2004). Another argument 
explaining possible inefficient production is that since a firm is qualified for 
disbursement only if it manufactures the same particular product, the firm might produce 
the specific good longer than it is efficient to do so instead of allocating resources for the 
production of alternative products (Grimmett and Jones, 2005). 
 
CDSOA also increases transaction costs. By increasing the incentive for firms to file AD 
cases and by adding the costs associated with the distribution of duties, the total social 
cost increases. 
 
Another negative aspect pertaining to Byrd is retaliation by other countries, which affect 
the interests of US exporters. Finally, Byrd discourages the settling of cases by private 
negotiation because, with an investigation, they would get protection as well as the duty 
revenues, while with suspension agreements they only get protection. If the effect is 
either good or bad for the US economy is unclear. In any case, a positive effect is 
represented by the fact that AD duties are sometimes so high that they can force the 
foreign firms out of the US market, while with a settlement agreement the foreign firms 
usually remain in the market. Further, with a settlement agreement, the rent obtained 
from the price increase remains with the foreign producer, while in case of an 
investigation, the rent goes to the US government as duty revenue.  
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A secondary effect of implementing Byrd Amendment is represented by an increased 
incentive of the trade lawyers to follow up the cases in favour of the domestic producers.  
In the US, it is common for law firms to undertake cases where their fees are entirely 
determined by a pre-specified share of the settlement (i.e. their income is determined 
solely by their ability to obtain a monetary settlement for their clients). The trade lawyers 
may, hence, be directly interested in their financial reward when presenting the case in 
front of ITC. Further, the trade lawyers might encourage domestic producers to file 
petitions.  
 
Based on the general discussion in this section, the purpose of the next section is to give 
an overview of what is happening in one AD case and to see whether this specific case is 
in some way legitimate or whether it is an expression of protectionist actions.  
 
3.5 Case study – the US case against Durum wheat and Hard Red Spring wheat from 
Canada 
Since the early 1990s, imports of Canadian durum and spring wheat have been a concern 
to wheat producers in the northern US. They claim that the Canadian wheat imports are 
highly subsidized and this affects the prices of the local grains in a negative way. The 
complains of the US producers are aggravated by the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), 
which they consider it has special market powers and financial guarantees by the 
Canadian government, and by certain Canadian import rules and regulations that 
discriminate against imports to the benefit of Canadian wheat producers. On the other 
hand, Canada maintains that its grain import practices and CWB export practices comply 
with WTO obligations and international trade rules. These disputes led to various 
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investigations initiated by US trade officials pertaining to Canadian wheat trading 
practices and the CWB (Schnepf, 2004). 
 
3.5.1 Industry characteristics 
Hard Red Spring Wheat (HRS) is one of the three classes of hard wheat, having the 
highest content of protein and gluten relative to the other two classes, Hard Red Winter 
(HRW) and Hard White (HW). HRS is valued as it can be blended with lower-protein 
wheat to be milled into premium bread flour. Durum wheat, on the other hand, is also a 
type of hard, high-protein wheat, but it is valued because it is the only wheat class that 
can be milled into semolina and can be processed into various pasta products. Therefore, 
the two classes of wheat have a significant premium price over the other wheat types. 
Most of the Canadian production of HRS and durum wheat occurs in the Prairie 
Provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta), while US production takes place in the 
northern states (Minnesota, Montana, North and South Dakota and Washington).  
 
The big difference between the HRS and durum industries in the US and Canada is 
represented by the way in which the products are marketed: in the US, grain is marketed 
through producer cooperatives and trading companies, while in Canada, the Canadian 
Wheat Board (CWB) has the exclusive right to buy and sell western Canadian wheat and 
barley (Schnepf, 2004). 
 
The US is the world’s biggest exporter of wheat, while Canada is the world’s leading 
exporter of HRS and durum wheat. Imports of wheat into the US are, in general, small, 
approximately 3% of total US supplies each year, and most of the imports are represented 
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by HRS and durum from Canada. As Figure 3.8 indicates, almost all US imports of HRS 
and durum wheat are from Canada (Olson24).  
 
Figure 3.8 Imports of durum and hard red spring wheat 
 
Source: Olson, K., “Dumping in agriculture. Case studies in antidumping. Case study: wheat” 
 
The increasing trend of imports of HRS and durum wheat from Canada, starting in the 
early 1990s: from 330,000 metric tons in 1989 to over 2.4 million metric tons (mmt) in 
1994/1995 and having an average of over 1.8 mmt since then, has been considered very 
disruptive by the US border states’ producers, especially in periods of low prices. The 
growth in agricultural trade between the two countries can be explained by many factors 
such as the 1989 Free Trade Agreement between US and Canada, policy changes and 
different macroeconomic factors (e.g. exchange rate).  
 
Production of durum wheat in the US has decreased in the period prior to the 
antidumping petition from 110 million bushels in 2000/2001 to 79 million bushels in 
                                                 
24 http://nw08.american.edu/~reynolds/ 
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2002/2003. The same situation could be observed in case of HRS, domestic production in 
the US has decreased from 502 million bushels in 2000/2001 to 357 million bushels in 
2002/2003. At the same time imports of Canadian durum and HRS have increased. The 
imports of HRS wheat rose from 41 million bushels in 2000/2001 to 46 million bushels in 
2001/2002, afterwards falling to 11 million bushels in 2002/2003, while durum imports 
increased from 12 million bushels in 2000/2001 to 18 million bushels in 2001/2002, 
afterwards decreasing to 13 million bushels in 2002/2003 (Figure 3.9). 
 
Figure 3.9 US Imports of Durum and Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada 
 
Source: Olson, K., “Dumping in agriculture. Case studies in antidumping. Case study: wheat” 
 
The market share of Canadian HRS in the US rose from 12.8% in 2000/2001 to 15.9% in 
2001/2002, dropping sharply to 5.8% in 2002/2003. A similar trend could be observed for 
Canada’s share of the US market for durum wheat, it increased from 18% in 2000/2001 
to 29.3% in 2001/2002, falling back to 20.8% in 2002/2003 (Olson25). 
 
                                                 
25 http://nw08.american.edu/~reynolds/ 
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As can be seen in Figure 3.10, the average import price of HRS wheat from Canada fell 
in the period prior to the antidumping petition. As a result, the price received by the US 
producers decreased from $2.94 per bushel in 2000/2001 to $2.89 per bushel in 
2001/2002, which does not seem to be a significant decline. It increased dramatically, 
however, in 2002/2003 to $3.84 per bushel.  
 
Figure 3.10 Average import price of durum and HRS wheat from Canada 
(Calculated unit price per kilogram) 
 
Source: Olson, K., “Dumping in agriculture. Case studies in antidumping. Case study: wheat” 
 
Durum prices followed an opposite trend , as the average import price has increased in 
the period prior to the antidumping petition and, as a result, the price received by the US 
farmers rose from $2.66 per bushel in 2000/2001 to $4.04 in 2002/2003 (Olson26).  
 
3.5.2 The antidumping case against Canadian wheat 
On September 13, 2002, the North Dakota Wheat Commission, the Durum Growers 
Trade Action Committee and US Durum Growers Association filed an AD and a CVD 
                                                 
26 http://nw08.american.edu/~reynolds/ 
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petition with both the ITC and ITA claiming that the US market was materially injured or 
was threaten to be injured by subsidized and less than fair value (LTFV) imports of 
Canadian durum and hard red spring wheat. The period under investigation was July 1, 
2001 – June 30, 2002. On November 25, 2002, the preliminary decision of the ITC was 
that wheat producers in the US were being materially injured by the Canadian imports of 
durum and HRS wheat, thus letting the investigation to move forward (USITC, 2003).  
 
On May 8, 2003, the ITA released its preliminary determination that durum wheat and 
HRS from Canada were being, or likely to be, sold at less than fair value on the US 
market. The temporary antidumping duties established by ITA were 8.15% for each 
exporter, CWB and all others, in the case of durum wheat and 6.12%, again for CWB on 
one side and all the other exporters on the other side, for HRS wheat. The dumping 
margin is calculated as the difference between the normal value and the export price. In 
the case of durum wheat and HRS wheat, the ITA calculated the normal value based on 
the Canadian home market sales data as the merchandise was sold in sufficient quantities 
in home market and there is no particular market situation that prevents a proper 
comparison with the export price. When the normal value is calculated using domestic 
prices, the ITA compares the domestic prices to the average cost of production in the 
country under the investigation. As there were more than 56,000 HRS wheat producers in 
Canada, the ITA developed a methodology to calculate a representative cost of 
production and constructed value for the merchandise under consideration. The ITA 
stratified producers of HRS wheat by all relevant soil types within each major producing 
province, calculated a simple average of the costs of production within a stratum and, 
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further, it weight averaged the amounts per stratum based on each stratum’s delivered 
tons. As some of the 27 Canadian producers that were selected for the calculation of the 
cost of production did not provide the necessary information to calculate the average cost 
of production, ITA was obliged to use “facts otherwise available” to calculate the cost of 
production of these specific producers27. As CWB was the largest exporter to US of the 
specific merchandise during the investigated period, the ITA used CWB as a sole 
respondent in the HRS wheat investigation. More than 20% of the CWB’s HRS home 
market sales were at prices less than the average cost of production and, thus, these sales 
were excluded from the calculation of the normal value.  
 
The ITC final ruling of October 20, 2003 regarding the AD investigation was that the US 
market is materially injured by the Canadian imports of hard red spring wheat, but not by 
durum wheat. The reasoning of ITC behind the decision not to impose dumping duties on 
durum wheat was that as the import price of durum wheat from Canada was, generally, 
higher than the price charged by the domestic producers, the volume of durum wheat 
imports from Canada could not depress the domestic price. The ITC established that the 
lower net returns of the US domestic industry in 2001/2002 was caused by decreases in 
governmental payments and increases in total expenses (Olson28). The final 
determination of ITA was that the imports of hard red spring and durum wheat are sold in 
the US at less than fair value (LTFV), injuring domestic producers. Thus, the final 
weighted-average dumping margin calculated and imposed on durum wheat was 8.26% 
                                                 
27 WTO Standard: In cases in which any interested Member or interested party refuses access to, or 
otherwise does not provide necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the 
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of 
the facts available. (AD Agreement, Art. 6.8; SCM Agreement 12.7) 
28 http://nw08.american.edu/~reynolds/ 
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and on HRS was 8.87%. However, AD duties were imposed only on Canadian imports of 
HRS wheat, as ITC did not find that durum wheat was materially injuring the US market 
(USITC, 2003). 
 
On November 24, 2003, the CWB filed a request for panel review with the US Section of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Secretariat. On June 7, 2005, a 
NAFTA dispute settlement panel directed the ITC to reconsider the affirmative material 
injury determination regarding the Canadian exports of HRS wheat to US. There were 
different reasons why the panel asked for a reconsideration:1) they considered that ITC 
made a mistake in finding that the volume of subjects imports was significant; 2) there 
was not enough evidence regarding price underselling and price suppression; 3) there was 
not enough evidence for finding that Canadian imports led to the price drop in the period 
2000/2001 and 2001/2002; 4), they believed that the ITC did not compare the prices at 
the same level of trade; 5) the ITC did not consider other factors that could be causing 
injury to US producers. 
 
In the review the ITC used as purchase prices of domestically produced and imports of 
HRS wheat, the prices reported by US millers. The ITC has determined that the Canadian 
HRS is not significantly underpriced. Thus, on October 2005, the ITC determined that the 
domestic industry was not materially injured or threaten to be injured by the Canadian 
imports of HRS wheat. As a result, the US removed the antidumping duties on Canadian 
imports of HRS wheat. 
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Each step of an AD case (pre-investigation, investigation, post-investigation) affects the 
behaviour of the domestic and foreign firms in different ways. Further, the costs and 
benefits of an AD case play an important role in deciding whether or not to participate in 
a petition. Consequently, the AD literature will be reviewed in the next section.  
 
3.6 Literature review 
The literature on AD is extensive because of the widespread use of AD protection. 
Blonigen and Prusa (2001) review the growing literature on AD. They divide the 
literature on AD into three broad categories related to different phases of the trade policy: 
pre-investigation, investigation and post-investigation.  
 
Prusa and Skeath (2001) found in an empirical study that the increasing trend that is 
observed in AD petitions can be explained by both economic and strategic motivations. 
The economic motives pertain to “unfair” trade and “special protection”. The “special 
protection” is defined by Bagwell and Staiger (1990) as a tool utilized by countries to 
limit the expansion of imports or exports for the sensitive industries that would occur as a 
result of tariff-reduction obligations imposed by trade negotiations. The set of strategic 
reasons considered in their study can be classified as “club” and “retaliation” motives. 
The traditional users of AD protection are considered club members, while “retaliation” 
refers to AD petitions that are filed against countries that had previously investigated 
them. The empirical results showed that both, the economic and strategic motives, are 
important for traditional users of AD, while for the new users the strategic reasons are the 
most important.  
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Blonigen and Prusa (2003a) argue that the cost of AD protection is much higher than that 
suggested by standard tariff analysis for two reasons: first, the administrative reviews that 
adjust the AD duties and, second, the altering of profit maximizing behaviour by 
domestic and foreign firms in order to influence the AD outcome. They argue that in 
addition to the loss in welfare arising from the administrative reviews, which is outlined 
in Gallaway et al. (1999), there are other costs of AD duties that are difficult to observe 
and estimate: the possibility of retaliation, the way in which an AD protection in the 
upstream industry affects the downstream industries and the domestic industry’s rent-
seeking cost. They review the literature on how AD distorts the non-cooperative 
outcomes29. Their review concentrates mostly on how firms can manipulate the dumping 
margin and the injury determination, which provide almost diametrically opposite 
incentives to alter strategic behaviour. Regarding the manipulation of the dumping 
margin that is calculated based on a price method, the domestic firm can increase the 
output in a Cournot game, driving down the domestic common price and, as a result, the 
foreign firm’s exports. On the other hand, if the foreign firm determines the export price 
which is used in the calculation of the dumping margin, it can have incentive to raise 
prices and, as a result, the domestic firm can raise the price as well, hurting the domestic 
welfare (Ethier and Fischer, 1987; Fischer, 1992 and Reitzes, 1993). As to injury 
manipulation, Hillman et al. (1987) considered employment as strategic variable, firms 
hiring an excessive number of workers in period 0 and firing them in period 1.  
Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001) show that firm’s product quality choice may be 
                                                 
29 The non-cooperative outcome literature is concentrated on “the link between decisions and the prospect 
of AD protection as internal to the firm” (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003a, pp. 239), while the cooperative 
outcome literature is focused on different ways in which AD law can lead to collusions among firms 
(Blonigen and Prusa, 2003b). 
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affected. Several papers looked at the relationship between the threat of AD protection 
and voluntary export restraints (VER). Anderson (1992, 1993) examined the case when 
the causality runs from VERs to AD duties, which leads to an outcome called “domino 
dumping”, meaning that the foreign firms are encouraged to dump in order to start an AD 
case that will lead to a VER. The motive is the capture of the quota rents that are 
available in the VER. Kolev and Prusa (2002) examined the case when the causality runs 
from AD to VERs and found that the efficient and inefficient foreign firms form a pool 
and voluntarily restrain their exports in period 1, which leads the AD authorities to 
impose a very low AD duty for efficient firms and very high ones for the inefficient 
firms.  
 
In terms of the question of how a cooperative outcome would be influenced by AD, there 
are several theoretical papers showing how the AD law can lead to the collusion among 
domestic and foreign firms. Prusa (1992) answered the question of why there are so many 
antidumping petitions withdrawn in the US. He outlined the fact that the firms that are 
participating in an AD case are exempt from antitrust actions according to a US legal 
principle called Noerr-Pennington, thus opening the door for private settlements between 
the domestic and foreign firms once an AD case has been initiated. Using a bargaining 
model, he showed that the firms would prefer settlements rather than AD duties and, 
hence, to withdraw cases.  
 
Another body of literature looks at how the AD process and the imposition of an AD duty 
affect domestic and foreign country welfare, trade volume and the prices. The effect of 
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AD duty on welfare, given that most of the studies use computable partial and general 
equilibrium models, are the ones obtained in case of an ad-valorem tariff. Some features 
of AD law, however, are complex. The administrative review is one example. As in the 
administrative review, the ITA recalculates dumping margins, DeVault (1996) has shown 
that many foreign firms raise prices, the dumping margins are lower in the administrative 
reviews and AD duties can be avoided. Gallaway et al. (1999) found that while the 
welfare loss on the US economy from AD and CVD duties was $209 million annually, 
the real welfare loss ranges from $2 to $4 billion annually because of how much the AD 
duties declined over time as a result of the administrative reviews.  
 
Lee and Jun (2002) review the five effects that AD petitions and duties have on trade that 
are outline by the literature: the first degree of in terrorem (the first order of 
investigation) effect or trade destruction effect, which represents the direct impact of 
raising the tariff on imports into the subject country; the trade diversion effect, which is a 
side-effect of the AD protection, representing the rising in the value of exports from non-
petitioned competitors to the country that initiated the AD petition; the second degree of 
in terrorem (the second order of investigation) effect which is also a side-effect of AD 
protection and means the reduction of the value of exports by the non-petitioned to the 
country that initiates the AD petitions; the trade deflection effect, which is another side-
effect of AD protection, arising because the petitioned country shifts exports to other 
markets to make up for the market lost in the original importing country; and the trade 
depression effect, again a side effect that means that the non-petitioned firms will 
decrease their exports to the petitioned country. Another effect of AD investigation and 
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duty imposition is tariff-jumping by foreign firms. Haaland and Wooten (1998) and 
Vandenbussche, Veuglers and Belderbos (1999) show that domestic producers can be 
worse off because of increased domestic competition if the foreign firms locate in the 
protectionist country to avoid AD protection.  
 
The effects of AD duties and investigations on prices is that the price paid by the 
consumers in the protectionist country increases. Boltuck (1987) derived the market 
conditions that would determine how much the foreign firm raises its export price and/or 
lowers its home price to decrease the AD duty when the dumping margin is calculated as 
the difference between the foreign firm’s export price and the domestic price.  
 
The area of trade policy with oligopolistic industries has been widely researched. Most of 
the literature on strategic trade policy under oligopoly has assumed that the firms within a 
country are symmetric such that either they have the same marginal cost of production or 
they are of the same size. However, Helpman and Krugman (1989) have outlined that 
there is a need for models of strategic trade that would consider heterogeneous firms. 
Thus, Collie (1993) has shown that under asymmetric oligopoly, trade policy has a 
rationalization effect that does not occur in a symmetric oligopoly. The rationalization 
effect depends on the convexity of demand and the variation of the industry’s output. The 
author is analysing the effect of an export subsidy. In a later paper, Collie (2006) showed 
that the ad valorem and specific trade policy instruments such as import tariffs and 
production subsidies have similar rationalization effects as an export subsidy. An ad 
valorem production subsidy has an additional negative rationalization effect compared to 
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a specific production subsidy. On the other hand, Van Long and Soubeyran (1997) have 
shown that in case of an asymmetric oligopoly such that the firms have different marginal 
costs, in the determination of the optimal trade policy a major importance is played by the 
Herfindahl index of concentration and the elasticity of the slope of demand. One of their 
results is that in case of a convex demand curve, an export subsidy shifts the domestic 
concentration in favour of lower cost firms and if the concentration index is high, the 
efficiency gain will be higher than the loss resulting from a fall in price. In case of a 
concave demand, an export tax would be optimal. 
 
A number of authors have discussed the collective action problems. Rodrik (1986) had 
shown in a Nash lobbying game that the well-established proposition that subsidies are 
superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non-economic objective can be reversed 
as long as the endogeneity of the distortion or non-economic objective is allowed. Van 
Long and Soubeyran (1996) analyzed the relationship between the degree of 
heterogeneity of a pressure group, demand conditions and the total lobbying expenditures 
for tariff protection, in non-cooperative and cooperative games. They concluded that in a 
non-cooperative setting, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of domestic firms 
increases the total lobbying expenditures under specific sufficient conditions, while in a 
cooperative game, there is a positive correlation between heterogeneity and lobbying 
expenditures if the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is negative. Hillman, Van 
Long and Soubeyran (2001) looked at an oligopolistic industry in non-cooperative and 
cooperative settings where firms allocate resources between lobbying for quantitative 
import restrictions and internal cost-reducing activities. They showed that under non-
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cooperative lobbying, the ranking of firms’ profitability is reversed when lobbying 
opportunities are available as long as either the monitoring technology exhibits increasing 
returns or the demand curve is locally convex. They explained this result by the evidence 
of free riding in a non-cooperative lobbying. As in cooperative lobbying there is no free 
riding, the reverse situation does not appear. Bandyopadhyay, Park and Wall (2004) have 
concentrated on lobbying for domestic export subsidies and have concluded that greater 
domestic cost heterogeneity leads to a higher subsidy level and a larger domestic market 
share. Regarding the effect of cost heterogeneity on the welfare, the results are 
ambiguous, showing that for a near symmetric situation, the increased heterogeneity 
reduces domestic welfare if the number of domestic firms exceeds a critical number, 
while for a farther from symmetric situation, the relationship is reversed.  
 
Conlon and Pecorino (2004) outlined that lobbying is characterized by activities that are 
aimed to influence different policies (e.g. tariffs, quotas, tax policy etc.), while rent 
seeking is represented by a set of activities that would lead to obtaining rents for 
particular agents, given existing policies (e.g. competing for import licenses etc.). Thus, 
free riding is an important problem in case of lobbying as all the firms in the industry 
would benefit from a tariff or a quota, for example, and not just the firm that lobbied for 
it. On the other hand, in case of rent seeking, only one agent gets an import licence, for 
example, the licence being denied to the others. Thus the benefits of rent seeking are rival 
and excludable and free riding does not occur.  
 
 207
Some authors have studied the relationship between lobbying and free-riding. The 
general conclusion that they found is that lobbying for non-excludable goods suffers from 
free-riding mainly when the firms play non-cooperative games. Grossman and Helpman 
(1996) showed that the sunset industries are better at overcoming the free rider problem 
associated with interest group politics than the sunrise industries. They explained their 
result on the observation that firms in a sunset industry are not new entrants who can free 
ride on the efforts of those with the sunk investments, which is the opposite in case of 
sunrise industries.  
 
Pecorino (1998) analyzed the relationship between industry concentration and free riding 
in a repeated tariff lobbying game where cooperation is maintained through a trigger 
strategy. His results contrast with the previous findings such that there is no presumption 
that it is becoming more difficult to maintain cooperation as the number of firms in the 
industry rises. In a subsequent paper, Pecorino (2001) studied again the relationship 
between industry concentration and free riding. In a non-cooperative lobbying game, his 
results showed that only the largest firm lobbies for protection and that only the size of 
the largest firm influences the equilibrium tariff. However, the effect of an increase in the 
market share of the dominant firm on the cooperation is ambiguous. On the other hand, in 
a repeated game, the size distribution among the fringe firms affects the ability to 
maintain cooperation, such that cooperation is easier to be maintained when there are 
only few fringe firms than when there are many small fringe firms.  
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Sandler and Hartley (2001) looked at problems of collective action, developing 
expenditure reaction functions. They considered the case of national defence, considered 
as a pure public good, and showed that small and poor allies free ride on the large and 
rich allies in NATO (exploitation hypothesis). The free riding is a consequence of the 
defence spilling, which replaces the need for the ally’s self-provision of defence. In the 
case of a standard pure public good model, they showed that the exploitation hypothesis 
might arise, indicating that the defence burdens are shared in a disproportionate fashion. 
They also considered a joint product model of alliances, where there are private benefits 
among allies, but public within an ally. In this case, they showed that the exploitation 
hypothesis loses its relevancy and the disproportionality between allies’ defence burdens 
dissipates. 
 
Mao and Zaleski (2001) showed that free riding is a function of industry concentration 
and the rate of return on lobbying. They developed a cooperative game theory model in 
which the firms lobby the government for tariff protection. In case of low rate of return 
on lobbying, free riding will decrease as industry concentration increases. When the 
lobbying expenditures have high rates of return, free riding is decreasing even in the less 
concentrated industries. 
 
In Magee (2002), the tariffs are determined endogenously through a Nash bargaining 
model between an industry lobby and the government. He showed that the free rider 
problem becomes more severe when industry concentration decreases. He also 
considered another three situations: the rent obtained from the lobbying game is received 
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by the industry, case in which an increase in the number of firms makes cooperation 
easier to maintain; a large part of the rent goes to the industry, which leads initially to 
easier cooperation in case the number of firms increases below a critical value, but 
afterwards the free rider problem becomes more stringent; and a large fraction of the 
lobbying rents is captured by the policy maker, case in which an increase in the number 
of firms makes cooperation more difficult. 
 
Baylis and Furtan (2003) looked at the link between federalism, rent-seeking and free-
riding behaviour. They considered the case of the dairy industry in Canada, which is 
regulated through production quotas, administered pricing schemes and import tariffs. 
They showed that the federalist framework for Canadian agriculture creates the potential 
for underinvestment in rent seeking. Further, they estimated reaction functions for 
provincial rent seeking expenditures, testing whether the provinces cooperate, act 
independently or free ride on each other. They showed that the Canadian provinces that 
have less to lose from a change to the supply management system in the dairy industry 
free ride on the expenditure of the larger provinces. Provinces free ride when lobbying 
the federal government for supply management rents.  
 
The relationship between anti-dumping/countervailing duties and the free-riding in 
lobbying activities is not well studied. The paper by Herarder and Pupp (1991) is based 
on the microeconomic factors that might affect the decision of a representative firm in the 
steel industry and not on the macroeconomic situation. Macroeconomic factors cannot 
accurately reflect the economic performance of some industries. The authors take into 
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account the fact that the benefits of antidumping and countervailing duties have the 
characteristics of a public good. The results show that an increasing relationship between 
the expenditure on anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases and the potential benefits 
of the trade action does not exist, indicating that firms have the potential to free ride. 
They also show that the sectors that can control the free riding problem the best will get 
the highest protection; and not the sectors that are most injured by imports. 
 
Olson (2004) estimates a structural model of rent-seeking by firms and her focus is on the 
free riding phenomenon. She used data on 157 countries and 447 four-digit 1987 
Standard Industrial Code (SIC) industries in the manufacturing sector for the period 
1980-1996. She also empirically studied the possibility of an industry reaching a 
settlement agreement with the foreign competitors. The empirical results obtained in this 
study are that the industries with more firms and more concentrated industries are having 
greater problems in overcoming the free riding problem. The author found that there is a 
directly proportional relation between the trade protection level and political factors, 
including the number of firms that chose to lobby the government for protection. Olson 
(2005) conducts an empirical analysis to see whether the introduction of the Byrd 
Amendment increased the level of rent seeking in the US. The study concentrates on two 
questions: whether the introduction of Byrd Amendment led to an increase in the number 
of AD cases and in the average proportion of the industry filing a petition. She used data 
at the four-digit SIC level on AD filings by over 350 US manufacturing industries 
between 1980 and 2003. A Zero Inflated Poisson model was used to estimate the 
determinants of number of antidumping petitions and the results confirm that more 
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petitions are filed under Byrd by traditional AD users. An Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression was used to estimate the proportion of the industry that files a petition and the 
results confirmed that the Byrd Amendment gives firms an incentive to contribute to the 
filing of a petition, thus mitigating the free rider problem. 
 
Chang and Gayle (2006) developed a non-cooperative game with homogenous firms to 
examine the economic effects of Byrd Amendment. They concluded that if Byrd 
disbursements are related to the volume of imports, for more competitive markets than 
Cournot equilibrium, Byrd may increase the foreign imports, while if the market is less 
competitive than a Cournot, Byrd acts as an instrument of trade protectionism.   
 
On the other hand, Ichino and Wong (2001) considered that there is a difference between 
political lobbying and a petition for administered protection. According to them, in 
administered protection, the level of protection is not related to the resources spent on 
filing a petition, thus the agents cannot influence directly the decision in an AD case and 
the size of the AD duty. They studied the decision to file a petition for administered 
protection considering that the protection that the agents get is a public binary good. The 
authors concluded that as long as the probability of protection is independent of the 
number of petitioners, there will be no free riding only if the individual benefit from 
protection is fairly small, such that no firm is willing to file a petition by itself. 
Otherwise, when the benefits-costs ratio increases, there will be free riding.  
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The focus of the rest of this chapter is on the relationship between the firms’ participation 
in an AD case and the characteristics of the AD benefits. The main issue that is analyzed 
whether there is free riding in an AD case and whether the free riding decreases as a 
result of Byrd amendment.  
 
3.7 Research methodology 
This part of the chapter discusses the research method utilized to study the behaviour of a 
firm in case of an AD petition. It will show that for AD cases, there is a possibility of free 
riding. Following the seminal paper of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), who analyzed the 
economics of alliances, this chapter will show that in AD petitions as well, the 
“exploitation hypothesis” will occur. The “exploitation hypothesis” is defined by Olson 
and Zeckhauser (1966) as the disproportionate sharing of burdens in an alliance, 
dependent on a pure public good, which leads to the possibility of free riding by the small 
allies on the large allies. Firstly, AD petitions will be considered a pure public good with 
non-rival and non-excludable benefits. The AD benefits are non-rival when one firm’s 
consumption of a unit of benefits does not subtract from the consumption opportunities 
available to the other firms in the industry from the same unit. The AD benefits are non-
excludable as they are accessible to all firms in the industry and they cannot be provided 
just to the petitioners. In this case, it is expected that the free riding will be high. 
Secondly, the AD petitions are considered a joint product, with public and private 
features. This situation can be applied only in case of US because of the Byrd 
Amendment. Thus, when firms lobby for AD protection, except the benefits that all firms 
in the industry get from the imposition of a tariff, the petitioners or the supporters of a 
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petition will share the AD duty collected under certain circumstances. Therefore, the 
firm-specific benefits represent an incentive for firms to participate in the lobbying 
process, and, thus, the free rider problem would diminish.  
 
However, the AD statistics (Table 3.6) show that before year 2000 when Byrd was 
amended, free riding was taking place.  
 
Table 3.6 The number of firms in the industry and the number of petitioning firms:  
1990-2000 
 The number of petitioning firms 
Number home firms in the industry 1 firm All firms Some firms 
1 firm (19 cases) 19 cases - - 
2 firms (16 cases) 11 cases 5 cases - 
3 firms (17 cases) 14 cases 2 cases 1 case 
4 firms (11 cases) 8 cases 1 case 2 cases 
5 firms (12 cases) 6 cases 1 case 5 cases 
6 to 10 firms (31 cases) 9 cases 0 cases 22 cases 
More than 10 firms (40 cases) 4 cases 0 cases  36 cases 
 Source: Yasu Ichino and Kar-yiu Wong, 2001 
 
As it can be observed in Table 3.6, when the number of firms in the industry is small, the 
petition is typically filed by 1 firm, while when the number of firms in the industry is 
large, more firms would join the petition, but not all of them. This situation can be 
explained by the fact that in industries with a small number of firms, the gains from 
protection that one firm receives are large enough to cover the petitioning cost. On the 
other hand, for industries with a large number of firms, the firms jointly file petitions as 
 214
the individual gain from protection is not large enough to cover the petitioning cost. As 
Table 3.6 shows, in all situations there is evidence of free riding.  
 
According to Olson (2005), the average proportions of firms participating in a petition 
increased from 40.4 % between 1980 and 2000 to 46.3 percent following the passage of 
Byrd Amendment (2001-2003) (Table 3.7). 
 
Table 3.7 Proportion of firms filing Antidumping petitions 
 Share of petitions filed
Between 1980 – 2000 
Share of petitions filed 
Between 2001-2003 
0.00<Proportion<0.25 36.7 17.0 
0.25<Proportion<0.50 35.7 51.9 
0.50<Proportion<0.75 12.3 18.5 
0.75<Proportion<1.00 15.6 12.6 
Source: Olson, K.M., 2005 
 
In this theoretical model, it is assumed that the firms in the industry play a non-
cooperative (Cournot-Nash) game. According to Shy (1995), “an outcome is said to be a 
Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player would find it beneficial to deviate provided that all 
other players do not deviate from their strategies played at the Nash outcome.”30 As the 
Cournot-Nash game is characterized by simultaneous moves, the conjectural variation is 
zero, meaning that each firm assumes that the other firms would continue producing the 
same level of output no matter how it behaves.  
 
                                                 
30 Shy, O. (1995), Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications, Published by Cambridge, Mass. MIT 
Press, pp. 18. 
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It is a two-stage lobbying game of protection with heterogeneous firms, which is solved 
using backward induction. Thus, in the second stage, given the AD duty, the domestic 
and foreign firms set their output levels by playing a Cournot-Nash game. In the first 
stage, the domestic firms play the non-cooperative lobbying game that determines the AD 
duty rate. Hence, in each stage, a Nash equilibrium is obtained for the specific sub-game.  
 
It is assumed that there is a market for a homogenous product in the home country with 
the following demand function 
 
)Q(PP =              (3.1) 
 
where P represents the price, while Q is the total output supplied on the home country 
market. The usual assumption is that the demand is downward sloping, thus 
 
0<)Q('P              (3.2) 
 
The home country (domestic) market is supplied by m domestic firms and m* foreign 
firms. Considering that the individual output for a firm i is qi, the total quantity supplied 
on the domestic market is: 
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It is considered that the unit cost of production for a firm i is constant and it is denoted by 
iΘ . By assuming a constant marginal cost of production, the output decisions in the 
domestic market are independent of the output decisions in the foreign markets.  
 
Thus, following Van Long and Soubeyran (1996), in the second stage of the game, each 
firm, domestic and foreign, maximizes its profit taking into account that the exports to the 
domestic market are subject to a specific AD duty, which is denoted by t. The objective 
function for a domestic firm is represented by: 
 
m1,2,...,i      ,q*])Q(P[max iii
qi
=Θ−=Π          (3.4) 
 
while the objective function for an exporter is: 
 
*
jjj
q
mm 1,...,mj    ,q*]t)Q(P[max
j
++=−Θ−=Π         (3.5) 
 
These are unconstrained maximization problems. The Cournot equilibrium is represented 
by m+m* equations, which are the first order conditions (FOC) for the maximization 
problems: 
 
m1,2,...,i          ,)Q(P)Q('Pq ii =Θ=+          (3.6) 
 
  *jj mm,...mj   ,t)Q(P)Q('Pq ++=+Θ=+ 1         (3.7) 
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The profit functions are maximized if the second order conditions (SOC) hold: 
 
*
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By adding up all the FOC, Eq. (3.6) and (3.7), for the domestic and foreign firms, the 
total quantity supplied on the domestic market can be found: 
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Eq. (3.9) shows that the equilibrium quantity supplied on the domestic market is a 
function of the sum of the unit costs and the total AD duty that is collected from the 
exporting firms. Hence, the total quantity supplied can be written as: 
 
)tm(QQ *s +Θ=           (3.11) 
 
This result is in agreement with the theorem of Bergstrom and Varian (1985), which 
states that the equilibrium quantity in Nash equilibrium is independent of the distribution 
of the unit costs, being a function only of the sum of the unit costs.  
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Based on the FOC, some comparative statistics can be carried out. By totally 
differentiating Eq. (3.9), the relationship between the Cournot equilibrium output and the 
AD duty rate is obtained. Hence, 
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The denominator of expression (3.12) is negative, due to Hahn stability condition (Hahn, 
1962). According to Hahn, a sufficient condition for stability of a Cournot equilibrium 
with respect to a natural adjustment process is that the marginal revenue of each firm 
should decrease as the output of any other firm increases. Thus, it is assumed that the 
outputs are strategic substitutes, meaning that the reaction functions are downward 
sloping. Hence, a well known result is obtained, as the AD duty increases, the 
equilibrium total output decreases.  
 
Based on the effect of the AD duty on the total equilibrium output supplied on the 
domestic market, the relationship between the profit of the domestic firms and the AD 
duty can be found. From Eq. (3.6), the output of a domestic firm is: 
 
'P
)Q(P
q ii −
Θ−=           (3.13) 
 
Thus, the equilibrium profit for a domestic firm i is equal to: 
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Knowing that the total quantity Q is a function of the AD duty rate t, the change in the 
individual domestic firm profit for a unit change in the AD duty rate is: 
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According to SOC, expression (3.16) has a negative sign. Thus, from Eq. (3.12), (3.15) 
and (3.16), it follows that any domestic firm would gain from an increase in the AD duty.  
 
Based on the profit function found in stage II, stage I of the game can be solved. In stage 
I lobbying is introduced, meaning that the domestic firms can lobby the governmental 
organizations (e.g. ITC) that are responsible for resolving the AD cases, to put in place 
and to raise the AD duty.  As Herander and Pupp (1991) have shown, the ITC’s injury 
decision is not dependent only on the prescribed injury criteria, but also on the 
effectiveness of the industry coalition. Hence, lobbying plays an important role in the 
decision of protecting a market against foreign producers.  
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Stage I of the game will be analyzed in two situations. Firstly, the benefits of the AD 
petition are purely public. Thus, all the firms in the industry will benefit from the 
imposition of an AD duty and not only the domestic firms that are paying the lobbying 
cost. It is expected that this situation will be characterized by a high level of free riding. 
Secondly, the benefits of an AD petition are considered a joint product. Hence, all the 
firms in the industry will benefit from the imposition of the trade restriction, but only the 
firms that will actively participate in the lobbying process would share the AD duties 
collected. It follows that the domestic firms would have an additional incentive to 
participate in the AD cases. Thus, it is expected that in this situation the free riding will 
decrease.  
 
Stage I of the game is played only among the domestic firms. As was outlined in the 
previous part of this chapter, to obtain a favourable decision, the AD case must be first 
initiated. According to the antidumping and countervailing legislation, a petition can be 
initiated only if a number of firms with a total specific market share sign the petition. 
Thus, m1 represents the domestic firms that are necessary to sign the petition in order for 
the case to be accepted. In this model, it is considered that there always will be m1 firms 
that are initiating the petition and, therefore, they participate in the lobbying action. The 
rest of the domestic firms, m2 (m-m1), called fringe firms, will decide according to the 
petitioning benefit-cost ratio and the probability of winning the case if they will 
participate or not in the lobbying action.  It is assumed that the firms are normally 
distributed with respect their marginal cost of production. As the firms with the highest 
market share or the most efficient firms are gaining the most from restricting trade, it is 
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assumed that the m1 firms that are initiating the petition are the most efficient ones, thus 
they always have lower marginal costs than the fringe firms.  
 
By having two domestic firms, one with a low cost of production and the other one with 
high cost of production, it can be shown that the low cost firm will always produce more 
than a high cost firm. Let i be the low cost firm, with iΘ the marginal cost of production, 
and j be the high cost firm, with jΘ marginal cost of production. Using Eq. (3.13), it 
follows that: 
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As jΘ is greater than iΘ  and P’ is negative, the sign of the expression (3.17) is always 
positive, thus a petitioner will always produce more than a fringe firm. 
 
In Stage I of the game, the firms decide simultaneously how much to pay for lobbying. 
Let’s consider that an initiating (petitioner) firm would incur sli lobbying costs, while a 
fringe firm would have sfj lobbying costs in case he participates. The AD duty, t, is an 
increasing function of the total lobbying cost s, where  
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Hence, it is postulated that: 
 
0(s)t"  0,(s)t'  ),s(tt <>=          (3.19) 
 
Expressions (3.19) show the normal assumptions that the marginal effectiveness of 
lobbying expenditure is positive, but diminishing. When there are no private benefits, the 
objective function of a petitioner is: 
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where Ni is the net profit, )),t(Q( ii ΘΠ is the firm’s Cournot equilibrium profit from 
Stage II and t stands for )ss(t
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. This is an unconstrained maximization 
problem. In maximizing the net profit, a firm takes into account only its own lobbying 
expenditures as in a Cournot equilibrium there is no conjectural variation, meaning that 
the firm conjectures that the other firms will not change their output in response to a 
change in its own output level. The necessary condition for maximizing Ni is: 
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For maximization of net profit, expression (3.21) always equals 0 as it is assumed that the 
petitioners certainly are participating in the lobbying action, thus sli>0. The necessary 
condition for maximizing Ni can be rewritten as: 
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It is assumed that SOC holds 
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and thus, there is an unique positive solution, sli, that maximizes the net profit of firm i.  
 
On the other hand, a fringe firm will maximize, with respect its own lobbying 
expenditures, sfj, the following net profit function, taking into account the non-negativity 
constraint: 
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where again, )),t(Q( jj ΘΠ is the Cournot equilibrium profit found in Stage II.  
The necessary condition for maximization is: 
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The complementary slackness condition says that for sfj>0, the equality for the 
maximization necessary condition holds, meaning that in case a fringe firm participates in 
the petition, there is an equilibrium lobbying cost that would maximize its net profit 
function. If sfj=0, the first condition in expression (3.25) will always be less than 0, 
meaning that when a fringe firm does not participate in a petition, 0 is the equilibrium 
lobbying cost that would maximize its net profit function and, as a consequence, the firm 
free rides. Considering only the situation where sfj>0, the necessary condition for 
maximization can be rewritten as: 
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It is assumed that the SOC holds and, hence, there is a unique Nash equilibrium lobbying 
cost. As Eq. (3.22), the FOC for a petitioner, always holds, the question is in which 
situations Eq. (3.26), the FOC for a fringe firm, would hold. The circumstances under 
which the necessary condition for maximization of net profit for a fringe firm would hold 
can be found by equalizing the two FOCs. Thus, it is obtained that: 
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As it was shown before, the quantity produced by a low cost firm, qi, is always higher 
than the quantity produced by a high cost firm, qj. Therefore, qi-qj is always positive. 
Expression (3.27) equals 0 only when 'P)qq("P ji 2++ is 0. According to the stability 
condition for a Cournot equilibrium, 
 
0<+ "Pq'P i            (3.28) 
 
0<+ "Pq'P j            (3.29) 
 
By adding up the two stability conditions, the following inequality is obtained: 
 
02 <++ "P)qq('P ji           (3.30) 
 
Based on the heterogeneity of firms and the stability condition, the equality expressed in 
Eq. (3.27) can never hold, showing that there is no lobbying cost for a fringe firm that 
would maximize its net profit. It can be concluded that in case of having only public 
benefits, all the fringe firms will free ride and the petition will be supported financially 
only by the minimum number of firms necessary to initiate a petition.  
 
Considering the situation under Byrd Amendment, the analysis would include the private 
benefits expressed as a function Bi. The private benefits are dependent on the individual 
lobbying cost. Thus, 
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The assumption about the private benefit function is that it is increasing in the firm’s 
lobbying cost, but diminishing. The private benefit would be different for each firm 
depending on their market share, the losses that they suffer as a result of dumping and the 
size of the imports. However, all these factors are represented by the individual lobbying 
cost assuming that the firms with the higher losses or larger market share would have 
more interest in winning the AD case than the smaller firms.  
 
Thus, the objective function of a petitioner is the maximization of the net profit function 
including the private benefits: 
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where, Ni is the net profit function for firm i, )),(( ii tQ ΘΠ is the Cournot’s equilibrium 
profit found in Stage II, t stands for )(
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li sst and Bi is the individual private 
benefit. This is an unconstrained maximization problem as well. The necessary condition 
for a petitioner to maximize its net profit is: 
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As the m1 firms will initiate the AD petition, the FOC will always be binding, meaning 
that there is always an equilibrium individual lobbying cost, sli, that maximizes the net 
profit function for firm i. Assuming again that SOC holds, meaning that 
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there will be an unique positive lobbying cost that maximizes the net profit function of 
firm i.  
 
Also, a fringe firm will maximize its net profit function taking into account the non-
negativity constraint, which can be written as: 
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where Nj is the ,net profit function for a fringe firm, )),(( jj tQ ΘΠ is the equilibrium 
profit found in Stage II, t stands for )(
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li sst and Bj represents the private benefit 
for the fringe firm j, which is a function of the individual lobbying cost.  
 
The necessary condition for profit maximization for a fringe firm is: 
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Therefore, if sfj=0 is the lobbying cost that maximizes the net profit for a fringe firm, the 
necessary condition for maximization will never be binding and all the fringe firms will 
free ride. In case sfj>0, the FOC will be binding and there will be an equilibrium lobbying 
cost for the fringe firm that would maximize the net profit function. By assuming that the 
second order condition holds, the equilibrium will be unique. Knowing that equation 
(3.33), FOC for a petitioner, will always hold, as the initiators of the petition will at all 
times pay for lobbying, the conditions under which Eq. (3.36), FOC for a fringe firm, will 
hold can be found. The specific conditions are obtained by equating the two FOCs. Thus, 
it can be concluded that the fringe firms for which the condition: 
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holds will not free ride. Having a closer look at the non-free riding condition, it can be 
rewritten as: 
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As it was shown before, the firm with the low cost of production will produce more than 
a firm with high cost of production and, thus, knowing that firm i, one of the petitioners, 
has a lower cost of production than firm j, one of the fringe firms, qi-qj will always be 
positive. The expression ]'2)("[ PqqP ji ++ is negative due to stability condition, t
Q
∂
∂  
was shown as being less than 0, while t’(.) is positive according to the assumptions of the 
model. Thus, the first term of expression (3.37), which represents the additional marginal 
public benefit of lobbying that a petitioner receives compared to a fringe firm, is always 
positive. By assumption, the private marginal benefits of lobbying for a petitioner and a 
fringe firm,
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and 
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∂
, are positive. 
 
The fringe firms for which the private marginal benefit equals the sum between the 
marginal private benefit of a petitioner and the additional public benefit of a petitioner 
compared to the fringe firm, will not free ride. Hence, it can be concluded that there will 
be some fringe firms for which the marginal private benefit would be high enough to 
represent an incentive for them to participate in the lobbying action. Thus, the free riding 
will be reduced in comparison with the situation where the AD duty has only public 
benefits.  
 
Based on the non-free riding condition, some conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
relationship between the heterogeneity among firms and the possibility of free riding. 
Thus, the non-free riding equality can be expressed as: 
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Hence, 
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which has a positive sign, meaning that if the heterogeneity of firms increases, the 
marginal private benefits for a fringe firm should be higher in order for the firm not to 
free ride. Thus, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of domestic firms would lead 
to more free riding among the fringe firms. It can be concluded that only the fringe firms 
with marginal cost of production close to the petitioners’ marginal cost of production will 
find it beneficial not to free ride. 
 
Since our concern is more on Stage I problem, the second stage can be simplified by 
considering, as special case, a linear inverse demand function. Thus, the price can be 
written as: 
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For a linear inverse demand function, the Cournot equilibrium quantity that would be 
supplied on the domestic market becomes: 
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where m represents the number of domestic firms, m* is the number of exporters, t is the 
AD duty rate and ∑+
=
Θ=Θ
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. As was shown in the general case, )tm(QQ *s +Θ=  
and the relationship between the total quantity supplied and the AD duty rate is negative 
being equal to: 
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The individual profit for a domestic firm equals: 
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and the change in the individual profit for a change in the AD duty rate is positive being 
equal to: 
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Moving further into the first stage of the game, in case where the AD duty has only 
public benefits, it is found that the fringe firms for which the condition 
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holds, will not free ride. As it is assumed that the firms are normally distributed with 
respect their marginal cost of production and a petitioner will always have a lower 
marginal cost of production than a fringe firm ( ji Θ<Θ ), the non-free riding condition 
never holds, the conclusion that was expected as the general case has led to the same 
result.  
 
In case where the benefits of an AD petition have the characteristics of a joint product, 
the non-free riding condition becomes 
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where iΘ and jΘ are the marginal costs of production for a petitioner and, respectively, a 
fringe firm with iΘ < jΘ , t’(.) represents the marginal AD duty rate with respect to the 
lobbying expenses, while 
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 are the marginal private benefits of lobbying a 
petitioning and, respectively, a fringe firm.  
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By substituting the first derivative of the total quantity supplied with respect the AD duty 
rate by expression (3.43), the non-free riding condition can be re-written as 
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where m1 is the number of firms that initiate the AD petition, while m2 is the number of 
fringe firms, with m1+m2=m being the total number of domestic firms. Being a specific 
case of the general analysis carried out before, the same conclusion is obtained, meaning 
that a fringe firm will not free ride, as long as its marginal private benefits of lobbying 
equals the sum between the marginal private benefits of a petitioner and the additional 
marginal public benefits gained by a petitioner compared with a fringe firm.  
 
Regarding the relationship between free riding and heterogeneity of firms, the main 
conclusion is that as firms become more heterogeneous, the incentive to free ride grows, 
thus the fringe firms that are close in terms of marginal cost of production with the 
petitioning firms will have more incentive not free ride.  
 
Based on the non-free riding condition obtained in case of a linear inverse demand 
function, some conclusions about how a change in the number of firms will affect the 
possibility of free riding can be drawn.  
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Thus, if the market is less competitive than Cournot, by considering just two domestic 
firms, one petitioner and one fringe firm, and one exporter, the fringe firm will not free 
ride on the lobbying expenses of the petitioner if 
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If the fringe firm has a much higher marginal cost of production compared to the 
petitioning firm, it will require a large market share and, thus, a sufficient level of private 
benefits to compensate for the additional marginal public benefits and the marginal 
private benefits of the petitioner in order not to free ride. Alternatively if its marginal 
private benefits are low, which makes an investment in lobbying unprofitable, the result 
is a decision to free ride. 
 
If the fringe firm has a low marginal cost of production in comparison with that of the 
petitioning firm, the chances of getting sufficiently high private benefits for the firm to 
decide to participate in the lobbying process are much higher than in the first situation 
where the difference in the marginal costs of the two domestic firms is large.  
 
As the market becomes more competitive than is the case under a Cournot situation, the 
individual private benefits would decrease as according to Byrd Amendment, the 
disbursements are divided among the petitioning firms. Thus, for less concentrated 
industries, the incentive to participate in an AD case would decrease. 
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Moving further to a situation of a perfectly competitive market characterized by an 
infinite number of domestic suppliers, any of the firms will be too small to influence the 
price or to have any market power. In this case, either all firms will participate in the 
lobbying process or none of them will as their costs and public or private benefits from 
lobbying would be the same.  
 
To summarize, the results obtained in this chapter, first, when an AD petition is 
considered to have only the characteristics of a public good, only the set of the most 
efficient firms necessary to initiate the petition will participate in the lobbying process, 
while all the others will free ride and, second, in the case that the AD petition has both, 
public and private characteristics, some other firms, in addition to the ones necessary to 
initiate the petition, will pay for lobbying. The non-free riders are represented by 
domestic firms with a marginal cost of production close to the petitioner’s marginal cost 
of production.  
 
As outlined in the previous section, the literature on AD is quite extensive, but the 
decisions taken at the firm level regarding the possibility of participating in an AD 
investigation is not much studied. The research that addresses this issue is, for the most 
part, concentrated on empirical findings (Herander and Pupp, 1991; Olson, 2004) or on 
simple theoretical models based on different strong assumptions, as for example 
considering that all firms in the industry are homogenous (Chang and Gayle, 2006). 
Some of the literature does not consider the AD petition as a lobbying activity, while 
other authors believe the opposite. The model developed in this chapter is novel, in the 
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sense that, to my knowledge, there is no other study that models an AD investigation as a 
lobbying game of protection with heterogeneous firms. As outlined before, it is a two-
stage game, solved using backward induction. In the second stage, the domestic and 
foreign firms play a Cournot-Nash game and set their output levels given the AD duty, 
while in the first stage, the domestic firms play a non-cooperative lobbying game 
determining the AD duty rate. Thus, the model combines the literature on administered 
protection, lobbying and free riding. Another important feature of the model is that the 
firms are assumed to be heterogeneous. Heterogeneity among firms is an important 
determinant of the group’s influence on economic policies. Most of the literature 
considers, for the sake of simplicity, identical agents, but the cost of this assumption is 
not small when taking into account endogenous policies. The model can also be used 
when analyzing the effects of other trade policies such as tariffs, countervailing duties, 
export taxes, etc. It can also be easily applied when studying different domestic policies, 
by considering only domestic firms. Thus, by bringing together knowledge related to 
different economic and trade policy issues and by being kept simple enough to be used in 
analyzing the effects of different other policy instruments, the theoretical model 
developed in this chapter represents an important contribution to the literature on trade 
policy.  
 
3.8 Data and possible empirical methodology 
A possible empirical analysis would use firm level data on antidumping filings by US 
manufacturing industries between 1980 and 2003. From all the manufacturing industries, 
the steel industry would represent the best selection for empirical investigation for two 
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reasons. The first motive is that the steel industry has seen the largest number of AD 
petitions and, second, most of the micro level data are available. The database from 
Olson provides a list of all petitions filed by industries, the proportion of firms filing the 
petitions, including the four-digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC) for the period 1980-
1997 and the six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for the 
period 1998-2003 and the disbursements for each petitioner. This database can be 
supplemented using information from the Global Antidumping database for the period 
1980-2003 with the firms that participated in each petition. Using the Standard & Poor 
Compustat for North America database, the yearly employees’ number and sales for each 
individual firm can be partially identified. The database contains a total of 1031 AD cases 
for the period 1980-2003 in the entire manufacturing sector, 430 cases being filed only in 
the steel industry. Out of the total 430 cases filed in the steel industry, 66 petitions took 
place in the period 2001-2003, after Byrd was passed into law.  
 
The firm specific data that should be considered in the study are the individual firm AD 
costs and individual firm AD benefits. The expected costs of filing a petition per firm 
include payments to lawyers, economists and other consultants that prepare the petition, 
the presentation for the ITC and the responses to comments of opponents of the petition. 
The task of each firm’s group that deals with a petition – hereafter termed counsel team – 
depends on the number of contributing firms. The collective cost of preparing and dealing 
with a petition – hereafter counsel costs – depends in general on the complexity of the 
case. In addition usually one counsel team will be hired by several firms which will share 
the counsel costs. As a result, the counsel costs of an individual firm decline with the 
 238
number of contributing firms. The privacy of information, however, does not allow any 
direct calculation of the costs associated with an AD case. Herander and Pupp (1991) 
reported that per firm costs can range between $50,000 and $150,000 per case – but this 
was 20 years ago. Olson (2005) suggested that the expected cost consists of two terms: 
the average cost of participating in a petition, which decreases with the number of firms 
and another term that allows contributions to vary with the size of the firm. Thus, the 
average cost is the same for each participating firm while the individual firm costs are a 
function of the size of the firm. As a result, a proxy can be used for the individual cost of 
participating in a petition (for example the size of the firm expressed by the number of 
employees). 
 
The expected benefits per firm can be calculated as the summation of three factors: the 
profits accruing to a firm when the government imposes a duty as, for example, the 
greater the share of product production, the greater the benefits, which will be a function 
of the number of firms participating in a petition (more firms can provide more political 
pressure for higher protection); the disbursements that the firm gets after the Byrd 
amendment came into force; and, as in Olson 2005, expected benefits that are known 
only by the domestic industry; i.e. factors that contain private information about potential 
growth in the market or future cost changes. As there are no firm level data available on 
the benefits accruing to individual firms except for the disbursements under Byrd, the 
variable can be approximated by constructions based on different industry characteristics 
such as: growth in industry’s imports, total size of the US market, the size of the 
individual firm and the number of firms participating in a petition.  
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Except for the firm level factors that influence the cost of antidumping, among the 
exogenous variables included in the reaction function, are different industry and 
macroeconomic factors: annual real import levels, growth in capacity utilization, political 
influence (the four firm concentration ration ), real exchange rate, real GDP growth etc.  
 
In order to test whether the free riding has decreased after the introduction of the Byrd 
Amendment, a dummy variable can be used for petitions filed between 2001 and 2003.  
 
An OLS estimation would be used. It is a cross section regression and not in panel form 
as we do not consider yearly values, but the individual cases’ values (each year there are 
several antidumping cases initiated and the same firm can participate in all of them). In 
order to test whether firm i free rides on the petitioning expenses of firm j, the estimated 
coefficient on the expenses should be negative: as the petitioning costs of firm j 
increases, the petitioning cost of firm i decreases.  
 
There are several issues with the firm level data that have to be solved before estimating 
the model. First, regarding the proxy used for the individual firm costs (number of 
employees or sales), there are many missing values. Second, per firm expected benefits 
should be simulated based on the industry and firm characteristics.  
 
The individual firm data collected allow an examination of whether the theoretical results 
hold in reality. One of the main conclusions of theoretical model is that before the Byrd 
Amendment was implemented, a petition was supported financially only by the minimum 
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number of firms necessary to initiate a petition, while all the others would free ride. 
These firms are the most efficient producers in the industry, meaning that they have the 
highest levels of sales. As the firm’s sales are a function of the marginal cost of 
production and by assuming that the individual marginal cost of production is constant, 
the firm that is producing the highest level of sales will have the lowest production cost. 
After the coming into force of the Byrd Agreement, free riding is reduced and for some 
of the fringe firms, the marginal private benefit would be high enough to represent an 
incentive to participate in the lobbying action. 
 
The data that are considered for this exercise are related to the AD cases open in the steel 
industry, specifically for steel works, blast furnaces (including coke ovens) and rolling 
mills (SIC 3312) for the period 1980-1997, and for iron and steel mills (NAICS 331111) 
for the period 1998-2003. By looking at the data, the main question that should be 
answered is whether or not the petitioners are the most efficient firms in the industry. 
During the period 1980 – 2003, there were 351 AD cases open in the steel industry’s 
sectors outlined above, with a total number of 126 petitioners. Among the 126 petitioners, 
9 firms went bankrupt, 16 were purchased or merged with other firms, while for 28 firms 
no information is available. As the individual data are only partially available, it is not 
possible to give a definitive answer.  
 
However, one main characteristic of the data that is available is that the firms that most 
often participated in the AD petitions are either closed or purchased by other firms, 
including Bethlehem Steel Corp., which was once the second largest producer in the US 
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after the US Steel. Is this an indication that the least efficient firms in fact petitioned for 
protection? Firstly, the US Steel, which is the largest integrated producer of steel in the 
US and the seventh largest in the world, participated as a petitioner in most of the AD 
cases opened during the time period 1980-2003. Secondly, while the US steel industry 
prospered during World War II, later on, as a result of non-investment in newer 
technology plus the high benefit concessions given to US steelworkers, the American 
steel producers started to decline in efficiency relative to foreign steel firms. Thus, a high 
percentage of firms went bankrupt and trade barriers were requested to fight competition 
from countries such as Kazakhstan and South Korea. The collapse of Soviet Union 
produced six major steel producing countries – Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
Belarus and Uzbekistan – that have as main goal to produce and export as much steel as 
possible. On the other hand, the emerging economies of Asia, especially China which is 
the world largest producer of steel, have also expanded their exports. The increase in the 
amount of exports pushed the world price of steel down during 1990s. The former Soviet 
Union and the other emerging economies would still find it beneficial to produce steel as 
their production costs were much lower. On top of cost efficiency, the currency 
devaluation in emerging markets gave another boost to exports to dollar economies.  
Another interesting characteristic of the individual data is related to the companies that 
were purchased or merged with other steel producers. Most of the steel producers were 
purchased by firms that were participating as petitioners in AD cases. Being able to 
acquire other firms in such an instable environment might represent an indication of 
efficiency.  
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Thus, it is hard to conclude whether or not the main petitioners are the most efficient 
firms even if they are the largest steel producers in the US. It can be concluded, however, 
that the US steel producers are much less efficient than the foreign competitors from 
different emerging economies. An econometric analysis will be needed to see whether the 
theoretical results hold but sufficient data does not exist to undertake a formal empirical 
investigation.  
 
3.9 Summary and conclusions 
Anti-dumping (AD) actions are legitimate measures permitted under Article VI of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Even if AD was little used in the past, 
its importance has been increasing rapidly. The traditional users of AD measures, the US, 
the EU, Canada and Australia, accounted for more than two thirds of the AD cases 
opened before 1995. After 1995, when the AD Agreement was adopted by the WTO, 
developing countries became more active, filing over half of the AD petitions.  The main 
explanation for the increase in the number of AD cases is related to trade liberalization: 
the reduction and even the elimination of trade policy instruments lead to an increase in 
trade volume, and thus, to more trade tensions. Therefore, AD actions, for the most part, 
became an answer to requests for economic protection, and they are not being used only 
in cases of “unfair” trade practices.  
 
The WTO AD Agreement specifies different guidelines that have to be taken into account 
by each member state when imposing AD measures. However, each country interprets 
the specific guidelines in different ways, leading to considerable variations among AD 
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statutes. In the US, two governmental agencies handle an AD case. These are the ITA and 
ITC. Each of them has a different role to undertake in an AD case, but only if both 
agencies arrive at a positive conclusion will a decision to impose anti-dumping duties be 
taken.  
 
Following the seminal paper of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), who analyzed the 
economics of alliances, this research proves theoretically that even in AD petitions, the 
“exploitation hypothesis” can occur. The “exploitation hypothesis” is defined by Olson 
and Zeckhauser (1966) as the disproportionate sharing of burdens in an alliance 
dependent on a pure public good, which leads to the possibility of free riding by the small 
allies on the large allies. AD petitions are considered a pure public good with non-rival 
and non-excludable benefits meaning that considerable free riding can be expected. The 
indirect benefits of an AD case can be considered a public good because as an AD duty 
increases the price of imports, all the domestic producers will benefit. However, only the 
firms that lobby for protection have to bear the costs, leading to the possibility of free 
riding: a firm will contribute to the AD expenditures as long as the benefits of winning 
the case are higher than the incurred costs taking into account the probability of winning 
the case. 
 
In the second situation considered in this chapter, the indirect benefits of an AD case are 
a joint product, with public and private features. This situation can be applied only in 
case of US because of the so called Byrd Amendment: when firms lobby for AD 
protection, in addition to the benefits that all firms in the industry receive from the 
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imposition of a tariff, the petitioners or the supporters of a petition will share the AD duty 
collected. Therefore, the firm-specific benefits represent an incentive for firms to 
participate in the lobbying process, and, thus, the free rider problem would diminish.  
 
The theoretical model developed in this chapter assumes that the firms in the industry 
play a non-cooperative (Cournot-Nash) game.  It is a two-stage lobbying game of 
protection with heterogeneous firms, which is solved using backward induction. Thus, in 
the second stage, given the AD duty, the domestic and foreign firms set their output 
levels by playing a Cournot-Nash game. In the first stage, the domestic firms play the 
non-cooperative lobbying game that determines the AD duty rate. Hence, in each stage, a 
Nash equilibrium is obtained for the specific sub-game. Some of the assumptions of the 
model are that there is a market for a homogenous product in the home country and the 
unit cost of production for each firm is constant. The result obtained for the second stage 
is the same for both cases studied: the equilibrium quantity that is provided on the 
domestic market by the domestic and foreign producers is independent of the distribution 
of the unit costs, being a function only of the sum of the unit costs. The results of the 
Stage I of the game, the lobbying game played only among the domestic producers, are 
different in the two situations analyzed.  
 
In case of an AD petition with only public benefits, all the fringe firms will free ride and 
the petition will be supported financially only by the minimum number of firms 
necessary to initiate a petition. When considering AD benefits as a joint product, it could 
be concluded that there will be some fringe firms for which the marginal private benefit 
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would be high enough to represent an incentive to participate in the lobbying action. As 
well, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of domestic firms would lead to more free 
riding among the fringe firms. Thus, the fringe firms with marginal cost of production 
close to the petitioners’ marginal cost of production will find it beneficial not to free ride. 
 
The theoretical model developed in this chapter is new and it represents an important 
contribution to trade policy literature. It combines the literature on administered 
protection, lobbying and free riding and it considers heterogeneous firms, which is an 
important determinant of the group’s influence on endogenous economic policies. The 
model can be easily applied when examining the effects of other trade or domestic 
policies.  
 
The theoretical results could not be verified by analyzing the firm level data on AD cases 
opened in the US steel industry – where the best industry level data exists. An empirical 
test of whether the relationship between the free riding and the characteristics of AD 
indirect benefits’ explained by the findings of this theoretical research will have to await 
the collection of better data. 
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APPENDIX A – VARIABLES IDENTIFICATION 
 
Table 3.A.1 Variables identification  
Variable name Description variable 
P Price of product 
Q Total output supplied on home country market 
m Number domestic firms 
m* Number foreign firms 
q Individual output  
θ Individual unit cost of production 
t AD duty 
Π Profit function 
s Total lobbying cost 
sl Individual lobbying cost for a petitioner 
sf Individual lobbying cost for a fringe firm 
N Net profit function 
m1 Number of petitioners (initiators) 
m2 = m-m1 Number of fringe firms 
Bi Private benefits 
a, b  Intercept and slope of a linear inverse demand function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 247
REFERENCES 
 
Anderson, J.E. “Domino dumping I: competitive exporters.” American Economic 
Review 82(1992): 65-83. 
 
Anderson, J.E. “Domino dumping II: anti-dumping.” Journal of International 
Economics 35(1993): 133-150. 
 
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R.W. “A theory of managed trade.” The American Economic 
Review 80 (4)(1990): 779-795. 
 
Bandyopadhyay, S., Park, E.S. and Wall, H.J. “Endogenous export subsidies and 
welfare under domestic cost heterogeneity.” Economics and Politics 16(3)(2004): 
347-366. 
 
Baylis, K. and Furtan, H. “Free-riding on federalism: trade protection and the Canadian 
dairy industry.” Canadian Public Policy  XXIX(2)(2003): 145-161. 
 
Bergstrom, T. and Varian, H. “When are Nash equilibria independent of the 
distribution of agents’ characteristics?” Review of Economic Studies 52(4)(1985): 
715-718. 
 
Blonigen, B.A and Prusa, T.J. “Antidumping.” NBER working paper 8398, 2001. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8398. 
 
Blonigen, B.A. and Prusa, T.J. “The cost of antidumping: the devil is in the details.” 
Policy Reform 6(4)(2003a): 233-245. 
 
Blonigen, B.A. and Prusa, T.J. “Antidumping.” In Handbook of International Trade, 
edited by E.K. Choi and J. Harrigan, 251-287. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2003b. 
 
Blonigen, B.A. “US antidumping database.” 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html. 
 
Boltuck, R.D. “An economic analysis of dumping.” Journal of World Trade Law 
21(1987): 45-54. 
 
Bown, C. P. “Global antidumping database.” Version 2.1, 2006. 
http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/. 
 
Chang, Y.M. and Gayle, P.G. “The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset act: An 
economic analysis.” Southern Economic Journal 73(2)(2006): 530-545. 
 
 248
Collie, D. “Strategic trade policy under asymmetric oligopoly.” European Journal of 
Political Economy 9(1993): 275-280. 
 
Collie, D. “Tariffs and subsidies under asymmetric oligopoly: ad valorem versus specific 
instruments.” The Manchester School 74(3)(2006): 314-333. 
 
Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress (CBO). “Economic analysis of the 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset act of 2000.” Report prepared for 
Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives, 2004. 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5130&sequence=0. 
 
Conlon, J.R. and Pecorino, P. “Policy reform and the free-rider problem.” Public 
Choice 120(2004): 123-142. 
 
Cornes, R., Hartley, R. and Sandler, T. “Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in 
public good models: an elementary proof via contraction.” Journal of Public 
Economic Theory 1(4)(1999): 499-509. 
 
Das, S.S. Antidumping as a trade remedy measure: Evidence from three countries (US, 
EU and India). Joint DGFT, New Delhi, 2003. 
http://www.ieport.com/articles/index-das.htm. 
 
DeVault, J.M. “Economics and International Trade Commission.” Southern Economic 
Journal 60(1993): 463-478. 
 
Dixit, A. “Comparative statics for oligopoly.” International Economic Review 
27(1)(1986): 107-122. 
 
Ethier, W.J. and Fischer, R.D. “The new protectionism.” Journal of International 
Economic Integration 2(1987): 1-11. 
 
Finger, J.M. Antidumping: How it works and who gets hurt. Ann Arbor, MI: University 
of Michigan Press, 1993. 
 
Finger, J.M., Ng, F. and Wangchuk, S. “Antidumping as safeguard policy.” 
Manuscript, 2000. http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/antidumping/finger.pdf. 
 
Fischer, R.D. “Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior.” Journal of 
International Economics 32(1992): 149-163. 
 
Friedman, L.S. The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis. Princeton University 
Press, 2002. 
 
Gallaway, M.P. Blonigen, B.A. and Flynn, J.E.  “Welfare costs of US antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws.” Journal of International Economics 49(1999): 211-244. 
 249
Grimmett, J.J. and Jones, V.C. “The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act 
(“Byrd Amendment”).” CRS Report for Congress. Order Code RL33045, 2005. 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57503.pdf. 
 
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. “Rent dissipation, free riding and trade policy.” 
European Economic Review 40(1996): 795-803. 
 
Haaland, J.I. and Wooton, I. “Anti-dumping jumping: reciprocal anti-dumping and 
industrial location.” Weltwirtschafyliches Archiv 134(1998): 340-362. 
 
Hahn, F.H. “The stability of the Cournot oligopoly solution.” The Review of Economic 
Studies 29(4)(1962): 329-331. 
 
Hansen, W.L. and Prusa, T.J. “The road most taken: the rise of title VII Protection.” 
The World Economy 18(1995): 295-313. 
 
Harris, B. and Devadoss, S. “Why did the Byrd Amendment not fly with the WTO?” 
The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 6(2)(2005): 226-
250. http://www.esteycentre.ca/journal/j_pdfs/harrisdevadoss6-2.pdf. 
 
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P.R. Trade policy and market structure. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1995. 
 
Herander, M.G. and Pupp, R.L. “Firm participation in steel industry lobbying.” 
Economic Inquiry 29(1)(1991): 134-147. 
 
Hillman, A., Katz, E. and Rosenberg, J. “Workers as insurance: anticipated 
government assistance and factor demand.” Oxford Economic Papers 39(1987): 
813-820. 
 
Hillman, A.L., Van Long, N. and Soubeyran, A. “Protection, lobbying and market 
structure.” Journal of International Economics 54(2001): 383-409. 
 
Ichino, Y. and Wong, K. “Administered protection as a public good.” 2001. 
http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/papers/Yasu.pdf. 
 
Kerr, W.A. “Dumping – one of those economic myths.” The Estey Centre Journal of 
International Law and Trade Policy 2(2)(2001): 211-220. 
http://www.esteycentre.ca/journal/j_pdfs/editors2-2.pdf. 
 
Kerr, W.A. “Dumping: Trade policy in need of a theoretical make over.” Canadian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 54(2006): 11-31. 
 
Kolev, D. and Prusa, T.J. “Dumping and double crossing: the (in)effectiveness of cost-
based trade policy under incomplete information.” International Economic Review 
43(2002): 895-918. 
 250
Knetter, M.M. and Prusa, T.J. “Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: 
evidence from four countries.” Journal of International Economics 61(1)(2003): 1-
17. 
 
Krantz, S.G. and Parks, H.R. The Implicit Function Theorem. History, theory and 
applications. Boston: Birkhäuser, 2002. 
 
Lee, S.Y. and Jun, S.H. “On the investigations effects of the US antidumping petitions: 
a psychological approach.” 2002. 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/econ/seminars/fall02/slee.pdf. 
 
Magee, C. “Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-
rider problem.” Journal of International Economics 57(2002): 449-471. 
 
Mao, W. and Zaleski, P. “The effect of industry concentration on free riding.” Review of 
Industrial Organization 19(2001): 295-303. 
 
McGee, J.S. “Predatory price cutting: The standard oil (N.J.) case.” The Journal of Law 
and Economics 1(1958): 137-169. 
 
Miranda, J., Torres, R.A. and Ruiz, M. “The international use of antidumping: 1987-
1997.” Journal of World Trade 32(1998): 5-71. 
 
Olson, K. “Dumping in Agriculture. Case studies in Antidumping. Case study: wheat.” 
http://nw08.american.edu/~reynolds/. 
 
Olson, K. “Free riders among the rent-seekers: a model of firm participation in 
antidumping petitions.” 2004. http://nw08.american.edu/~olson/. 
 
Olson, K. “Subsidizing rent-seeking: antidumping protection and the Byrd Amendment.” 
2005. Downloaded from http://nw08.american.edu/~reynolds/. 
 
Olson, K. online database. http://nw08.american.edu/~reynolds/. 
 
Olson, M and Zeckhauser, R. “An economic theory of alliances.” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 48(3)(1966): 266-279. 
 
Pecorino, P. “Is there a free-rider problem in lobbying? Endogenous tariffs, trigger 
strategies and the number of firms.” The American Economic Review 88(3)(1998): 
652-660. 
 
Pecorino, P. “Market structure, tariff lobbying and the free-rider problem.” Public 
Choice 106(2001): 203-220. 
 
Prusa, T.J. “Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?” Journal of 
International Economics 33(1992): 1-20. 
 251
Prusa, T.J. and Skeath, S. “The economic and strategic motives for antidumping 
filings.” NBER working paper # 8424, 2001. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8424. 
 
Reitzes, J.D. “Antidumping policy.” International Economic Review 34(1993): 745-763. 
 
Rodrik, D. “Tariffs, subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy.” Journal of 
International Economics 21(1986): 285-299. 
 
Sandler, T. and Hartley, K. “Economics of Alliances: the lessons for collective action.” 
Journal of Economic Literature XXXIX(2001): 869-896. 
 
Schnepf, R. “U.S.-Canada wheat trade disputes.” CRS report for Congress, 2004. 
http://ottawa.usembassy.gov/content/can_usa/wheat_crs_061404.pdf. 
 
Shy, O. Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 
1995. 
 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat for North America database. University of 
Saskatchewan library. 
 
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “FY 2005 CDSOA Annual Disbursement 
Report.” 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/add_cvd/cont_dump/cdsoa_05/fy_200
5_annual_report/2005_annual_disbursement.ctt/2005_annual_disbursement.pdf. 
 
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “FY 2006 CDSOA Annual Disbursement 
Report.” 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/add_cvd/cont_dump/cdsoa_06/fy_06_
report/06_annual_rpt_web.ctt/06_annual_rpt_web.pdf. 
 
US Government Accountability Office (GAO). “International Trade. Issues and Effects 
of Implementing the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act”. Report to 
Congressional Requesters, 2005. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05979.pdf. 
 
US International Trade Commission. “Rules of practice and procedure”. Federal 
Register 63(108)(1998). http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/pubs/701_731/sunrules.pdf. 
 
US International Trade Commission. “Durum and Hard Red Spring Wheat from 
Canada.” Investigation Nos. 701-TA-430A and 430B and 731-TA-1019A and 
1019B (Final). Publication No. 3639, 2003. 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/2002/wheat/fin
alphase.htm. 
 
US International Trade Commission. “Antidumping and countervailing duty 
handbook.” Publication 3750, 2005a. 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/ handbook.pdf. 
 252
US International Trade Commission. “Import injury investigations. Case statistics (FY 
1980-2004).” Washington, DC 20436, 2005b. 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/USITC_Stat_Report-11-04-PUB.pdf. 
 
US International Trade Commission. “Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada.” 
Investigation Nos. 701-TA-430B and 731-TA-1019B (Remand). Publication No. 
3806, 2005c. 
 
US International Trade Commission [a]. “Statutory timetables.” 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/TIMETABL.PDF. 
 
US International Trade Commission [b]. “Trade remedy investigations. Byrd  
Amendment.” http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/byrd.htm. 
 
US International Trade Commission [c]. “Trade remedy investigations. Completed 
investigations.” 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/2002/wheat/fin
alphase.htm. 
 
Van Long, N. and Soubeyran, A. “Lobbying for protection by heterogeneous firms.” 
European Journal of Political Economy 12(1996): 19-32. 
 
Van Long, N. and Soubeyran, A. “Cost heterogeneity, industry concentration and 
strategic trade policy.” Journal of International Economics 43(1997): 207-220. 
 
Vandenbussche, H., Veugelers, R. and Belderbos, R.A. “Undertakings and 
antidumping jumping FDI in Europe.” CEPR discussion paper 2320, 1999. 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/2320.html. 
 
Vandenbussche, H. and Wauthy, X. “Inflicting injury through product quality: how EU 
antidumping policy disadvantages European producers.” European Journal of 
Political Economy 17(2001): 101-116. 
 
Young, L.M. and Wainio, J. “The antidumping negotiations: proposals, positions and 
antidumping profiles.” The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade 
Policy 6(1)(2005): 23-46. http://www.esteycentre.ca/journal/j_pdfs/youngwainio6-
1.pdf. 
 
 
